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ARTICLES 
Redesigning Education Finance: How Student 
Loans Outgrew the “Debt” Paradigm 
JOHN R. BROOKS* & ADAM J. LEVITIN** 
This Article argues that the student loan crisis is due not to the scale of stu-
dent loan debt, but to the federal education finance system’s failure to utilize 
its existing mechanisms for progressive, income-based payments and debt 
cancellation. These mechanisms can make investment in higher education 
affordable to both individuals and the government, but they have not been 
fully utilized because of the mismatch between the current system’s economic 
reality and its legal, financial, and institutional apparatus. 
The current economic structure of federal student loans does not resemble a 
true credit product, but a government grant program coupled with a progres-
sive, income-based tax on recipients. For example, federal direct loans do not 
require the full repayment of all principal and accrued interest. Instead, bor-
rowers have the contractual right to satisfy their obligations by paying only a 
percentage of their income for a fixed period of time. Debt forgiveness is con-
tractually baked into the federal student loan product.  
The education finance system, however, still relies on a legal, financial, 
and institutional apparatus based on “debt,” developed under the pre- 
2010 system, which was based on private loans backed by federal govern-
ment guarantees, rather than the post-2010 system of direct federal lend-
ing with income-driven repayment. The frictions between the legacy legal, 
financial, and institutional “debt” apparatus and the economic reality of 
subsidized finance; progressive, income-driven repayment; and debt for-
giveness are the source of nearly all of the problems in education finance, 
including high levels of default, abusive servicing, and even the very idea 
of a student debt crisis. 
It’s time to call federal student loans what they really are—a tuition 
grant plus an income surtax on students. To this end, this Article pro-
poses a set of targeted reforms: automatic income-based payments using 
a graduated rate schedule; collection through the tax withholding and 
return filing; and replacement of interest accrual with an inflation adjust-
ment. Moving toward a grant-and-tax framework would facilitate 
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substantial reforms to the financing of higher education and help ensure 
that instead of being a debt trap, federal financing facilitates affordable 
higher education.    
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INTRODUCTION 
We live in an age of student debt. Americans owe over $1.5 trillion in student 
loan debt, making it the second largest category of consumer debt behind home 
mortgages.1 
FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT: 2019: Q3, 
at 1, 3 (2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/hhdc_ 
2019q3.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NVK-93ZF]. 
This debt is held by 45 million people,2 
See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., 2018 STUDENT LOAN UPDATE (2018), https://www.newyorkfed. 
org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/xls/sl_update_2018.xlsx [https://perma.cc/XZD5- 
LG34] (showing that 44.7 million people had outstanding student loans in 2017 Q4). 
roughly fourteen percent of 
the population,3 
See id.; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION BY SINGLE 
YEAR OF AGE AND SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2019, at 1 (2020), https:// 
www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2010-2019/national/asrh/nc-est2019-syasexn.xlsx 
[https://perma.cc/6YCE-EXZM]. 
with over half of it owed by consumers under age forty.4 
See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT: MAY 
2020, at 21 (2020), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/xls/ 
HHD_C_Report_2020Q1.xlsx [https://perma.cc/YS7V-A4SL]. In contrast, the population under forty 
has less than a quarter of mortgage and credit card debt and only a third of auto loan debt. See id. 
Eighteen to forty-year-olds were thirty-one percent of the total U.S. population in 2019. See U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 3. 
As a 
result, carrying student loan debt is increasingly a baseline fact of life for young 
people and for our economic and financial system more broadly. 
For many borrowers, student debt is a source of real pain and distress. Over 9 
million borrowers are in default on their loans,5 
See OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DIRECT LOAN PORTFOLIO BY LOAN 
STATUS (2020), https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/PortfoliobyLoanStatus. 
xls [https://perma.cc/T7UA-7WJF] (combining the “Cumulative in Default” figures for Direct Loans and 
FFEL Loans). 
meaning that they have not made 
regular loan payments for nearly a year.6 
Default is defined differently for student loans than for other types of debt. For federal student 
loans, default means either 270 or 330 days of nonpayment depending on the frequency of installments. 
34 C.F.R. § 682.200(b) (2018). For private student loans, 120 days of nonpayment is the typical measure 
of default. See Cheryl Winokur Munk, What to Know About Missing a Student-Loan Payment, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2019, 4:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-to-know-about-missing-a-student- 
loan-payment-11570136084. These are both substantially longer timelines than for mortgages, credit 
card, or auto loan debt, where thirty days is the standard measure of delinquency, and where regulatory 
requirements mandate “charge-offs”—meaning that insured depository institutions cannot carry such 
loans as assets on their regulatory balance sheets—at 90 days delinquent for mortgages, 120 days 
delinquent for closed-end loans, and 180 days delinquent for open-end loans. See Uniform Retail Credit 
Classification and Account Management Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 36,903, 36,904 (June 12, 2000). 
Borrowers in default can face severe fi-
nancial consequences, such as capitalized interest that causes loan principal to 
balloon and loss of eligibility for deferment, consolidation, and most income- 







7. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.204(a)(3) (2019) (defaulted loans not eligible for deferment); id. § 685.209(a) 
(ii) (defaulted loans not eligible for Pay As You Earn plans); id. § 685.209(c)(ii) (defaulted loans not 
eligible for Revised Pay As You Earn plans); id. § 685.210(b)(1) (defaulted borrowers restricted from 
changing repayment plans); id. § 685.219(c)(1)(i) (defaulted loans not eligible for Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness); id. § 685.220 (defaulted loans typically not eligible for consolidation); id. § 685.221(a)(2) 
(defaulted loans not eligible for income-based repayment plans). 
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borrowers,8 and in some states, defaulted borrowers are further punished through 
suspension of professional licenses.9 Some of these borrowers may be perma-
nently financially crippled. 
Not as obviously, increased levels of student loan debt are also harmful to con-
sumers who do not have student loan debt. To the extent that student loan debt 
delays household formation and home purchases, it puts downward pressure on 
home prices, which harms existing homeowners by reducing the value of many 
households’ main asset—home equity.10 Moreover, to the extent that student loan 
debt impairs borrowers’ ability to save for retirement, it threatens to impose a 
greater burden on public resources.11 
Indeed, student loan debt weighs down the entire economy. Because student loan debt service 
reduces consumers’ current ability to buy other goods and services, it reduces the total level of real 
consumption in the economy. Certain types of consumption, most notably of housing, have an economic 
multiplier effect. Every two home purchases generate a new job. Jobs Impact of an Existing Home 
Purchase, NAT’L ASS’N REALTORS, https://www.nar.realtor/jobs-impact-of-an-existing-home-purchase 
[https://perma.cc/GJ3Y-GQCV] (last visited Aug. 5, 2020). In contrast, repayment of a student loan to 
the government has no economic multiplier effect. 
The reliance on debt to finance tuition also 
poses a risk to the viability of the higher education sector as a whole. Student 
loan debt presents a macroeconomic challenge. 
As a result, student debt has also become a first-order political issue. As a pres-
idential candidate in 2016, Senator Bernie Sanders made a tuition-free public col-
lege proposal a centerpiece of his campaign.12 
See Michael Stratford, How Bernie Sanders Would Cancel All Student Loan Debt, POLITICO, 
(June 24, 2019, 4:49 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/24/bernie-sanders-2020-student- 
loan-debt-forgiveness-plan-1296863 [https://perma.cc/Z36K-UVHS]. 
Student loan forgiveness proposals 
as well as tuition-free education proposals further spread throughout the 2020 
Democratic presidential primary, and multiple candidates offered plans for free 
college, debt-free college, student loan cancellation, and more.13 
See, e.g., Carmin Chappell, Here’s How the Democratic Presidential Candidates Plan to Address 
the Student Debt Crisis, CNBC: MAKE IT (July 30, 2019, 4:46 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/30/ 
democratic-presidential-candidates-plans-for-addressing-student-debt.html [https://perma.cc/ZZP6- 
CZSL]. 
These proposals, as well as many academic14 and journalistic15 accounts, pres-
ent the size and scale of student debt as the primary problem. We disagree. The 
8. See Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the Undue Hardship 
Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495, 524–25 (2012). 
9. See Andrew Wagner, The Debate Over Suspending Licenses for Student Loan Defaulters, 26 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES LEGISBRIEF, no. 40, 2018, at 1. 
10. See Jesse Bricker, Lisa J. Dettling, Alice Henriques, Joanne W. Hsu, Lindsay Jacobs, Kevin B. 
Moore, Sarah Pack, John Sabelhaus, Jeffrey Thompson & Richard A. Windle, Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of 
Consumer Finances, 103 FED. RES. BULL., no. 3, 2017, at 1, 18. A higher percentage of households have 
home equity than any other type of asset excluding bank accounts and vehicles, and the median value of 




14. See, e.g., William S. Howard, The Student Loan Crisis and the Race to Princeton Law School, 7 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 485, 485–87 (2011); Adam Looney & Constantine Yannelis, A Crisis in Student 
Loans? How Changes in the Characteristics of Borrowers and in the Institutions They Attended 
Contributed to Rising Loan Defaults, 2015 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 1–2; Roger Roots, 
The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A Lesson in Unintended Consequences, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 501, 501–02 
(2000); Eryk J. Wachnik, The Student Debt Crisis: The Impact of the Obama Administration’s “Pay as 
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See, e.g., Patrick B. Healey, We Should All Be Concerned About the Student Debt Crisis, CNBC 
(Nov. 4, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/04/we-should-all-be-concerned-about-the- 
student-debt-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/DM92-ZQGR]; Hillary Hoffower & Allana Akhtar, 11 Mind- 
Blowing Facts That Show Just How Dire the Student-Loan Crisis in America Is, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 11, 
2019, 11:17 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/student-loan-debt-crisis-college-cost-mind-blowing- 
facts-2019-7 [https://perma.cc/2FAT-AQUT]; John Thune & Mark Warner, Americans Are Drowning in 
$1.5 Trillion of Student Loan Debt. There’s One Easy Way Congress Could Help, TIME: IDEAS (Aug. 27, 
2019, 2:36 PM), https://time.com/5662626/student-loans-repayment/ [https://perma.cc/DT6Z-FYEL]. 
student loan system already has in place mechanisms that allow for progressive, 
income-based payments and debt cancellation that can make the investment in 
higher education affordable both to individuals and to the government. If the 
existing features of the student loan system were fully implemented and utilized, 
there would not be a student debt crisis.16 The problem is that the income-based 
repayment and debt-cancellation mechanisms are poorly implemented and sub-
stantially underutilized. 
The underutilization of these mechanisms highlights that the student loan debt 
crisis is not primarily about the total amount of student loan debt outstanding. 
Instead, it is about the failure of the education finance system to deliver on the 
public policy of affordable—not free—education through federal financial sup-
port. We argue that this failure is fundamentally due to the mismatch between the 
legal and institutional apparatus of student loans and the economic reality of edu-
cation finance. 
Education finance transactions are characterized as loans, that is, as debt obli-
gations that must be repaid. The “loan” characterization and the infrastructure 
that has emerged around it reflect the origins of the modern education finance sys-
tem.17 The system’s development, particularly since the federal government 
became the primary direct lender in 2010,18 has completely divorced the financial 
fundamentals of student loans from those of typical debt arrangements. As a 
result, the terms of federal education loans are today vastly different than those 
for any other kind of debt in the marketplace. 
For example, there is no underwriting of student loans—borrowers get the 
same loan terms regardless of risk factors like major and school, an unheard-of 
situation for most consumer loans. Likewise, the terms of federal student loans 
are much more borrower-friendly than those of private loans. Interest accrual can 
be deferred for substantial periods, and interest often does not compound. And 
critically, borrowers who use one of the Education Department’s income-driven 
repayment (IDR) plans are not obligated to pay off a fixed amount as with a 
you Earn” Plan on Millions of Current and Former Students, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 442, 443 
(2012). 
15. 
16. We mean by this that the individual and aggregate levels of borrowing would not be a crisis. 
There are still many other problems of equity, access, and affordability in higher education, especially in 
terms of racial disparities. 
17. See Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and the Siren Song of Systemic Risk, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
99, 103 (2016) (explaining that the Higher Education Act is built on using credit to promote higher 
education). 
18. See SAFRA Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §§ 2201–2213, 124 Stat. 1029, 1074–81 (2010) (enacted 
as part of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010). 
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typical loan but are instead obligated to pay only a percentage of their income for 
a fixed number of years. 
The terms of federal education loans are so different because the loans do not 
reflect the commercial considerations that underlie normal debt products. Instead, 
they reflect the substantial public policy reasons behind federal education finance 
and public finance in general. They incorporate ideas of progressivity, insurance, 
and ability to pay that are more akin to taxation. For loans under IDR in particu-
lar, the current economic reality of the system would be more accurately 
described as a combination of transfer payments or grants (the funding leg) and 
taxes (the repayment leg): the government makes an up-front grant to pay tuition, 
and in return the borrower is subject to an income surtax for a fixed number of 
years. We refer to this economic reality through the shorthand of grant-and-tax. 
Yet even though the terms of student loans do not look at all like traditional 
loans, they are still accompanied by a vast legal and institutional infrastructure 
based on the “loan” characterization. This infrastructure effectively determines 
the operation of the education finance system. The frictions between the legal and 
institutional apparatus of “loans” and the economic reality of a progressive grant- 
and-tax system generate many of the problems in education finance and are the 
primary source of the student debt crisis itself. 
Abandoning the debt paradigm would undo the disconnect between the lack of 
front-end underwriting on federal student loans and the optional back-end under-
writing in the form of IDR plans. Currently, borrowers take on student loan debt 
without any consideration of their ability to repay.19 The federal student loan pro-
gram then offers generous IDR options that account for a borrower’s ability to 
repay on the back end and provide for substantial debt forgiveness, but this back- 
end underwriting is not automatic. Instead, it requires borrowers to opt in and 
annually recertify eligibility for IDR plans.20 The result is that many borrowers 
are not in IDR plans when they should be, leading to much higher loan payments 
and default rates than necessary and undermining the federal policy of supporting 
affordable education finance. 
Similarly, the institutional structure of debt—including features like interest, 
loan servicing, default, and rehabilitation—is poorly designed to manage a pro-
gram that is fundamentally about progressive and universal financing of higher 
education. Most, if not all, of the problems borrowers face managing their student 
loans are a result of these features, rather than of the affordability of the loan pay-
ments themselves. If the loan program instead adopted the institutional features 
of taxation, especially withholding and graduated payments, borrowers’ well- 
being—and the financial stability of the loan program—would be substantially 
improved. 
19. See Jonathan D. Glater, Law and the Conundrum of Higher Education Quality, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1211, 1215–16 (2018) (describing disconnect between freely available loans and attempts to police 
debt levels after the fact). 
20. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(5)(i)(A) (2019). 
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Additionally, the debt paradigm has encouraged the continued use of private 
loan servicers under contract with the Department of Education to manage bor-
rowers’ accounts. Servicers are borrowers’ sole point of contact and their duties 
include providing borrowers with information about deferment, forbearance, and 
repayment plan options. Loan servicers are chosen by the Department, not by bor-
rowers, and they operate with little oversight and few incentives to ensure that 
consumers are able to take advantage of the most favorable features of federal 
student loans. Instead, servicers are motivated to cut operational costs and lower 
quality of service, even though it often results in suboptimal servicing. As a 
result, borrowers often do not obtain the full benefits of student loans or are 
steered into suboptimal payment plans. Abandoning the debt paradigm for one of 
grant-and-tax would lead to better alternatives, such as automatic income-based 
repayment through the tax system. 
Likewise, under a grant-and-tax paradigm, the anomalous and notoriously 
uncharitable treatment of student loans in bankruptcy would cease to be an issue. 
Moreover, with a grant-and-tax system, there would be no crushing debt burden 
shaping borrower psychology and credit scores, merely a higher future tax pay-
ment for grant recipients with the income to support it. 
The insistence on treating education financing as debt rather than as grants and 
taxes is a legacy of the historical development of education financing from a sys-
tem of private loans backed by federal loan guarantees and subsidies.21 This debt 
framework has persisted, however, even after the wholesale reform of higher edu-
cation financing in 2010, when the federal government became the direct lender 
for almost all student loans and expanded income-based repayment options.22 
The continued use of a debt paradigm is also a symptom of a political culture 
that is averse to transfers and taxes and prefers framing policies in terms of 
arm’s-length contracting. Yet federal student loans hardly resemble any sort of 
arm’s-length transaction.23 This political aversion to taxes and transfers has led to 
the framing of education financing as a matter of contractual debt arrangements. 
Ironically, this very framing created the student debt crisis because of consum-
ers’ and voters’ different perceptions of debt obligations versus tax obligations 
and the different legal status of each. Consumers view debt obligations in terms 
of the amount of principal—the entire amount to be repaid over time. Thus, a 
consumer with $100,000 of student loan debt feels a heavy stone weighing down 
her future. Likewise, journalistic reporting on student loan debt—which frames 
the public policy discourse—focuses on the total stock of indebtedness, some 
$1.5 trillion,24 even though a substantial amount of this sum will not actually 
have to be repaid because of IDR and other forms of debt cancellation. 
21. See infra Part I. 
22. See SAFRA Act §§ 2201–2213. 
23. A similar tendency can be seen in proposals for postal banking to provide low-cost financial 
services, including loans, to the poor instead of transfer payments. See Postal Banking Act, S. 2755, 
115th Cong. § 2(a) (2018). 
24. See sources cited supra note 15. 
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In contrast, tax obligations are viewed in terms of annual flows, and to the 
extent there is periodic tax withholding, the consumer’s actual flows are never 
affected. The sum of an individual’s annual tax payments may be equal, to the 
dollar, to the sum of student loan debt payments, yet because there is no “princi-
pal” owed on taxes, the borrower is not psychologically weighed down by an 
insurmountably large obligation, nor does the marketplace treat her as having a 
balance-sheet liability. Income taxes may be painful, but by definition, they are 
paid only when there is income sufficient to support payment. Moreover, the 
terms on which consumers are able to obtain other forms of consumer credit 
depend on the borrower’s credit report and credit score, not tax liability. If educa-
tion finance were a tax instrument (a flow) rather than a debt obligation (a stock), 
it would not appear on consumer credit reports as a liability.25 
See Kristin Blagg, Laurie Goodman & Kelia Washington, All Five Federal Mortgage Programs 
Should Treat Student Loan Debt the Same Way, URB. INST.: URB. WIRE (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www. 
urban.org/urban-wire/all-five-federal-mortgage-programs-should-treat-student-loan-debt-same-way 
[https://perma.cc/N5FN-LJQC] (discussing flawed attempts by mortgage programs to account for 
IDR when underwriting mortgages). 
In such a situation, 
tax obligations related to education financing would create less of a drag on con-
sumers’ ability to borrow for other purchases, such as mortgages. 
To be clear, taxation comes with its own institutional, budgetary, and rhetorical 
baggage. Moreover, student loans retain a few features of traditional debt that dif-
fer from taxation, particularly that the total principal obligation is capped at an 
amount based on the initial sum borrowed. A purely tax-funded program would 
be more like the Sanders proposal—free college, paid for through actual income 
taxes. Student debt, even with IDR, is similar to tax-funded free college, but it is 
not the same. 
Therefore, the student loan system is actually a hybrid that falls between pure 
debt and pure tax. As such, it demands its own legal category and its own set of 
institutions and practices, taking the most useful and relevant elements from debt 
law and tax law, while jettisoning the most damaging and counterproductive ele-
ments. In particular, student loans should adopt notions from the tax law of auto-
matic enrollment, payroll, and graduated payments among others. The loan 
system should also reject notions of default, loan serving, and interest accrual and 
capitalization from debt and commercial law, though it should continue to treat 
the funds as a credit program of the Department of Education for federal budget-
ary purposes. 
This Article makes several contributions to the scholarly literature. First, we 
present a concise history of student loans that holds out important lessons about 
the nature of higher education financing and why the United States chose debt, 
rather than tax and transfer, as the vehicle of federal funding. We show that the 
United States’ reliance on student loans as a financing instrument was a histori-
cally contingent choice made for political expedience, but that once that choice 
was made, the loan system became a vehicle for the delivery of increasingly 
25. 
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progressive benefits to students. These gradual changes over time ended up fun-
damentally transforming student loans toward the grant-and-tax model we 
describe. 
Second, we show the full extent of the differences between student loans and 
typical debt. The scholarly literature thus far has yet to fully absorb how substan-
tially the IDR plans alter the very nature of the financing instrument, and journal-
istic accounts and public discourse are even further behind. This is not a minor 
point. Student loans are the second largest category of consumer debt26 and the 
largest category of direct government loans by an order of magnitude.27 
The United States makes around $112 billion in new student loans each year. The next largest 
group of direct loans is from the Department of Agriculture, which makes about $12 billion in loans 
each year. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FEDERAL CREDIT 
SUPPLEMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2020: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 1–2 (2019), https://www.govinfo. 
gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2020-FCS/pdf/BUDGET-2020-FCS.pdf [https://perma.cc/LV9J-4MF2] 
(available together with other budgetary materials at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/supplemental- 
materials [https://perma.cc/7DSR-U2UD]). 
That they 
exist in their own legal and institutional universe is of great importance. 
Scholarship, policy, and advocacy must better understand the nature of this trans-
formation, and we hope this Article helps that conversation. 
Third, the Article presents in particular detail—we believe for the first time in 
the scholarly literature—the totality of the complex legal and institutional 
arrangements governing student loans, specifically the loan servicing contracts 
and the unique (lack of) government oversight. It also shows how these institu-
tional details contribute to problems with student loan debt, often frustrating the 
policy goals of the education finance system. 
Fourth, we present a novel set of policy proposals that begin to carve out the 
contours of the new debt–tax hybrid space where student debt already de facto 
resides. Although we would continue to describe student debt as a credit program 
of the U.S. government, we propose four discrete changes to the education 
finance system that would better align it with its economic reality and remedy the 
problems we have identified: we would (1) make IDR the automatic default; 
(2) move collection from private loan servicers to collection by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) through the tax system via withholding and tax return fil-
ings; (3) cap tax liability at the original grant amount, adjusted for inflation, so 
there would cease to be either interest accrual or loan forgiveness; and (4) impose 
a progressive, graduated schedule of marginal repayment rates for the IDR 
income-based payments, instead of the flat percentage used today. Automatic 
IDR combined with graduated repayment rates and inflation adjustment in lieu of 
interest accrual would ensure that education finance obligations are affordable 
and would virtually eliminate the default problem, and a tax-based collection sys-
tem operated by the IRS would be fairer to borrowers than one based on private 
collectors that contract with the Department of Education. We are not alone in  
26. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 1, at 3. 
27. 
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making some of these proposals,28 
See, e.g., SUSAN DYNARSKI & DANIEL KREISMAN, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, LOANS FOR 
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: MAKING BORROWING WORK FOR TODAY’S STUDENTS 5–6 (2013), https:// 
www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links/THP_DynarskiDiscPaper_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XG9N-MR3Q]. 
though unlike those before us, we base our 
proposals not on administrative convenience but on the theoretical relationship 
between student loans and tax payments that we describe here. 
Our proposals are also similar in broad strokes to some ideas for so-called 
income share agreements (ISAs). These instruments provide students with a grant 
in exchange for a commitment to pay a percentage of their income above a mini-
mum threshold for a set number of years, rather than a commitment to repay a 
sum certain, as with a loan.29 (This similarity should not be surprising because 
income taxation itself is essentially a giant income share agreement, in which tax-
payers provide a share of their income to the government in exchange for the ben-
efits government provides.)30 Existing ISA programs are all private, but there are 
calls for the adoption of public ISA programs.31 
See, e.g., JASON DELISLE, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., HOW TO MAKE STUDENT DEBT AFFORDABLE 
AND EQUITABLE 5 (2019), https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/R-0719-JD2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V7XP-F8U6]. 
Like our proposal, public ISAs 
would jettison elements of debt, like interest, while adopting elements of taxation, 
like automatic withholding.32 The main difference between our proposals and 
those for public ISAs is the allocation of “upside” risk, that is, who bears the risk 
that more than the initial grant will end up being repaid and over how many years. 
As discussed below, we are wary of the moral hazard and adverse selection prob-
lems associated with public ISAs if they are used as an option in addition to stu-
dent loans, particularly if they have total repayment caps that greatly exceed 
those of the initial grant. 
A final note before proceeding. This Article focuses on how to redesign and 
reform the current system of higher education finance—a system that relies in 
large part on student fees facilitated by government credit programs using 
income-based payments. We therefore do not take a position on alternative pro-
posals to provide free or much more heavily subsidized higher education through 
increased direct federal funding. Free (or reduced-cost) college that is funded 
through general tax revenues bears some conceptual similarity to our grant-and- 
tax framing, which means that the choice between the two is more a question of 
institutional design than one of public-versus-private funding, but those questions 
are beyond the scope of this Article.33 
28. 
29. In the typical ISA, a party provides up-front capital to pay a student’s school expenses and then 
earns a percentage of the student’s income for a term of years. We distinguish public ISAs—where the 
government provides the funds and earns the income share—from private-sector ISAs, where private 
investors provide the initial capital and earn the return. Private-sector ISAs have substantially different 
economics and are beyond the scope of this Article. 
30. See John R. Brooks II, Fiscal Federalism as Risk-Sharing: The Insurance Role of Redistributive 
Taxation, 68 TAX L. REV. 89, 98 (2014). 
31. 
32. See id. at 6. 
33. For one approach to answering those questions, see John R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment 
and the Public Financing of Higher Education, 104 GEO. L.J. 229, 263–74 (2016). 
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents a brief history of student loans 
that illustrates how education finance has morphed from a program built around 
federal guarantees of private student loans to one of direct federal lending on 
income-contingent terms. Part II turns to the unusual nature of student loan debt 
and how it does not resemble other types of debt obligations in critical ways. Part 
III addresses the problems that arise from treating education finance as a matter 
of debt rather than grant-and-tax. Part IV considers a full shift to a taxation frame-
work, where students would face an income surtax to pay for education. We 
ultimately reject such a shift because the political economy and budgetary impli-
cations of a full transition to taxation would be too onerous. Part V presents 
instead our vision of how education finance could be reframed as a new legal and 
financial category that is a hybrid of debt and taxation and explains why that 
would be helpful in ameliorating the adverse consequences of the rising costs of 
education. It also presents a set of policy proposals that follow from that hybrid 
treatment. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STUDENT LOANS 
Higher education finance is a huge, rich topic with a long history—more than 
can be covered in this brief overview. Higher education in the United States has 
always been paid for with a mix of public, charitable, and individual funds, but 
the particular mix and choice of instruments has varied greatly over the years. 
Here, we focus specifically on student loans as one of those financing instru-
ments, and in particular on how student loans have evolved over time. 
The review that follows shows several important points. First, the United 
States came to rely on student loans for particular political and historical reasons. 
The United States was willing to make direct grants for education to veterans 
and, to a lesser extent, for national security purposes. However, the budgetary 
politics of general education aid was more challenging, forcing Congress to rely 
on loan guarantees, which did not appear as on-balance-sheet obligations for fed-
eral budget purposes, but which were also less generous than direct grants. 
Second, once the loan programs were in place, they became attractive vehicles 
for delivering benefits to students. As tuition costs kept rising, and thus needs of 
students kept growing, Congress made incremental changes to student loans to 
try to lower financial barriers to higher education. Congress made other changes 
to the program because student loans themselves suffered from market failures 
that necessitated an active government role to maintain the system. Fifty years of 
tinkering and expansion of the program led to the enormous levels of student debt 
we see today. 
Third, the incremental evolution of student loan terms caused student loans to 
transform over time in an ad hoc way from being primarily private, traditional 
debt instruments to being essentially a federal transfer program that incorporates 
notions of progressivity, insurance, and ability to pay, while shedding many of 
the traditional features of debt. The debt-financing framework remains, however, 
artificially constraining federal education financing and preventing it from 
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fulfilling its potential. It is that transformation that necessitates the new approach 
we put forward below. 
A. EARLY YEARS OF FEDERAL HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCE 
Although national-government involvement and financial support for higher 
education predates the Constitution,34 federal involvement in higher education is 
typically treated as beginning with the Morrill Land Grant Acts of 186235 and 
1890.36 These Acts provided federal land for the establishment of new public uni-
versities, administered by the state governments. But even with that generous 
subsidy, higher education was still largely paid for out of individual and charita-
ble (including church) funds, and partly as a result, higher education served only 
a small percentage of the population. In 1910, only nine percent of Americans 
aged eighteen to twenty-four attended college; by 1940, the percentage had 
barely risen, to thirteen percent.37 In 1940, student tuition and fees constituted 
about one-third of total revenue for higher education institutions (about fifty per-
cent for private schools and nineteen percent for public).38 In 1947, the 
President’s Commission on Higher Education (the Truman Commission) pin-
pointed high student fees as one of the primary barriers to higher education and 
focused much of its attention on ways to bring the fees down—just as we still do 
today.39 
In the pre- and immediate post-World War II years, charitable contributions 
(especially for private schools) provided some aid to families who could not 
afford college fees,40 but there were relatively few options beyond that. Some 
institutions offered loans to their students to make up the difference, but they do 
not appear to have been heavily utilized.41 The Truman Commission reported 
that, in 1946–1947, $23.6 million in loans was available, but only $3.7 million 
was actually borrowed because students often found the terms onerous and the 
loans risky.42 Private lenders and philanthropists also tried to get some loan pro-
grams off the ground but with limited success.43 Ten years later, on the eve of the 
passage of the National Defense Education Act of 1958,44 roughly 83,000 
34. The College of William and Mary, a public institution, was founded by Royal Charter in 1693. 
CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY 255 
(2008). The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 contained an early version of federal land grants to establish 
state colleges. See WILLIAM ZUMETA, DAVID W. BRENEMAN, PATRICK M. CALLAN & JONI E. FINNEY, 
FINANCING AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 60 (2012). 
35. Pub. L. No. 37-130, 12 Stat. 503. 
36. Pub. L. No. 51-841, 26 Stat. 417. 
37. 2 THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON HIGHER EDUC., HIGHER EDUCATION FOR AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY: A REPORT 4 (1947) [hereinafter TRUMAN COMM’N]. 
38. 6 id. at 45. 
39. See 1 id. at 28–29. 
40. See 6 id. at 45. 
41. See BETH AKERS & MATTHEW M. CHINGOS, GAME OF LOANS: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF 
STUDENT DEBT 45 (2016). 
42. 2 TRUMAN COMM’N, supra note 37, at 46. 
43. See AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 41, at 45–46. 
44. Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580. 
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students borrowed a total of only $13.5 million.45 Borrowing remained the excep-
tion in higher education financing well into the 1950s. 
The lack of privately provided educational financing relative to demand was an 
indication of the well-known market failure in student lending.46 Part of the rea-
son private financing was not readily available for education was that it was typi-
cally done through unsecured loans—education borrowers tend to be young and 
have few pledgable assets.47 As a result, only unsecured lending is an option, but 
unsecured debt is difficult to collect because of state property exemption laws48 
and limitations on garnishment,49 
See 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2018) (establishing federal limitations on wage garnishment); Carolyn 
Carter, Wage Garnishments and Bank Account Seizures: Consumer Debt Advice from NCLC, NAT’L 
CONSUMER L. CTR. (June 18, 2018), https://library.nclc.org/wage-garnishments-and-bank-account- 
seizures-consumer-debt-advice-nclc [https://perma.cc/UFK9-Z9DB] (noting that “[s]tate law may limit 
garnishment even more or even prohibit wage garnishment” and that “[m]any types of federal and state 
benefits are completely protected from garnishment”). 
even if a borrower has assets or income. Young 
borrowers not only often lack assets of value but also have uncertain future 
income; indeed, for the first few years of the debt, borrowers are proposing being 
full- or part-time students with little or no income.50 Additionally, young bor-
rowers have little if any credit history, so they lack a repayment history that can 
be used to predict their future propensity to repay. 
These factors mean that lenders have little basis for gauging a borrower’s 
future ability to repay. Rather than try to price this uncertainty, traditional lenders 
simply did not lend prior to the government’s intervention. The market relied 
instead on the limited supply of lenders with philanthropic motives, and these 
lenders often were not well matched to borrowers.51 This market failure under-
laid, and still underlies, the federal government’s intervention into higher educa-
tion financing. 
The experience of the two world wars also underscored to the government the 
importance of higher education—particularly in languages and applied sciences— 
to national defense,52 a commitment reinforced by the Korean War and the Cold 
War. In addition, policymakers understood the role of higher education in address-
ing issues of income, race, and gender inequality53 and the need to plan for the 
45. PAMELA EBERT FLATTAU, JEROME BRACKEN, RICHARD VAN ATTA, AYEH BANDEH-AHMADI, 
RODOLFO DE LA CRUZ & KAY SULLIVAN, INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSIS, THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 
EDUCATION ACT OF 1958: SELECTED OUTCOMES, at II-7 (2006). 
46. This market failure has been well understood since at least 1935. See, e.g., J. R. Walsh, Capital 
Concept Applied to Man, 49 Q.J. ECON. 255, 276–77 (1935). 
47. See Jonathan D. Glater, The Other Big Test: Why Congress Should Allow College Students to 
Borrow More Through Federal Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 37 (2011). 
48. See generally Richard M. Hynes, Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of 
Property Exemption Laws, 47 J.L. & ECON. 19 (2004) (examining the intersection between state and 
federal exemption laws, which allow people to protect assets when they default on loans). 
49. 
50. See Glater, supra note 47. 
51. See AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 41, at 45–46. 
52. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE UNCERTAIN TRIUMPH: FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY IN THE 
KENNEDY AND JOHNSON YEARS, at xviii (1984) (noting “the discovery during the two world wars of 
widespread illiteracy among the conscripts”). 
53. See 2 TRUMAN COMM’N, supra note 37, at 3. 
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explosion of college attendance by the oncoming baby boom generation.54 This 
led to a series of important interventions by the federal government into higher 
education, each of which had implications for the creation and growth of the stu-
dent loan program. 
The first of these interventions, the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 
(the original GI Bill),55 did not have any significant loan provisions. Instead, it 
provided direct grants for returning servicemembers to cover student tuition and 
fees (among other benefits).56 But the Bill and its justifications provided a tem-
plate for the expansions to come. One such expansion was the National Defense 
Education Act of 1958 (NDEA).57 
These early interventions were rooted in particular constituencies (for exam-
ple, veterans) or particular policy goals (for example, national defense). In con-
trast, much of the work in subsequent decades after the NDEA was focused on 
expanding federal support for higher education to all citizens with the broader 
and more amorphous goal of general social welfare.58 But because this broader 
goal entailed more money going to groups that were less politically favored than 
veterans, or for policy reasons that were less specific than national security, large 
grants were pushed aside in favor of less generous and more budgetarily opaque 
guaranteed loan programs. 
B. THE FIRST FEDERAL LOANS: THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT OF 1958 
Fourteen years after the GI Bill, Congress enacted the NDEA. As its title sug-
gests, the Act was justified by a need to invest in higher education—especially 
science—due to the perceived threat of the Soviet Union, whose 1957 launch of 
Sputnik, the world’s first satellite, had triggered the Space Race.59 Unlike those 
of the GI Bill, however, the NDEA’s benefits were available to anyone (including 
women), not just veterans. The NDEA stated that “no student of ability will be 
denied an opportunity for higher education because of financial need.”60 
The NDEA introduced the first substantial federal student loan program, the 
National Defense Student Loan (NDSL) Program.61 The bill, as originally pro-
posed in the House, included a direct grant program, perhaps modeled after the 
54. See GRAHAM, supra note 52, at xviii. 
55. Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284. 
56. Id. § 400. 
57. Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580. 
58. See Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1561, 1576 
(2015). 
59. See National Defense Education Act of 1958 § 101; see also William J. Jorden, Soviet Fires First 
Earth Satellite into Space; It Is Circling the Globe at 18,000 M.P.H.; Sphere Tracked in 4 Crossings 
Over U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1957, at A1 (announcing the launch of Sputnik I). 
60. National Defense Education Act of 1958 § 101. 
61. The NDSL Program was renamed the National Direct Student Loan Program in 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-318 § 137, 86 Stat. 235, 272 (1972), and the 1986 HEA reauthorization renamed it the Perkins Loan 
Program, Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-498, sec. 405, § 461(a), 100 Stat. 
1268, 1439; FLATTAU ET AL., supra note 45, at II-4 to -5. The Perkins Loan Program was phased out in 
2017. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087aa(b)(1)(B) (2012) (authorizing Perkins Loan expenditures only through 
September 30, 2017). 
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GI Bill.62 It proposed to give an average grant of $750 per year (or roughly 
$6,700 in 2020) to 23,000 students selected by state scholarship commissions on 
the basis of “objective criteria,” but it did not require any particular type of stu-
dent or course of study (though it provided preference to science, math, engineer-
ing, and foreign languages).63 At this point, the United States was spending over 
$700 million per year on veterans’ education and training through the GI Bill,64 
THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 
1958, at 102 (1957), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/usbudget/bus_1958.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/P9A9-YVEH]. 
but for nonveterans, the proposed $17.5 million per year was determined to be 
too generous.65 The final version of the bill saw the scholarship provisions elimi-
nated. In their place was an appropriation for a loan program.66 The special favor 
given to veterans was not extended even to needy nonveteran students. 
Rather than being structured as direct loans to consumers, the NDSL Program 
operated as a loan to higher education institutions, which in turn loaned the 
money to students.67 Formally, the creditors on NDSL loans were the schools, not 
the federal government.68 But the NDEA governed the terms of the institutional 
loans to students.69 
The NDEA stated that loans could not exceed $1,000 per year (about $9,000 in 
2020) and $5,000 total per student (about $45,000 in 2020), were to be given to 
students on the basis of need, and were not to have interest rates exceeding three 
percent per year.70 The federal money was divvied out by state and then by insti-
tution, with no institution receiving more than $250,000 each fiscal year.71 
Schools were also supposed to provide ten percent of the loan funds themselves,  
62. See H.R. REP. NO. 85-2157, at 6 (1958). The grants would have been for a base amount of $500 
plus an additional amount up to $500 based on need. Id. That structure is similar to the GI Bill education 
grants. See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, § 400(b), 58 Stat. 284, 289. 
63. See National Defense Education Act of 1958 § 204(4) (“[S]pecial consideration shall be given to 
(A) students with a superior academic background who express a desire to teach in elementary or 
secondary schools, and (B) students whose academic background indicates a superior capacity or 
preparation in science, mathematics, engineering, or a modern foreign language.”); H.R. REP. NO. 85- 
2157, at 6 (explaining that, even if chosen under the above criteria, “[s]tudents will be completely free to 
select their own course of study”). 
64. 
65. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 85-2688, at 5, 29–30 (1958) (Conf. Rep.); 104 CONG. REC. 19,612 (1958) 
(statement of Rep. Judd). 
66. See National Defense Education Act of 1958 § 201. 
67. Id. §§ 201, 203, 207; see also id. § 206 (on repayment). As a formal matter, much of the federal 
money to schools was structured as a “capital contribution” to a student loan fund, which would then 
make “capital distribution[s]” back to the government of its proportionate share of the principal and 
interest repaid. Id. §§ 203, 206. Typical direct loans to institutions were also available. Id. § 207. 
68. See id. § 205(b)–(c). 
69. See id. § 205(b). 
70. Id. § 205(a), (b)(1), (b)(4). The law also provided that interest would not accrue before repayment 
began. See id. § 205(b)(4). 
71. Id. §§ 202(a), 203(b). This cap was later increased to $800,000 in 1963, see Act of Dec. 18, 1963, 
Pub. L. No. 88-210, sec. 22(c), § 203(b), 77 Stat. 403, 416, and then eliminated in 1964, see National 
Defense Education Act Amendments, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-665, sec. 203, § 203, 78 Stat. 1100, 1101. 
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with the hope that the schools would thereby build capacity for more direct sup-
port of students.72 
Setting the stage for later developments, the NDEA also provided for a loan 
forgiveness plan for teachers, cancelling ten percent of the loan balance for each 
year of service, up to a maximum of fifty percent.73 Some states had already insti-
tuted similar plans, especially for medical students that agreed to practice in 
underserved (typically rural) areas.74 
Although needy students relied heavily on the loans, there is some evidence 
that the loans were still not enough to substantially reduce financial barriers to 
higher education. In 1963–1964, right before the passage of the Higher Education 
Act, average tuition, fees, room, and board at all four-year institutions was 
$1,286 ($10,700 in 2020), and at public four-year institutions it was $929 ($7,700 
in 2020).75 
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 
tbl.330.10 (2017), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d17/tables/dt17_330.10.asp [https://perma.cc/ 
7BKF-S79N] (cataloging average undergraduate tuition and fees and room and board rates charged for 
full-time students in degree-granting postsecondary institutions, by level and control of institution). 
The maximum $1,000 loan would therefore have been just barely suf-
ficient, but because the total and per-school appropriations were capped, the 
funds ended up being spread more widely, with loans averaging between $400 
and $500 per student.76 By 1964, Congress and the former Department of 
Housing, Education, and Welfare found that NDSL was falling short of meeting 
student need.77 
Moreover, many students simply did not qualify for NDSL, either because of 
higher family income, grades below the required minimums, or studies outside of 
the favored fields.78 Some of these students and their families turned to loans 
72. See National Defense Education Act of 1958 § 201 (stating that the purpose of the loans was to 
“stimulate and assist in the establishment at institutions of higher education of funds for the making of 
low-interest loans to students in need”); id. § 204(2)(B) (requiring institutions to contribute one-ninth 
the amount of federal funds); FLATTAU ET AL., supra note 45, at II-3. Half of the institutions 
participating in NDSL in 1962 had never offered long-term loans prior to NDEA. Id. at II-7. 
73. National Defense Education Act of 1958 § 205(b)(3). 
74. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5604265200A (Apr. 26, 1956) (describing a typical state program). 
Loan forgiveness raises tax issues, because cancellation of debt typically creates taxable income for the 
debtor. I.R.C. § 61(a)(11) (2018). As we will see, the tax question is particularly acute for the modern 
IDR plans. See infra Section II.F. At the time, the issue was resolved by treating the forgiven loans as 
“scholarships,” which were excluded from gross income under § 117 of the Internal Revenue Code, but 
the IRS would reverse this position in 1973. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-256, 1973-1 C.B. 56 (declaring that 
medical loan forgiveness is taxable); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6004275330A (Apr. 27, 1960) (declaring that 
teachers’ student loan forgiveness is not taxable); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5807039700A (July 3, 1958) 
(declaring that state medical loan forgiveness is not taxable); see also Richard C.E. Beck, Loan 
Repayment Assistance Programs for Public-Interest Loans: Why Does Everyone Think They Are 
Taxable?, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 251, 261-63 (1996) (discussing the IRS’ policy change); John R. 
Brooks, Treasury Should Exclude Income from Discharge of Student Loans, 152 TAX NOTES 751, 754 
(2016) (providing a general history on the issue). 
75. 
76. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, 1964 ANNUAL REPORT 237 (1964) (reporting 
that the average loan in 1964 was $484). 
77. See FLATTAU ET AL., supra note 45, at II-6; Glater, supra note 47, at 36. 
78. See SUZANNE METTLER, DEGREES OF INEQUALITY: HOW THE POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
SABOTAGED THE AMERICAN DREAM 61 (2014). 
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from banks and other private lenders, the terms of which varied greatly depending 
on perceptions of risk.79 By 1964, at a time when the risk-free rate was 3.5%,80 
Yields on Short-Term United States Securities, Three-Six Month Treasury Notes and Certificates, 
Three Month Treasury Bills for United States, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS: THE RES. DIVISION, https:// 
fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M1329BUSM193NNBR [https://perma.cc/TR8T-XXBK] (last updated Aug. 
20, 2012) (analyzing data provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research). 
the interest rates on private student loans were often in the range of 11% to 14%, 
and sometimes as high as 26%, reflecting in part the inability for private lenders 
to secure themselves by attaching collateral.81 By 1962, even libertarian econo-
mist Milton Friedman was pointing out the market failure around private student 
lending and the need for more government intervention.82 
C. GUARANTEED LOANS: THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1965 
By the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the focus and goals of national 
higher education policy had shifted somewhat. The Cold War remained a con-
cern, but there was also a renewed focus on domestic issues, particularly social 
welfare and economic concerns as embodied in the Great Society programs.83 
Moreover, the baby boom generation was entering college, driving growth in 
demand for higher education, which strained the NDSL Program’s ability to meet 
the country’s education financing needs. Just like today, college costs were rising 
rapidly, and many families who did not qualify for NDSL could not afford to pay 
more out of pocket. 
Congress’s response to these problems was the Higher Education Act of 1965 
(HEA).84 The HEA included many provisions that expanded the federal role in 
higher education, including the creation of the Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) 
Program, the predecessor of the current federal student loan program.85 The GSL 
Program was modeled off of more limited state “loan insurance” programs86 and, 
unlike the NDSL Program, was designed to stimulate lending by private lenders 
rather than by educational institutions.87 Also unlike the NDSL Program, the 
GSL Program did not require the federal government to put up any capital 
because the government would be only guaranteeing private loans, rather than  
79. See Glater, supra note 47, at 36. 
80. 
81. President’s Consumer Panel Studies High Interest Rates on Student Loans, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 
1964, at A3. 
82. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 104 (40th anniversary ed. 2002) (“Whatever the 
reason, an imperfection of the market has led to underinvestment in human capital. Government 
intervention might therefore be rationalized on grounds both of ‘technical monopoly,’ insofar as the 
obstacle to the development of such investment has been administrative costs, and of improving the 
operation of the market, insofar as it has been simply market frictions and rigidities.”). 
83. See Glater, supra note 47, at 35. 
84. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219. 
85. See id. § 421(a)(1)(B). The GSL Program was renamed the Stafford Loan Program in 1987. 
AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 41, at 47; see SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW 
INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 10 (2011) (detailing the GSL 
Program). 
86. See Glater, supra note 47, at 37–38. 
87. See id. at 37. 
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making loans itself.88 However, the government also subsidized interest on the 
loans by paying the interest during the years the borrower was still enrolled in 
college, plus a share of the interest for those with family incomes below $15,000 
(or roughly $125,000 in 2020).89 
The GSL Program greatly increased the amount of higher education financing 
available, authorizing as much as $700 million in its first year and $1.4 billion by 
1968 (contrasted with $17.5 million in the first year of the NDSL).90 There was 
technically no income cap under the GSL Program to determine eligibility for 
the loans, but because subsidized interest was available only to families with 
income under $15,000, lenders would usually lend only to families below that 
income threshold.91 The HEA also included a direct grant to the neediest students, 
but the funds involved were a fraction of the amount devoted to loans.92 
It is likely that the particular choice to use loan guarantees—as opposed to 
direct loans or even direct grants—was more about politics, optics, and budgetary 
effects than a fundamental belief in the policy instrument itself, for three reasons. 
First, the precedent of the NDSL Program (and the state insurance schemes) cre-
ated a model to follow.93 This was a new era in federal financing for higher educa-
tion, and the NDEA had been essentially the first federal intervention in general 
aid to higher education since the Morrill Land Grant Acts (because the GI Bill 
was limited to veterans). Given this background, policymakers may have under-
standably wanted to step carefully and incrementally, relying on existing models 
instead of something big and new. 
Likewise, earlier federal forays into consumer financial markets had relied on 
the provision of indirect support through loan guarantees and secondary market 
activities. In housing finance markets, the federal government guaranteed or 
insured mortgage loans through the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the 
Federal Housing Administration provided a secondary market in mortgages 
through the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), then a wholly- 
owned government corporation.94 Indirect support of debt markets was already 
well established as the federal government’s modus operandi.95 
Second, a loan guarantee appears to have a lighter fiscal footprint than a direct 
loan. With a loan guarantee, the government does not put up the initial capital 
and is only secondarily and contingently liable should the original lender go 
unpaid. The use of a guarantee, rather than a direct loan, however, is but a budget-
ary fiction. In either arrangement, most or all of the credit risk is on the federal 
88. See Higher Education Act of 1965 § 421. 
89. Id. § 428(a). 
90. Id. § 424(a); supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text (discussing the NDSL loans). 
91. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-951, at 11 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5314, 5324. 
92. See Higher Education Act of 1965 § 401(b) (authorizing $70 million in grants). 
93. See Glater, supra note 47. 
94. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Public Option in Housing Finance, 46 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1111, 1130 (2013). 
95. See Adam J. Levitin, Public-Private Risk Sharing in Financial Regulation 3 (Feb. 8, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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government. The only difference is the source of the original capital. But because 
the government does not need to make an initial outlay, a guarantee program 
requires a smaller budget appropriation than a direct lending program. 
Additionally, most of the appropriations for a guarantee program would be 
deferred because funds would be outlaid only when the guarantees were triggered 
in the future. Thus, a guarantee program is preferable from a budgetary stand-
point, but because the federal government has essentially unfettered access to 
cheap capital, requiring the capital to come initially from private lenders had little 
effect on total liquidity and only added to the cost of funds for the program as 
well as an additional layer of administrative expense. This choice to use an instru-
ment that is financially equivalent to direct loans, but more expensive and compli-
cated, suggests that policymakers went out of their way to create a more opaque, 
off-budget structure.96 
Third, and also pointing to budgetary concerns, there was a push during the 
HEA debates by some Republicans to offer benefits in the form of tax credits 
instead of loans or loan guarantees.97 President Johnson and the Democratic lead-
ership refused, however, in part because of the effects that credits would have had 
on tax revenue.98 Loan guarantees provided an alternative way to get substantial 
amounts of money in the hands of students without substantially affecting the 
national budget, which Johnson was trying to free up to fund the Vietnam War 
and the Great Society programs. 
The GSL Program was thus a product of compromise and the politics of the 
HEA in particular and the post-war period in general. It provided a way to meet 
the goals of the 1947 Truman Commission—expanded access to higher education 
for economic, national security, and equity reasons99—while navigating the chal-
lenging politics of trying to provide broadly available, general aid for higher edu-
cation, as opposed to aid for particular favored constituencies or purposes.100 And 
in the background were the beginnings of the conservative antitax response to the 
Great Society. As with much of the growth of the American welfare state, the  
96. Prior to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA), the national budget included direct loans 
as an outlay—thus increasing total government spending as much as direct grants—but loan guarantees 
only had a budgetary cost to the extent of any subsidies and guarantees actually paid out. See Thomas H. 
Stanton, Loans and Loan Guarantees, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW 
GOVERNANCE 381, 383–84 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). This made loan guarantees much more 
budgetarily attractive than direct loans. After the FCRA, the only on-budget cost for both direct loans 
and loan guarantees is the net subsidy cost, which is the expected difference between outlays and receipts, 
including interest, discounted to present value. See Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, 2 U.S.C. 
§§ 661a(5), 661c (2018). 
97. See METTLER, supra note 78. 
98. Id. 
99. See 1 TRUMAN COMM’N, supra note 37, at 29. 
100. See Jonathan D. Glater, Debt, Merit, and Equity in Higher Education Access, 79 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 91–95 (2016). 
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GSL Program relied on a relatively opaque, quasi-public arrangement to partially 
mask the extent of government involvement.101 
D. SOLIDIFYING THE FEDERAL ROLE: 1970S–1980S 
Student loans became an element of higher education finance for particular his-
torically contingent reasons, but once created, they became an important vehicle 
for delivery of additional support and benefits. Although other funding programs— 
most notably the Pell Grant102—were created and expanded along the way, policy-
makers also continued to tinker with the student loan program as the primary way 
to deliver benefits. Over the next few decades, the student loan program changed in 
several important ways, which we summarize here. 
The 1972 Amendments to the HEA created not only the aforementioned Pell 
Grants but also the Student Loan Marketing Association.103 This government- 
owned corporation, better known under the portmanteau “Sallie Mae,” purchased 
student loans that it financed with the sale of bonds.104 Sallie Mae’s bonds were 
backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.105 Sallie Mae guaranteed 
timely payment of principal and interest on the bonds, meaning that investors 
assumed the interest rate risk (including prepayment risk) on the underlying 
loans, while the federal government bore the credit risk. Issuance of the bonds 
through Sallie Mae, rather than as general Treasury bonds, enabled investors to 
invest solely in the interest rate risk of student loans. Sallie Mae was intended to 
bring in more capital to the student loan market in order to bring down interest 
rates and lower the government’s costs.106 
The 1976 reauthorization of the HEA continued the push to get more private 
capital into the student loan market by providing federal incentives to states to set 
up their own loan guarantee agencies.107 It also increased the income threshold 
for subsidized loans from $15,000 to $25,000 (which, because of inflation, was a 
reset to the same real income level it had been in 1965).108 
These 1972 and 1976 changes show that policymakers were still facing some 
degree of market failure in private student loan lending. Increases in federal sup-
port, subsidies, and guarantees were designed to address that market failure and 
ensure financing to meet student needs. 
101. On hidden welfare state spending, see, for example, JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE 
STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002) and 
John R. Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending, 104 GEO. L.J. 1057 (2016). 
102. See Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, secs. 131, 401, 411, 413A–D, § 401, 
86 Stat. 235, 247–55. 
103. See id. sec. 133(a), § 439 (adding a new section to the HEA). 
104. Id. 
105. See id. sec. 133(a), § 439(h). 
106. See S. REP. NO. 92-346, at 46–47 (1971). 
107. See Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, sec. 127(a), § 428A, 90 Stat. 2081, 
2120–23 (adding a new section to the HEA); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1701, at 185 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), as 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4877, 4886. 
108. See Education Amendments of 1976 sec. 127(a), § 428(a)(2)(B)(i); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1701, at 
187, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4877, 4888. 
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A bigger change in federal support for education financing came in 1978, as 
inflation and economic stagnation were taking a toll on middle-income families try-
ing to afford still-rising college tuitions. A partial solution from Congress was to 
remove the income cap on subsidized loans. Congress had found that, as a practical 
matter, lenders were often unwilling to lend to students through the GSL Program 
unless the interest was covered by the government while the student was in school 
and during the nine-month post-graduation grace period.109 As a result, many stu-
dents found themselves shut out of the GSL Program,110 or paying higher costs if 
they were not. The Middle Income Student Assistance Act of 1978 expanded eligi-
bility for interest subsidies to all borrowers regardless of family income.111 The 
change greatly expanded the pool of students that could rely on guaranteed loans, 
and guaranteed student loan volume about doubled as a result.112 
The no-cap era was brief, however. In 1981, under the Reagan Administration, 
Congress reintroduced a family-income cap of $30,000 (about $89,000 in 2020) 
to be eligible for subsidized guaranteed loans.113 Although loan volume dipped a 
bit as a result, it maintained its higher post-1978 levels until the more dramatic 
changes to the student loan program in 1992.114 
This period also saw developments in the tax treatment of forgiven debt. In 
1973, the IRS ruled that loan forgiveness through programs that required a partic-
ular type or field of work were not “scholarships” because they had a quid pro 
quo element more akin to employment.115 As a result, the debt cancellation could 
lead to a tax bill. This was contrary to earlier rulings that had held the opposite.116 
Congress responded with some temporary exclusions before finally adding § 108(f) 
to the Internal Revenue Code in 1984, which states that amounts forgiven through a 
program requiring that the borrower work “for a certain period of time in certain 
professions for any of a broad class of employers” are not gross income for tax 
purposes.117 
Finally, in 1980, Congress added the Parent Loan for Undergraduate Student 
(PLUS) Loan, a federal loan to parents of students, rather than to students them-
selves.118 This expanded the amount of funds available to pay for college, but the 
109. H.R. REP. NO. 95-951, at 11 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5314, 5324. 
110. Id. 
111. See Pub. L. No. 95-566, sec. 5(b)(1)(A), § 428(a)(2), 92 Stat. 2402, 2403 (removing Higher 
Education Act Section 428(a)(2)(A)–(B)). 
112. See AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 41, at 43 fig.3.2; ZUMETA ET AL., supra note 34, at 79 fig.4.3. 
113. See Postsecondary Student Assistance Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, sec. 532(a), 
§ 428(a)(2), 95 Stat. 357, 451 (enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981). 
114. See AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 41, at 43 fig.3.2. 
115. See Rev. Rul. 73-256, 1973-1 C.B. 56. 
116. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6004275330A (Apr. 27, 1960) (declaring that teachers’ student 
loan forgiveness is not taxable); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5807039700A (July 3, 1958) (declaring that state 
medical loan forgiveness is not taxable); see also supra note 74 (detailing change in the IRS’s position). 
117. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 1076(a), § 108, 98 Stat. 494, 1053–54 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 108(f)(1) (2018)). 
118. Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, sec. 419, § 428B(a), 94 Stat. 1367, 1424– 
25. 
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actual debtor (the parent) had more regular income and assets than a student and 
therefore was a more attractive borrower. Although not a huge change at the 
time, PLUS Loans would later become a meaningful tool for significantly 
expanding student loans to graduate students.119 
E. WATERSHED CHANGES: 1992 AND 1993 
The student loan program faced probably its biggest change since the establish-
ment of the GSL Program in the 1992 reauthorization of the HEA and the follow-
ing year’s Student Loan Reform Act. These bills made four important changes. 
First, the 1992 bill created a new category of unsubsidized Stafford Loans (which 
the GSL Program had been renamed to in 1987).120 Subsidized Stafford Loans 
retained income eligibility requirements, but the new unsubsidized Stafford 
Loans had no income limits.121 
Second, the 1992 Amendments removed the borrowing cap on PLUS Loans.122 
Prior to 1992, parents could borrow up to only $4,000 per year, but after 1992, 
parents could borrow up to the full “cost of attendance” of a college or univer-
sity.123 The cost of attendance is determined by each school and is defined to 
include living expenses, tuition, fees, room, and board.124 Although the measure 
is not perfect,125 this change meant that, for the first time, a student could be 
assured of having sufficient funds to cover nearly all of the costs of education. 
The bill also increased the loan limits on Stafford Loans.126 
Third, the 1992 Amendments created a pilot Direct Loan Program (while also 
consolidating the Stafford and PLUS Loans under the renamed Federal Family 
Education Loan (FFEL) Program),127 and the 1993 bill greatly expanded Direct 
Loans.128 In contrast to FFEL Loans, Direct Loans were made directly by the fed-
eral government and held on its balance sheet.129 The federal government, rather 
than a private lender, was the creditor on these loans. 
119. See infra notes 149–55 and accompanying text. 
120. See Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, sec. 422, § 428H, 106 Stat. 
448, 535. 
121. Id. (expanding loans to those who did not qualify for subsidies under Higher Education Act 
Section 428). 
122. See id. sec. 418(b)(2), § 428B (eliminating prior Higher Education Act Section 428B(b)(1)–(2)). 
123. Id. sec. 422, § 428H(c) (setting cost of attendance as maximum loan amount). 
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1087ll (2018). 
125. See SARA GOLDRICK-RAB, PAYING THE PRICE: COLLEGE COSTS, FINANCIAL AID, AND THE 
BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 42–45 (2016) (discussing how some components of the cost of 
attendance are often undervalued). 
126. See Higher Education Amendments of 1992 sec. 413, § 425. Limits were also raised in 1986. 
Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-498, sec. 402(a), § 425, 100 Stat. 1268, 1353, 
1359–60. 
127. See Higher Education Amendments of 1992 sec. 411(a)(1), § 421(c) (renaming the programs); 
id. sec. 451, § 451 (creating the “Federal Direct Loan Demonstration Program”). 
128. See Student Loan Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 4021, § 451, 107 Stat. 312, 341 
(enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993) (authorizing the Direct Student 
Loan Program). 
129. See id. sec. 4021, § 452. 
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As noted above, from a financial standpoint it is immaterial whether the gov-
ernment is making the loan or merely subsidizing and guaranteeing it.130 In both 
cases the economic risk of the loan rests with the federal government. But Direct 
Loans were considerably cheaper because the federal government would not 
need to subsidize banks’ high rates.131 The 1993 bill aimed to have sixty percent 
of all lending come from Direct Loans within the next five years.132 
Fourth, the 1993 bill created the Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR) plan, 
which allowed borrowers to, instead of paying a fixed, standardized loan service 
payment, pay based on a measurement of income, and even receive debt forgive-
ness after a period of time.133 As it was designed, ICR had little uptake, but it 
played an important role in terms of both policy design and regulatory process for 
the post-2010 changes discussed below.134 
In sum, the 1992 and 1993 legislation were important steps forward for the 
government’s direct role in higher education finance and a large shift in the loan 
terms themselves. Through a combination of student and parent borrowing, fed-
eral loans could now fully finance higher education for any student, regardless of 
income. The loans themselves were increasingly made directly by the federal 
government, rather than by private lenders with federal loan guarantees and sub-
sidies. And, with ICR, the stage was set for the massive shift in repayment terms 
that would follow the 2010s-era changes. Not surprisingly, loan volume exploded 
after 1993, nearly doubling over the following few years and beginning the steep 
upward climb that we still see today.135 
F. THE OLD SYSTEM BREAKS DOWN: 1990S AND 2000S 
Recall where federal student loans began in the 1950s: with the National 
Defense Student Loan Program providing funds for colleges themselves to make 
relatively small, low-interest loans.136 By the late 1990s, however, student loans 
had become big business for private lenders, with government-guaranteed profits 
and, as Suzanne Mettler has documented, powerful lobbying activities.137 Banks 
and other private lenders also started aggressively marketing directly to 
colleges.138 
130. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
131. The Direct Loans were also cheaper because, following the FCRA in 1990, direct government 
loans had the same minimal budget footprint as loan guarantees. See supra note 96. 
132. Student Loan Reform Act of 1993 sec. 4021, § 453(a)(2)(D) (stating the goal of sixty percent by 
1998). 
133. See id. sec. 4021, § 455(d)(1)(D), (e). 
134. Though the ICR plan was the first significant income-contingent loan repayment plan, there had 
been other proposals and pilot programs as far back as 1962. See Robert Shireman, Learn Now, Pay 
Later: A History of Income-Contingent Student Loans in the United States, 671 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 184, 188 (2017). 
135. See AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 41, at 47–49; ZUMETA ET AL., supra note 34, at 79 fig.4.3. 
136. See supra Section I.B. 
137. See METTLER, supra note 85, at 34–35, 71–79. 
138. 
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See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Offering Perks, Lenders Court Colleges’ Favor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
24, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/24/education/24loans.html?smid=pl-share. 
Moreover, as tuition and student living expenses continued to rise, private 
lenders began offering nonfederal, truly private loans—loans outside the FFEL 
Program—to fill the gap between college costs and existing aid and loan pack-
ages. These nonfederal loans had none of the protections, guarantees, and subsi-
dies of the FFEL Loans, and so became a particular source of risk (to students) 
and profit (to banks). Nonfederal loans went from being almost zero percent of 
loan volume in 1994139 to twenty-five percent by 2007–2008.140 
See COLL. BD., TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2018, at 15 fig.6 (2018), https://research.collegeboard. 
org/pdf/trends-student-aid-2018-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PLL4-TMJE]; see also AKERS & 
CHINGOS, supra note 41, at 43 fig.3.2 (charting the increase in dollars disbursed by type of loan). 
The late 1990s 
and early 2000s saw a number of loan-related scandals and investigations, likely 
souring the taste of many lawmakers for continuing to subsidize private 
lenders.141 
See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, U.S. Is Lax on Loans, Cuomo Says, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/26/us/26loans.html?smid=pl-share; Doug Lederman, Taming the 
Student Loan ‘Wild West,’ INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 7, 2007), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/ 
2007/06/07/taming-student-loan-wild-west [https://perma.cc/2XXS-WKYU]. 
The pain for many borrowers during this period was exacerbated by the further 
toughening of the rules for discharge of student loans in bankruptcy. Prior to 
1976, all student loan debt was dischargeable in bankruptcy; it was no different 
than any other type of unsecured debt. In 1976, however, Congress amended the 
HEA to prohibit a discharge during the first five years after repayment was first 
due, unless the loan imposed an “undue hardship” on the borrower.142 Subsequent 
amendments to the law excluded forbearance and deferment periods from the 
five-year nondischargeability period;143 expanded the limitation on discharge to 
all loans from nonprofit institutions;144 extended the five-year nondischargeability 
period to seven years;145 and extended the discharge restriction to cover educa-
tional benefits, scholarships, and stipends.146 In 1998, Congress restricted dis-
charge on public and nonprofit student loans, educational benefits, scholarships, 
and stipends to cases of undue hardship, no matter how much time had elapsed.147 
Finally, in 2005, Congress extended the discharge restriction to all student loans, 
including non-FFEL loans.148 
In some ways, the substantial restriction on discharge of student loan debt in 
bankruptcy created the demand for IDR plans. For most debts, bankruptcy func-
tions as a backstop social insurance program to address severe financial distress. 
139. See AKERS & CHINGOS, supra note 41, at 43 fig.3.2. 
140. 
141. 
142. See Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, sec. 127(a), § 439A, 90 Stat. 2081, 
2141 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2018)). 
143. See Act of Aug. 14, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-56, sec. 1, § 17(a), 93 Stat. 387, 387 (excluding 
forbearance and deferment periods from the five-year nondischargeability period). 
144. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 
§ 454(a)(1)(A)(2), 98 Stat. 333, 376. 
145. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3621(2), 104 Stat. 4789, 4965. 
146. See id. § 3621(1). 
147. See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971, 112 Stat. 1581, 1837. 
148. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§ 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59. 
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But with that safety valve essentially gone after 1998, the need for another form 
of insurance for student loans became more pressing. 
Another important development in this period was the extension of PLUS 
Loans to graduate students in 2005 (thus splitting Parent PLUS Loans, taken out 
by a student’s parents, and Grad PLUS Loans, taken out by the graduate or pro-
fessional student).149 Because PLUS Loans had essentially no borrowing cap after 
1992,150 a graduate student could, after the 2005 changes, directly borrow up to 
the full cost of attendance for expensive graduate programs, including law and 
medical school. As we will see in the next Section, Grad PLUS Loans also have 
important implications for the later IDR plans, and thus the overall progression of 
student loans toward becoming essentially a progressive government transfer 
program. 
In 2007, Congress created Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF)151 and the 
first iteration of Income-Based Repayment (Old IBR),152 both important steps in 
the move toward more redistribution and insurance through the federal govern-
ment. The PSLF plan provided that borrowers working in public service jobs 
could have the balance of their loan forgiven after ten years of regular pay-
ments.153 Old IBR—which was available to everyone, not just those working in 
public service—allowed borrowers to cap their monthly payments at fifteen per-
cent of discretionary income, with loan forgiveness after twenty-five years of reg-
ular payments.154 Importantly, the still relatively new Grad PLUS Loans were 
made eligible for Old IBR, but the original Parent PLUS Loans were not.155 
Finally, the financial crisis of 2008 caused credit to dry up across the whole 
economy, and that was no less true in the student debt market, even with its gov-
ernment subsidies and guarantees. With the Ensuring Continued Access to 
Student Loans Act of 2008, Congress authorized the Department of Education 
to buy up outstanding FFEL debt held on private lenders’ balance sheets as a way 
to infuse cash into those lenders (much as the Federal Reserve and other agencies 
did for other financial asset classes).156 
149. See Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, sec. 8005(c), § 425(a) 
(1)(A), 120 Stat. 4, 158–59 (2006) (enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005). 
150. See Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, sec. 418(b)(2), § 428B(b), 
106 Stat. 448, 531. 
151. See College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, sec. 401, § 455, 121 Stat. 784, 
800 (2007). 
152. See id. sec. 203, § 493C(b). 
153. College Cost Reduction and Access Act sec. 401, § 455(m)(1) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1087e(m)(1) (2018)). 
154. See College Cost Reduction and Access Act sec. 203, § 493C (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1098e(e) (2018)). 
155. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.221(a)(2) (2019) (excepting Direct PLUS Loans made to parent borrowers, but 
not to student borrowers). Similar provisions apply for the other IDR plans. See, e.g., id. § 685.209(a)(1)(ii) 
(similar scheme for Pay As You Earn plan); id. § 685.209(c)(1)(ii) (similar scheme for Revised Pay As You 
Earn plan). 
156. Pub. L. No. 110-227, sec. 7, § 459A, 122 Stat. 740, 746–47. 
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G. A NEW ERA: 2009 TO PRESENT 
When President Obama and a Democratic Congress entered office in 2009, the 
stage was set for some big changes. The FFEL system of subsidizing private lend-
ers had proven to be expensive and a source of corruption. The credit crisis had 
proven that ultimately the federal government was bearing the credit risk on 
FFEL Loans anyway. And the Direct Loan Program that started in 1992–1993 
had proven itself to be an effective alternative. Moreover, after a slow start with 
ICR in the 1990s, the more generous Old IBR and PSLF plans provided a plat-
form for further reforms to make student loans a vehicle for more generous and 
progressive support for students. 
The SAFRA Act eliminated the FFEL Program, ending subsidized government 
guarantees of private student loans.157 Going forward, the Direct Loan Program 
would be the only source of federal student loans. This alone was a massive 
change, ending the fiction of private student lending and making clear that the 
federal government was the real source of funds.158 Student loans immediately 
became the biggest direct government loan program, dwarfing the next largest 
category, direct loans from the Department of Agriculture, by a factor of more 
than ten.159 
Compare OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FEDERAL CREDIT 
SUPPLEMENT: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 2 tbl.1 (2009), https://www. 
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2010-FCS/pdf/BUDGET-2010-FCS.pdf [https://perma.cc/5F4T-5BMR] 
(showing total student Direct Loan obligations of $41.2 billion for Fiscal Year 2009), with OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FEDERAL CREDIT SUPPLEMENT: BUDGET OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 2 tbl.1 (2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET- 
2012-FCS/pdf/BUDGET-2012-FCS.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LNP-8D7D] (showing projected Direct Loan 
obligations of $162.3 billion for Fiscal Year 2012), and id. at 1–2 tbl.1 (showing projected Direct Loan 
obligations of $10.9 billion for the Department of Agriculture in Fiscal Year 2012). 
The SAFRA Act also made IBR more generous (New IBR) by allowing those 
who would be “new borrowers” after July 1, 2014, to pay ten percent of their dis-
cretionary incomes (rather than fifteen percent under Old IBR) and receive for-
giveness after twenty years (rather than twenty-five years under Old IBR).160 
Both IBR plans had some problems, however. Old IBR was not particularly gen-
erous, and New IBR would take a while to come into effect. And both Old and 
New IBR have little relief for interest accrual. If borrowers do not make payments 
sufficient to cover any interest currently due, the interest that accrues will be capi-
talized, meaning it will be added to the principal balance of the loan.161 That 
means that interest will compound on that larger principal (“negative amortiza-
tion”), in contrast to the usual noncompounding interest on fully amortizing 
157. Technically the “SAFRA Act” is the name for Title II, Subtitle A, of the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 2001, 124 Stat. 1029, 1071, more famous 
as the final piece of legislation that completed the enactment of Obamacare. The FFEL Program was 
terminated by Section 2205 of that Act. Id. sec. 2205, § 428(B)(a)(1). 
158. See METTLER, supra note 85, at 85. 
159. 
160. SAFRA Act sec. 2213, § 493C (codified at 26 U.S.C. 1098e(e) (2018)). 
161. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.221(b)(4) (2019) (“Except as provided in paragraph (b)(3) of this section 
[regarding subsidized loans], accrued interest is capitalized at the time a borrower chooses to leave the 
income-based repayment plan or no longer has a partial financial hardship.”). 
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FFEL and Direct Loans. Capitalization also means the accrued interest will be 
fully payable whenever a borrower’s income becomes high enough that IBR is no 
longer necessary.162 
The Obama Administration quickly turned to regulation to fix these problems 
and, in 2012, created the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) plan. The PAYE plan took 
the New IBR payment terms—ten percent of discretionary income and forgive-
ness after twenty years—and extended them earlier, to loans taken out after 
October 1, 2011.163 Perhaps more important financially, PAYE capped the 
amount of unpaid interest that could be capitalized into the loan balance, thus 
slowing the growth of a borrower’s balance when in negative amortization.164 
Both of these regulatory moves were not authorized by the IBR statute, which 
would not take effect until 2014, so the Administration relied on the Income- 
Contingent Repayment portions of the HEA, which gave more leeway to the 
Department of Education to set the repayment terms.165 So, although ICR itself 
was never heavily used by borrowers, it became the basis for much of the growth 
in income-contingent loans after 2012. 
Finally, in 2015, the Obama Administration created yet another repayment 
plan, Revised Pay As You Earn (REPAYE), which added some important new 
terms.166 The REPAYE plan was open to all borrowers, not just post-2011 bor- 
rowers.167 The REPAYE plan also had even more generous (though complicated) 
rules on interest accrual and capitalization, but it had somewhat less generous 
terms for graduate borrowers.168 Most significantly for our story of the progress 
of student loans, REPAYE removed the monthly cap on the income-contingent 
payments.169 In all the other plans—ICR, IBR, and PAYE—a borrower reverts to 
paying a flat, standard payment once the borrower’s income is high enough. For  
162. See id. 
163. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(1)(iii)(B) (2019) (time period for applicable loans); id. § 685.209(a)(2)(i) 
(repayment terms). 
164. See id. § 685.209(a)(2)(iv)(B) (limiting capitalized accrued interest to ten percent of original 
loan principal balance at the time the borrower entered repayment). For more on interest accrual and 
capitalization, see infra Section II.D. 
165. See Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. 
Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,088, 66,088 (Nov. 1, 2012) (describing PAYE as a 
“new ICR plan”). 
166. See Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and 
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,204 (Oct. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Final 
REPAYE Rules]. 
167. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(c)(1)(ii) (2019). In the REPAYE regulation, the term “[e]ligible loan” 
was defined broadly, without any limitation to “[e]ligible new borrower[s],” as seen in the PAYE 
regulations. See id. § 685.209(a)(1)(ii)–(iii). 
168. On interest accrual and capitalization, see id. § 685.209(c)(2)(iii) and infra Section II.D. 
Graduate borrowers have a repayment period of twenty-five years—instead of twenty—that includes 
any outstanding undergraduate debt. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(c)(5)(ii)(B). 
169. REPAYE does not include a provision similar to 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(4)(i), which recalculates 
the loan payment under PAYE when a borrower no longer has a partial financial hardship. See Final 
REPAYE Rules, 80 Fed. Reg. at 67,213. 
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REPAYE, however, borrowers continue to pay ten percent of their discretionary 
incomes no matter how high their incomes are.170 
The unlimited-ten-percent provision was intended to make the plan less gener-
ous to borrowers who eventually have high incomes.171 In financial terms, how-
ever, it actually has the opposite effect. Instead of making a high-income 
borrower pay more, it actually makes the borrower pay faster and therefore pay 
less. The loan principal is the same irrespective of the payment plan. Therefore, if 
a payment of ten percent of the borrower’s income is greater than the standard 
payment, the borrower will pay down the principal faster with REPAYE than 
with the standard payment, and a faster repayment means less interest will accrue 
on the loan, thus saving the borrower money over the full loan term.172 
II. STUDENT LOAN DEBT IS NOT LIKE OTHER DEBT 
In the previous Part, we laid out how the government’s involvement in higher 
education finance over the last seven decades was an evolving response to a mar-
ket failure—the private market provides inadequate funding for student bor-
rowers because of lenders’ difficulty pricing unsecured loans for unemployed 
borrowers with little or no credit history. We also explained why path depend-
ency and political considerations led the government to use the policy instrument 
of loans, rather than tax-funded grants or institutional support, to finance higher 
education, even as the program shifted from federal guarantees of private student 
loans to direct federal lending. Finally, we showed how student loans evolved 
over time, from being financial instruments with fairly standard terms to having a 
variety of features including income-contingent payments, interest relief, and 
potential loan cancellation that materially affect the total amount that the bor-
rower must repay to satisfy the loan obligation. 
In this Part, we break down why this current structure of student loans is so 
unlike other forms of debt. Other forms of debt sometimes have one or more of 
these features; what makes student debt different is the totality of these features— 
student loans go well beyond even most forms of contingent debt. The aggregation 
of what we term “nondebt features” requires us to look beyond the form of an 
instrument and consider better ways to describe its substance. 
The standard debt paradigm is a loan made at arm’s length by a private lender 
to a private borrower. The loan will be underwritten—that is, priced—based in 
part on the borrower’s risk profile; riskier borrowers receive less favorable terms, 
and at a certain point, will not be able to obtain a loan at all. Under the standard 
170. See Final REPAYE Rules, 80 Fed. Reg. at 67,213. 
171. See id. (stating that the provision was “directed towards ensuring that borrowers pay 
equitably”). 
172. See id. at 67,214 (responding to a comment submitted by one of us (Brooks)). To be clear, if ten 
percent of the borrower’s income is greater than the standard loan payment, then the borrower would be 
paying essentially the standard payment of principal and full interest, plus an additional paydown of 
principal. That means less (high-rate) interest accruing on that principal going forward, and thus a lower 
total cost over the life of the loan. 
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debt paradigm, the loan will be for a fixed sum, payable according to an agreed- 
upon schedule. The loan may or may not be amortized; it may allow for prepay-
ment or have late payment penalties; and interest may or may not compound, but 
the loan nevertheless contemplates a particular payment schedule as a baseline. 
This payment schedule makes it possible for the borrower to determine the cost 
of the loan and to therefore compare the loan with other products. Under the 
standard debt paradigm, the repayment schedule contemplates repayment in full 
of the principal. If prepayment is allowed, it will reduce interest payments, but it 
will not result in principal forgiveness. 
Under the standard debt paradigm, the loan will also come with a contractual 
asterisk regarding repayment. Although future-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. 
famously described a contract at common law as the obligation to perform as 
agreed or to pay damages (which in the case of a loan would be the same as per-
formance),173 under contemporary American law, a loan agreement is an agree-
ment for the borrower to pay as agreed or pay damages, subject to the possibility 
of restructuring or discharging the debt in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy asterisk 
represents an important safety valve against overleverage. Finally, under the 
standard debt paradigm, the lender will always be subject to regulatory oversight 
of some sort, although the details might vary by lender, borrower, and product. 
When viewed against this yardstick, student loan debt looks very different. 
Perhaps the central difference between most student loan debt and other types of 
debt obligations is that the federal government is the direct lender. A range of 
structural features of student loan debt flow from the government serving as 
lender because the government has different goals, incentives, and economics 
than a private lender. Whereas a private, for-profit lender’s goal is profit, that is 
not the objective of the federal government. Instead, federal student lending has a 
social goal of improving access to and affordability of higher education.174 
Additionally, the federal government has a much higher capacity to absorb and 
spread risk, especially across time and generations, and has access to taxing 
power to manage issues of moral hazard. 
The federal government’s lack of profit motive, its goal to have more college 
graduates, and its superior ability to absorb risk enables federal student loans to 
differ from other types of loans in a number of material ways. These differences 
include a lack of underwriting, income-contingent payments, debt forgiveness, a 
lack of compounding interest, a lack of interest accrual in some circumstances, 
favorable tax treatment, and other pro-debtor features. However, they also 
173. O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (“The duty to keep a 
contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it, — and 
nothing else.”). Holmes’s famous dictum is limited to common law, but it was also made at a time when 
there was no bankruptcy law in force in the United States. 
174. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-951, at 1 (1978) (stating the purpose of the Middle Income Student 
Assistance Act was “to provide needed financial assistance to students from hard-pressed working class 
and middle-income families”); H.R. REP. NO. 85-2157, at 1 (1958) (stating the purpose of the NDEA 
was “to assist in the improvement and strengthening of our educational system at all levels and to 
encourage able students to continue their education beyond high school”). 
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include sharp limitations on bankruptcy discharge. The federal government’s role 
as a direct lender also affects regulatory oversight of the loans because the 
Department of Education is not subject to regulation by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), or state regula-
tory authorities.175 Although we would describe many federal direct loan pro-
grams other than student lending as fairly typical debt contracts—government 
lending alone is hardly dispositive here—this totality of differences leads us to 
conclude that student loans are, in substance, a unique financial and legal 
category. 
A. LACK OF UNDERWRITING 
Perhaps the most remarkable and nondebt-like feature of federal student loans 
is that they are not underwritten in any way. Most lending is underwritten (priced) 
to reflect the borrower’s risk over a risk-free rate. This underwriting looks to vari-
ous measures of the consumer’s credit quality and the consumer’s capacity to 
repay from income and assets. Riskier borrowers pay more or receive less credit, 
and when borrowers become too risky, they do not receive credit on any terms. 
Federal loans to students have no underwriting. Instead, federal student loans 
are one-size-fits-all products in terms of loan eligibility, rates, and maximum loan 
size.176 It does not matter if a borrower is an engineering major at MIT or a poetry 
major at Upper Vermont State Community College. The loan terms for both bor-
rowers will be the same despite vastly different career, and hence repayment, 
prospects. 
The lack of underwriting reflects, in part, the difficulty in underwriting bor-
rowers with little or no credit history and no or part-time employment. It also 
reflects a reasonable political reluctance to price based on the borrower’s school 
and course of study because of concerns about steering students into particular 
schools or programs of study. Additionally, pricing based on school or course of 
study could raise discriminatory lending issues. Would rates be higher for stu-
dents at historically Black colleges and universities? Would there be different 
rates for students majoring in women’s studies than for computer science majors? 
The lack of underwriting has cross-cutting effects on borrowers. It increases 
the pool of borrowers who can get loans, which is helpful for those borrowers 
who would otherwise not be able to finance higher education. Lack of underwrit-
ing also means there is a cross-subsidization from borrowers who have lower risk 
profiles to those with higher risk profiles because all borrowers pay the same 
price.177 Directly, this is good for some borrowers and bad for others, but indi-
rectly its net impact is harder to discern because the cross-subsidy likely has 
175. Significantly, however, private loan servicers working for the Department of Education may be 
subject to regulation by the CFPB, FTC, and state authorities. 
176. See Glater, supra note 19. 
177. On cross-subsidization, see generally John Brooks, Brian Galle & Brendan Maher, Cross- 
Subsidies: Government’s Hidden Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229 (2018) (describing cross-subsidies 
and arguing that they are efficient in certain circumstances). Regarding cross-subsidization in student 
loans, see Brooks, supra note 33, at 269–71 and Brooks et al., supra, at 1260–61. 
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systemic benefits that accrue to all borrowers, such as helping create economies 
of scale in higher education and increasing the diversity of student bodies and the 
overall educational level of Americans. 
The lack of underwriting does have one clearly negative effect on borrowers, 
however. The absence of risk-based pricing means that borrowers do not receive 
market feedback about the riskiness of their borrowing. If a potential borrower is 
able to obtain credit only at a high price, that is a signal to the borrower that the 
creditor specifically and the market generally have doubts about the borrower’s 
likelihood of successful repayment. This, combined with the difficulty of predict-
ing effective interest rates, makes it near impossible for student borrowers to 
know if their borrowing is within their ability to repay.178 
Notably, the lack of front-end underwriting is mitigated by the availability of 
back-end “underwriting” in the form of IDR options, as discussed below.179 
Although affordability is not considered on the front end, it is essentially built 
into federal student loan products through repayment options that limit the obli-
gations based on a rough measure of affordability, namely a percentage of the 
borrower’s adjusted gross income. Additionally, deferment and forbearance 
options help ensure affordability of monthly payments at times when the bor-
rower is unlikely to have significant income. 
B. INCOME-CONTINGENT PAYMENTS 
A borrower in one of the IDR plans (ICR, Old IBR, New IBR, PAYE, 
REPAYE) is not required to pay a fixed monthly amount based on their principal 
and interest rate but instead is to make payments that are a function of their 
income. This is especially true for REPAYE, where a borrower pays ten percent 
of their discretionary income no matter what their income is.180 (In the other IDR 
plans, a borrower may revert to paying the standard loan amount when their 
income is high enough.)181 Moreover, the complicated rules on interest accrual 
and capitalization mean that for many borrowers there is little connection 
between typical debt terms—principal and interest rate—and what they actually 
pay, even if they never have their loans forgiven.182 
Income-contingent debt is a product that is virtually absent from the world of 
consumer finance. Concepts such as formal income-contingent repayment 
arrangements simply do not exist for products other than student loans. Instead, 
to the extent that any income-contingent repayment occurs, it is in the context of 
loan workouts, bespoke arrangements made when a debtor has fallen behind on a 
loan. Only student loans have a standing option of income-contingent repayment. 
178. See, e.g., Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 530 
(2013) (arguing that the “price signal” of risk-based pricing “would likely improve students’ ability to 
make informed decisions about the course of study that would best balance their innate abilities and 
individual preferences with postgraduate economic opportunities”). 
179. See infra Section II.B. 
180. See supra notes 166–72 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra note 169. 
182. See infra Section II.D. 
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To illustrate the unusualness, consider that tax law often requires a determina-
tion of whether a purported debt instrument is truly debt for tax purposes (and 
thus whether interest payments are deductible). The same is true for bankruptcy 
law and consumer credit regulation. Loan payments as variable as student loan 
obligations and based directly on revenue or profit of the borrower, with no rela-
tion to the stated interest rate or some other rate index, carry a serious risk of 
being legally recharacterized as equity instead of debt for tax, bankruptcy, or con-
sumer credit purposes.183 Of course, the concerns of tax law—protecting the tax 
base against excessive earnings stripping through interest deductions—and the 
concerns of bankruptcy law—determining the priority of claims or interests in 
the debtor—are not the same concerns as consumer credit law—ensuring smooth 
functioning of debt markets by protecting borrower rights. But in the case of fed-
eral loans to fund higher education, it is not clear whether any of these concerns 
are present. 
C. FORGIVENESS OF UNPAID BALANCES 
All borrowers in IDR are entitled to forgiveness of any unpaid balances— 
principal and interest—after being in a repayment plan for some set amount of 
time (ten, twenty, or twenty-five years, depending on the plan).184 The forgive-
ness is contractual, not discretionary, and is based only on objective factors, such 
as the borrower’s income and length of time in repayment. If the terms of the loan 
require payment only for a fixed number of years, with no discretion for the 
lender on whether payments must continue after that, it is debatable whether the 
end of the loan after that period is truly “forgiveness.” Instead, the contract itself 
is more aptly described as giving the borrower a right to satisfy the debt by paying 
X percent of income for Y years. This is vastly different than a standard debt con-
tract, which requires repayment in full of all loan principal and accrued interest. 
Student loan forgiveness can also occur outside the IDR plans, such as in cases 
of death and disability, school closure, false certification of loan eligibility, and 
fraud-like situations that provide borrowers a “defense to repayment.”185 
Although these rules were written to apply to private lenders under the 
Guaranteed Student Loan Program, they also apply to Direct Loans,186 meaning 
the lender—the federal government—has provided in the terms of the loan for a 
number of situations where the borrower simply does not have to pay the govern-
ment back. Whereas some commercial law and bankruptcy remedies provide for  
183. See, e.g., William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A 
Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369, 431–47 (1971). 
184. See supra Section I.G. 
185. 34 C.F.R. § 685.222(a)(5)(i) (2019); see id. § 685.212(a) (borrower’s death); id. § 685.213(a) 
(borrower’s disability); id. § 685.214(a) (closed school); id. § 685.215(a) (false certification of 
eligibility). 
186. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(a)(1) (2018) (stating that, unless otherwise specified, Direct Loans are to 
be treated the same as guaranteed loans). 
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cancellation or subordination of a debt in the case of lender malfeasance,187 stu-
dent loan forgiveness for federal Direct Loans applies where the lender (the U.S. 
government) has done nothing wrong, and at most perhaps a school, a third party 
that is neither the borrower nor the lender under the current program, has behaved 
badly.188 These are terms one would rarely expect to see in a typical debt 
instrument. 
D. INTEREST ACCRUAL 
The rules on origination fees (essentially points), interest forbearance, deferral, 
accrual, compounding, and capitalization are highly complex, so it is almost 
impossible for borrowers to understand ex ante how much interest they will 
actually pay or what their effective interest rates will be. Federal student loans are 
not subject to the Truth in Lending Act disclosure regime,189 so there is no disclo-
sure of the finance charge—the expected borrowing cost on the loan if paid off 
according to its terms. Moreover, federal student loans have automatic rights to 
deferment and forbearance, unlike any other type of debt—and that is before we 
get to the IDR plans. It is not an exaggeration to say that a student borrower can-
not know ex ante how much the borrowing will ultimately cost. 
To illustrate how complex the interest accrual rules are, we briefly summarize 
the interest terms of the various IDR plans. Together they show that the amount 
of interest that will actually be charged on a loan is indeterminate ex ante—it will 
depend on factors that neither the borrower nor the government can know at the 
time the loan is made. Moreover, the complexity of the terms makes it difficult to 
guess with much precision. 
It is necessary as an initial matter to define a few terms. Interest accrues 
monthly based on the unpaid principal balance and stated interest rate. 
Sometimes this accrued interest is paid by the borrower in the current monthly pe-
riod, sometimes it is paid by the government (and thus not charged to the bor-
rower), and sometimes it is simply unpaid. In some cases, unpaid accrued interest 
is capitalized into the loan principal, meaning that it becomes part of the principal 
balance of the loan on which further interest will compound. If accrued but 
unpaid interest is not capitalized, it is still owed, but interest will not compound 
on it. 
First, for all Direct Loans, whether in IDR or not, there is a distinction between 
unsubsidized and subsidized loans.190 Subsidized loans are available for families 
and students below a specified income threshold. With subsidized loans, the gov-
ernment pays the accrued interest while the student is enrolled in higher 
187. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2018) (providing for equitable subordination in bankruptcy); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 37-8 (2020) (principal and interest payments on usurious loan unenforceable); N.Y. 
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511 (McKinney 2020) (principal and interest payments on usurious loan 
unenforceable); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305–06 (1939) (recognizing availability of equitable 
disallowance in bankruptcy (citing Lesser v. Gray, 236 U.S. 70, 74 (1915))). 
188. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.215(a), 685.222(d) (2019). 
189. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(7) (2018). 
190. See supra Section I.E. 
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education and for a six-month period after leaving school (and also during any pe-
riod of deferment).191 
For unsubsidized loans, however, all interest accrues and is owed by the bor-
rower, unless an IDR provision provides otherwise.192 As noted in Section I.C, 
the interest subsidies were first put in place under the system of federal loan guar-
antees, so that the federal government was literally paying the interest subsidy to 
a private lender.193 But under the current Direct Loan system, the government’s 
“payment” of the interest is simply a decision not to charge or collect interest as it 
is due because the government would otherwise merely be “paying” itself. 
Essentially, the government just forgives some of the interest that would other-
wise be charged to the borrower. 
For tax purposes, we would think that either of these situations would generate 
gross income for the borrower—either the government is paying a debt on behalf 
of the borrower,194 or is forgiving part of the debt to itself.195 This issue does not 
appear to have ever been raised, and there is no authority on point. That this has 
never been broached suggests that all parties understand that interest obligations 
are a fiction or, at a minimum, that stated interest on student loans is not compara-
ble to interest on typical debt. 
Second, for loans using one of the IDR plans, the interest-accrual rules differ 
starkly based on the particular plan. To review, there are four types of IDR plans: 
Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR), Income-Based Repayment (Old and New 
IBR), Pay As You Earn (PAYE), and Revised Pay As You Earn (REPAYE).196 
We briefly explain these varied interest rules in order to illustrate the complexity 
for borrowers. 
1. Income-Contingent Repayment 
For a borrower in ICR (other than PAYE and REPAYE), unpaid accrued inter-
est is capitalized into the loan for an amount up to ten percent of the original loan 
balance.197 Unpaid, accrued interest beyond that is still owed but does not grow 
and compound over time—it is essentially an additional, interest-free loan. 
Because the debt is long-term (ICR forgiveness is at twenty-five years), the pres-
ent value of some early unpaid interest would be substantially discounted in pres-
ent value terms. For example, if we assume a discount rate equal to the long-term  
191. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.207(b)(3) (2019). 
192. Id. § 685.207(c)(3). 
193. See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 428(a), 79 Stat. 1219, 1240–41; supra 
text accompanying note 89. 
194. See, e.g., Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929) (“The discharge by a third 
person of an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed.”). 
195. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(11) (2018) (stating that gross income includes “[i]ncome from discharge of 
indebtedness”). 
196. See supra Section I.G. 
197. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(b)(3)(iv) (2019). 
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Treasury rate (roughly three percent at the time of this writing198
See Daily Treasury Long Term Rate Data, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY: RESOURCE CTR., https:// 
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=longtermrate 
[https://perma.cc/BHB3-T85M] (last visited Sept. 10, 2020). 
), a debt of $100 
in Year 1 that charges no interest would have a present value of about $48 in 
Year 25—that is, noncapitalization is equivalent to cancellation of $52 of debt in 
present value.199 If we assume that the present value should be discounted by the 
student loan interest rate that would otherwise be charged, the present value of 
that $100 could be as little as $16 (for Grad PLUS debt).200 
2. Income-Based Repayment 
If the payment of a borrower in IBR (Old or New) is not sufficient to cover the 
interest otherwise due, the government will cover the unpaid interest during the 
first three years of repayment (for both subsidized and unsubsidized Direct 
Loans).201 After that, however, any unpaid interest accrues and is fully capitalized 
into the loan if the borrower’s income becomes high enough that the borrower no 
longer needs income-based payments, or if the borrower simply leaves the 
plan.202 Contrast that with ICR, which does not reduce the interest payments for 
any period but caps the amount of unpaid interest that can be capitalized. 
3. Pay As You Earn 
The PAYE plan combines the terms of ICR and IBR. The government will 
cover unpaid interest during the first three years of repayment203 and will also cap 
the capitalization of any interest after that at ten percent of the original loan.204 
As with ICR, uncapitalized interest still accrues but does not bear an interest 
charge of its own.205 
4. Revised Pay As You Earn 
The REPAYE plan provides yet another treatment of interest. Under this plan, 
the government will pay all the interest in the first three years only for subsidized 
loans.206 For unsubsidized loans, the government covers only half of the interest 
(the rest is either paid or accrued and unpaid).207 However, after the first three 
years, the government will continue to cover half of the unpaid interest for all 
loans, subsidized and unsubsidized.208 Moreover, none of the leftover unpaid 
198. 
199. That is, $48 in Year 1, invested at a three-percent return, would generate $100 in Year 25. 
200. Interest on Grad PLUS Loans issued for 2018–19 is 7.6%. Annual Notice of Interest Rates for 
Fixed-Rate Federal Student Loans Made Under the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 83 
Fed. Reg. 53,864, 53,865 (Oct. 25, 2018). 
201. 34 C.F.R. § 685.221(b)(3) (2019). 
202. Id. § 685.221(b)(4). 
203. Id. § 685.209(a)(2)(iii). 
204. Id. § 685.209(a)(2)(iv)(B)(1). 
205. Id. § 685.209(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2). 
206. Id. § 685.209(c)(2)(iii)(A). 
207. Id. § 685.209(c)(2)(iii)(B). 
208. Id. § 685.209(c)(2)(iii)(A)–(B). 
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accrued interest is capitalized into the loan principal unless the borrower leaves 
REPAYE (which is not required, even for a person with high income).209 
* * * 
We describe these interest-accrual rules in detail to illustrate their complexity 
and variety. When a borrower takes out a loan, the borrower may not know the 
repayment plan he or she will ultimately use. The borrower may select a repay-
ment plan years after the actual loan. As a result, the borrower cannot know how 
interest accrual will work and thus cannot know the total cost of borrowing. The 
amount of interest a borrower will actually pay, or even have forgiven in a formal 
sense, is a complex function of the type of underlying loan, the choice of repay-
ment plan, and unforeseeable future income fluctuations. It is literally unknow-
able ex ante—to both the borrower and the lender—which distinguishes student 
loans from all other types of consumer borrowing, wherein the centerpiece of the 
disclosure regime is the ex ante disclosure of the costs of borrowing.210 
E. LACK OF PENALTY FOR LATE PAYMENTS 
Late fees are a standard feature of most consumer loans. Nearly all mortgages, 
auto loans, and credit card loans have late fees. The form of the note for federal 
student loans authorizes late fees,211 
See OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OMB NO. 1845-0007, MASTER 
PROMISSORY NOTE 5 (2019), https://studentloans.gov/myDirectLoan/subUnsubHTMLPreview.action 
[https://perma.cc/WS5P-NZEF] (authorizing a six-percent late fee). 
but the Department of Education does not 
levy late fees and forbids its loan servicers from charging them.212 
CFPB, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS: ISSUE 9, FALL 2015, at 24 (2015), https://files.consumerfinance. 
gov/f/201510_cfpb_supervisory-highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/DXC6-665E]. 
Thus, if a con-
sumer is delinquent, interest will continue to accrue, but there is no special pen-
alty for late payment. 
F. TAX TREATMENT OF DEBT FORGIVENESS 
In typical circumstances, forgiven debt creates gross income for tax purposes 
because the release of the liability delivers a benefit to the borrower equivalent to 
having received the money to pay off the debt.213 Relieving someone of that debt 
burden increases the person’s net wealth just as much as receiving cash. Therefore, 
this gain in wealth is treated as income by the tax system in normal circumstances. 
As should be clear by now, student loans are not such a normal circumstance. 
The tax treatment of student debt varies depending on the repayment plan and 
the reasons for forgiveness. That varied treatment is also in flux, subject to ad hoc 
rulings by the Treasury and IRS. The tax code has long provided that debt for-
given under PSLF (or its predecessors) is excluded from gross income for tax  
209. See id. § 685.209(c)(2)(iv). 




213. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(11) (2018). 
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purposes.214 The 2017 tax reform bill added an additional exclusion for debt for-
given due to death and disability (at least through 2025).215 Moreover, the HEA 
states that debt forgiven because of school closure is excluded from gross income 
for tax purposes.216 
The tax treatment of student debt discharged for other reasons is less clear. 
There is no explicit statutory exclusion for debt forgiven under any of the IDR 
plans, or for false certification or borrower defense to repayment, and the 
Treasury’s position seems to be that the forgiven debt does create taxable income 
in those situations.217 
Yet on at least two occasions, the IRS has ruled that debt forgiven under the 
borrower-defense theory could also be excluded. In 2015, the Department of 
Education forced Corinthian Colleges, a for-profit chain, to close and discharged 
any remaining debt held by its students, applying both closed-school (for recent 
students) and borrower-defense (for students who had graduated or were no lon-
ger enrolled) theories.218 
Fact Sheet: Protecting Students from Abusive Career Colleges, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (June 8, 
2015), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/fact-sheet-protecting-students-abusive-career-colleges 
[https://perma.cc/QD8L-GBTY]. 
Only the closed-school discharge has a statutory exclu-
sion from taxation, but the IRS announced that it would not assert that gross 
income had been created for any borrower.219 The IRS reasoned that many bor-
rowers with borrower-defense discharge were either victims of fraudulent mis-
representation or insolvent, both of which can lead to an income exclusion under 
the tax code.220 But because it would be too difficult to determine which bor-
rowers actually qualified for these exclusions, the IRS simply applied those theo-
ries to everyone.221 
In 2017, the IRS extended that same ruling to former students of American 
Career Institutes, whose debt had been discharged in similar circumstances.222 
These two examples might be enough to assume a pattern and a precedent, but 
the tax impact of these discharges still relies on the IRS issuing a formal ruling in 
future cases, and it is not clear whether future discharges under borrower defense 
would receive similar tax treatment. 
In any case, neither of these rulings apply to IDR discharges. Currently, the 
Treasury’s position is that those discharges will be taxable because no clear 
214. See id. § 108(f)(1). 
215. Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 11,031, § 108(f), 131 Stat. 2054, 2081 (codified at I.R.C. § 108(f)(5)(A)(iii) 
(2018)). 
216. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee(a)(5) (PSLF loans); id. § 1087(c)(4) (incorporating § 1087ee(a)(5) for 
FFEL loans); id. § 1087e(a)(1) (incorporating FFEL terms for Direct Loans). Notably, it seems that 
Treasury was unaware of this last exclusion for at least a period, likely because the exclusion was never 
codified in the tax law or regulations. See Brooks, supra note 74, at 752. 
217. See Letter from Eric Solomon, Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy, Dep’t of Treasury, to Hon. 
Sander Levin, U.S. House of Representatives 4 (Sept. 19, 2008) (on file with author). 
218. 
219. See Rev. Proc. 15-57, 2015-51 I.R.B. 863. 
220. See id. 
221. See id. 
222. See Rev. Proc. 17-24, 2017-7 I.R.B. 916. 
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statutory exclusion applies.223 However, as alluded to above and as one of us has 
argued elsewhere, the history of how student loan discharges are taxed suggests 
that IDR discharges should also be excluded.224 Recall that § 108(f) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which formally excludes debt discharge for PSLF, was 
added because of an adverse IRS ruling for an early PSLF-like plan.225 In that 
1973 ruling, the IRS reversed its earlier position and ruled that debt forgiveness 
under that plan did not qualify as an excluded “scholarship” under Section 117 
because there was a quid pro quo—a benefit could not be a “scholarship” if it was 
essentially pay for services.226 Congress then enacted Section 108(f) to plug that 
hole and continue the exclusion.227 But for IDR, as opposed to PSLF, there is no 
quid pro quo in the first place—the borrower is not required to work in a particu-
lar field or geographic region, or to do anything else. Thus, the scholarship exclu-
sion should continue to apply in principle. 
At any rate, the takeaway is that there is inconsistent and fluctuating tax treat-
ment of the forgiven debt and a lack of clarity as to what the theory or law is for 
including or excluding any discharge from gross income. At a minimum, this 
illustrates a weak commitment to treating student debt like other forms of debt. 
G. NONDISCHARGEABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY 
There are sharp limitations on the dischargeability of student loan debt in bank-
ruptcy. Conventional wisdom is that student loan debt is usually nondischarge-
able in bankruptcy.228 
See, e.g., Kat Tretina, Is It Worth Using Bankruptcy to Free Yourself from Student Loans?, 
CREDIT KARMA (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.creditkarma.com/advice/i/student-loans-in-bankruptcy 
(citing an education finance expert as stating: “Getting your loans discharged in bankruptcy is 
theoretically possible, but it’s not your ordinary bankruptcy proceeding, and it’s incredibly difficult”). 
Recent scholarship has shown that the restriction is not as 
absolute in practice,229 
229. 
but the limitation on the discharge of student loan debt still 
prevents many borrowers from obtaining debt relief, and the mistaken belief in its 
absolute scope likely chills many other consumers from seeking to address their 
debt burdens through bankruptcy.230 
In a sense, nondischargeability makes student loan debt more like traditional 
debt in that it tightens the obligation to repay. But dischargeability is a feature of 
most debt, including consumer debt.231 Typically debt is not an absolute obliga-
tion to pay but an obligation to pay or file for bankruptcy. Moreover, the IDR 
plans function more like a sliding-scale discharge, without the borrower having 
223. See Letter from Eric Solomon, supra note 217. 
224. See Brooks, supra note 74. 
225. See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. 
226. See Rev. Rul. 73-256, 1973-1 C.B. 56. 
227. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 1076(a), § 108, 98 Stat. 494, 1053– 
54 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 108(f)(1) (2018)); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-41-84, GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 1199–1201 
(1984). 
228. 
230. See id. at 499 (“99.9 percent of bankrupt student loan debtors do not even try to discharge their 
student loans.”). 
231. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2018) (excepting limited, enumerated types of debt from discharge). 
2020] REDESIGNING EDUCATION FINANCE 43 
See Iuliano, supra note 8, at 501. 
to actually declare bankruptcy. In other words, one can get similar benefits as dis-
charge but without having to be declared insolvent and without affecting other 
debt. Student loans, and IDR loans in particular, exist in their own category. 
H. FEWER CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 
Lack of bankruptcy discharge is not the only way in which student debt is 
actually tougher than other consumer debt. Borrowers often have fewer federal 
statutory protections. The federal Truth in Lending Act, for example, does not 
apply to federal student loans, even though it covers private student loans.232 
Likewise, federal student loans are exempt from state-law disclosure regimes.233 
This has four important implications. 
First, it means that federal student loan borrowers do not receive equivalent 
disclosures about the terms of their loans compared to other types of credit, 
including other types of credit that they might use as substitutes for financing 
their educations—private student loans and credit cards. A lack of adequate and 
comparable information impedes borrowers’ abilities to make informed con-
sumption decisions, such as whether to borrow and how much from which 
sources. 
The Truth in Lending Act has an ex ante disclosure regime, designed to pro-
mote an “informed use of credit.”234 This disclosure regime is based around the 
pre-borrowing disclosure of a standardized, all-in representation of the cost of 
credit in the forms of a “finance charge” and an “annual percentage rate.”235 
The HEA has its own disclosure requirements, but it does not require pre- 
borrowing disclosures of credit costs or use the standardized “finance charge” 
and “annual percentage rate” for disclosures.236 Instead, disclosures must merely 
disclose the “actual interest rate,” an undefined term.237 The lack of definition is 
particularly notable because the Truth in Lending Act’s definition of “finance 
charge” and “annual percentage rate” were adopted precisely because of the abil-
ity of lenders to deceive or confuse consumers by manipulating the presentation 
of the interest rate.238 Even more significantly, HEA disclosures are not made 
prior to lending. Instead, they must be made between 30 and 150 days before pay-
ment is first due, which means that they are made only after the borrower has 
committed to the deal.239 
232. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(7) (2018). 
233. 20 U.S.C. § 1098g (2018). 
234. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2018). 
235. Id. § 1637(a). 
236. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.205(a)(1)–(2) (2019). The Department of Education regulations are for 
FFEL loans, but pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(a)(1) (2018), the regulations governing FFEL loans 
apply to Direct Loans unless otherwise specified. 
237. 34 C.F.R. § 682.205(a)(2)(iv) (2019). 
238. See Anne Fleming, The Long History of “Truth in Lending,” 30 J. POL’Y HIST. 236, 237, 247 
(2018). 
239. See 20 U.S.C. § 1083(b) (2018); 34 C.F.R. § 682.205(a)(1) (2019).  
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Second, failure to comply with HEA loan disclosure requirements does not cre-
ate civil liability for the Department of Education240 or relieve the borrower of 
the obligation to repay the loan.241 In contrast, failure to provide Truth in Lending 
Act disclosures for typical debt results in the lender’s civil liability, including 
statutory damages of two times the finance charge and attorney’s fees.242 
Third, the Truth in Lending Act also contains an important consumer protec-
tion in the form of a “billing error”–resolution regime that enables consumer bor-
rowers to obtain information and requires lenders to undertake a good-faith 
investigation into disputed charges while the consumer withholds payment, with-
out triggering collection activity or negative credit reporting.243 Given the high 
costs of litigation relative to consumer debt amounts, this is an important con-
sumer protection that encourages consensual resolution of disputes. Borrowers 
under federal student loans do not have this protection because the Truth in 
Lending Act does not apply to them, even though it does apply to private student 
loans.244 
And fourth, the Truth in Lending Act also prohibits lenders from engaging in 
collection activity through offsets of consumer debts against amounts the lender 
owes to the consumer unless the lender has first obtained a judgment against the 
consumer.245 The HEA, in contrast, specifically authorizes the Department of 
Education to engage in “administrative offset,” that is, garnishment from govern-
ment payments, such as tax refunds or other government transfers.246 
I. MINIMAL REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 
Unlike all other types of consumer credit, federal student loans are exempt 
from independent regulatory oversight. Other types of consumer loans are subject 
to oversight and regulation variously by the CFPB and the FTC, as well as state 
regulatory authorities.247 Although these regulators may maintain authority over 
the servicing of student loans by private servicers,248 they have no authority to 
police the terms of the loans or the application of Department of Education 
240. 20 U.S.C. § 1083(f)(2)(B) (2018). 
241. Id. § 1083(f)(2)(A). 
242. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2018). 
243. Id. § 1666(a). 
244. See id. § 1603(7). 
245. Id. § 1640(h). 
246. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(5)(iii) (2019); infra Section II.J. 
247. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2018) (empowering the FTC to prohibit unfair and deceptive 
acts and practices in commerce, excluding depositories and credit unions); Adam J. Levitin, The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 322 (2012– 
2013). 
248. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction & Other Relief ¶ 16, CFPB v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17- 
cv-101, 2017 WL 3380530 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017) (bringing enforcement action against student loan 
servicer). The Department of Education asserts that the HEA preempts state regulation of federal student 
loan servicers. Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s Federal 
Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,619, 10,619 (Mar. 12, 
2018). This argument was rejected by the Seventh Circuit. See Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., 
Inc., 928 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 2019). 
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discharge decisions.249 In particular, federal student loans are not subject to pro-
hibitions on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices.250 Thus, what con-
sumer protection exists for federal student loans is undertaken primarily by the 
Department of Education, meaning that the lender is policing itself. 
Although the Department of Education is the first line of supervision of federal 
student loan servicers, that supervision is not undertaken by a dedicated consumer 
protection unit in the Department of Education—there is none—but by employ-
ees from three offices within Federal Student Aid (the unit of the Department of 
Education responsible for student loans), namely Business Operations, Program 
Compliance, and Finance.251 These offices are tasked with ensuring that the serv-
icers are complying with the terms of their contracts and general federal student 
loan servicing requirements.252 They have no authority to ensure that servicers 
comply with broader standards prohibiting unfairness, deception, or abuse, much 
less to discipline servicers based on these broad standards. 
Even within the scope of its authority, the Department of Education has done 
little to ensure servicer compliance with contract and regulatory requirements. A 
Department of Education Inspector General report found that Federal Student 
Aid “had not established policies and procedures that provided reasonable assur-
ance that the risk of servicer noncompliance with requirements for servicing fed-
erally held student loans was mitigated.”253 The report further found that: 
“[Federal Student Aid] management rarely used available contract accountability 
provisions to hold servicers accountable for instances of noncompliance.”254 
Thus, the Inspector General found that “[Federal Student Aid] also rarely penal-
ized servicers for recurring noncompliance. In the 5 years that ended September 
2017, FSA had required only three servicers to return about $181,000 to FSA for 
four instances of failure to service loans in compliance with Federal loan servic-
ing requirements.”255 The Department of Education’s weak oversight of servicers 
means that servicers have little incentive to take care to comply with federal loan 
servicing requirements.256 
249. There is no express exception to CFPB or FTC authority for federal student loans. For the 
CFPB, the Department of Education does not seem to fall under the definition of “person” and thus 
under the definition of “covered person,” which is its jurisdictional trigger, unless it falls within the 
catchall of “other entity,” which seems unlikely. See 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6), (19) (2018). Similarly, the 
FTC’s authority to prohibit unfair and deceptive acts and practices extends to “persons,” a term that is 
not defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 or its amendments. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a) 
(2018). It is unclear if the term could extend to the federal government. 
250. See supra note 249. 
251. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-OIG/A05Q0008, FEDERAL STUDENT 
AID: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE THE RISK OF SERVICER NONCOMPLIANCE WITH 
REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICING FEDERALLY HELD STUDENT LOANS 7 (2019). 
252. Id. at 30. 
253. Id. at 2. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 4. 
256. Id. 
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What all of this means is that the due process and borrower protections that 
Congress thinks should exist in the context of private loans do not exist in the 
context of federal loans. But because student loans are treated as loans, rather 
than as government benefits, they also lack the sort of due process provisions that 
govern Social Security and disability payments, or even tax payments.257 Student 
loans are again in their own category: one without the legal protections and over-
sight that apply to other categories. 
J. EXTREME CONSEQUENCES OF DEFAULT 
The consequences of defaulting on a student loan are substantially worse than 
defaulting on other forms of consumer debt. A default on regular consumer debt 
can result in dunning by debt collectors or a judgment followed by either garnish-
ment or execution on and the foreclosure sale of a debtor’s nonexempt property. 
Critically, a creditor on a standard loan can reach only the debtor’s future income 
or nonexempt property,258 but federal benefit payments are ordinarily exempt 
from garnishment.259 
In contrast, the federal government, as creditor, has collection capabilities that 
exceed those of private lenders. The federal government is allowed to engage in 
“administrative offset” of past-due student loan debt payments against future fed-
eral benefit payments and tax refunds.260 Private creditors are also able to engage 
in setoff, say against a deposit account balance, but a consumer can readily avoid 
setoff simply by limiting its dealings with a creditor. A consumer cannot avoid 
being a federal benefit recipient so easily. 
Moreover, under some state laws, a default on student loan debt can mean fro-
zen college credentials (for example, transcripts being withheld)261 
See KASEY KLEPFER, CHRIS FERNANDEZ, CARLA FLETCHER & JEFF WEBSTER, TG RESEARCH & 
ANALYTICAL SERVS., INFORMED OR OVERWHELMED?: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF STUDENT LOAN 
COUNSELING WITH A LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE EFFICACY OF LOAN COUNSELING 4 (2015), https:// 
files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED579985.pdf [https://perma.cc/N59V-B7MR]. 
or even sus-
pension of state occupational licenses.262 These modern-day forms of debtors’ 
prison are unique among consumer debts.263 
257. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330 (2018) (due process in tax collection); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 332–33 (1976) (due process in Social Security administrative proceedings). 
258. Property exemptions vary significantly among the states, as do wage garnishment restrictions 
above the federal floor. See Hynes et al., supra note 48, at 25–28 (explaining variation in state property 
exemption laws); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2018) (establishing federal limitations on wage 
garnishment). 
259. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2018) (prohibiting garnishment of Social Security benefits); 
31 C.F.R. § 212.6 (2019) (exempting federal benefit payments from garnishment while in a deposit 
account). Exceptions exist for federal- and state-tax delinquencies and domestic support obligation 
debts. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(1)(A) (2018) (support orders); id. § 1673(b)(1)(C) (federal- and state-tax 
delinquencies). 
260. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 30.20–.31, 682.410(b)(5)(iii) (2019). 
261. 
262. See id.; Wagner, supra note 9, at 1. 
263. They are also self-defeating because depriving a borrower of an occupational license makes it 
less likely that the borrower will be able to repay. More mundanely, debt concerns may drive some 
students to avoid fields that require graduate degrees or professional licensing or credentialing, or to live 
at home and attend lower ranked schools. 
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III. STUDENT LOAN PROBLEMS STEMMING FROM THE DEBT PARADIGM 
The primary claim of this Article is that most, if not all, of the problems with 
student loan debt in general and IDR debt in particular are due to the incompati-
bility between the legal and institutional apparatus of debt and the economic real-
ity of student loans as they exist today. Student loans operate like traditional debt 
when they should not and not like traditional debt when they should. 
The debt-based attributes of federal student loans are carryovers from the leg-
acy structure of education financing. When education financing was done through 
private loans backed by federal loan guarantees, the transaction was more clearly 
one of debt. From this debt framework, a number of features followed. 
For example, interest subsidization, the tax treatment of forgiven debt, and pri-
vate loan servicing all make sense in the context of a loan guarantee program. 
Interest subsidization was necessary because private lenders required a regular 
revenue stream on the loans while the student was still enrolled; the uncertainty 
of length of enrollment would otherwise make it difficult to price loans. Interest 
subsidization ensured this needed revenue stream. 
Likewise, the original tax treatment of student loan debt forgiveness lined up 
more closely with the treatment for other debt. And private loan servicing was the 
only option for collections on private loans. 
These concepts and features, among others, have carried over to the Direct 
Loan era, but they make little sense today, particularly because they have been 
tweaked and adjusted as the government’s direct role in lending has increased. As 
discussed in Part II, the federal government does not require a regular revenue 
stream on the loans; it can provide grants or loan forgiveness for a variety of rea-
sons, and it has collection options besides private loan servicers—the legacy fea-
tures are increasingly inapposite to the needs of today’s loan program and the 
powers of the government. For the reasons that we lay out below, the direct fed-
eral role in student loans requires a fundamental rethinking of the underlying 
structure of the education financing program. 
A. UNNECESSARILY HIGH LEVEL OF LOAN DEFAULTS 
Over 9 million student borrowers are currently in default,264 which is typically 
triggered after 270 days of nonpayment.265 This translates into a default rate of 
nearly thirteen percent,266 
See OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, supra note 5. By dollar amount, 12.7% of debt is in default, 
but it represents 18.4% of borrowers because small loans are more likely to be in default. See id. A 
different default number that is watched more closely, because it is tied to school eligibility for Title IV 
funding, is the “three-year cohort default rate,” defined as the percentage of borrowers (not debt) who 
enter default within the first three years after they enter repayment. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.202 (2019) 
(method of calculating cohort default rates); id. § 668.206 (school eligibility for Title IV funding). For 
Fiscal Year 2016 (the most recent data), the national cohort default rate is 10.1%, a drop compared to 
prior years. See Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.: OFF. OF FED. STUDENT 
a materially higher default rate than for any other type 
264. See OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, supra note 5. 
265. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.200(b) (2019). 
266. 
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AID, https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdr.html [https://perma.cc/DC9E-VYCL] 
(last updated Feb. 18, 2020). 
of consumer debt, even with a more generous measure of default for student 
loans.267 
In the first quarter of 2020, the credit card delinquency rate was 2.73%. See Delinquency Rate 
on Credit Card Loans, All Commercial Banks, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ 
series/DRCCLACBS [https://perma.cc/GMW7-ZZ3Z] (last updated Feb. 18, 2020) (analyzing data 
provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). In the first quarter of 2020, the 
home mortgage delinquency rate was 2.33%. See Delinquency Rate on Single-Family Residential 
Mortgages, Booked in Domestic Offices, All Commercial Banks, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, https://fred. 
stlouisfed.org/series/DRSFRMACBS [https://perma.cc/83CQ-FYHT] (last updated Feb. 18, 2020) 
(analyzing data provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
Although one would expect high default rates for loans that are not underwrit-
ten in any manner, the availability of IDR operates as a mitigant, a sort of back- 
end, ex post underwriting that keys payment obligations to income. If IDR were 
working properly, there ought to be close to zero defaults because repayments are 
based on income at a level that should ensure affordability. 
The continuing high level of defaults underscores several problems: (1) enroll-
ment in IDR is voluntary and complicated, rather than automatic; (2) the federal 
student loan servicing model creates bad incentives (discussed below) that reduce 
the use of IDR; (3) eligibility for IDR is restricted to borrowers with at most two 
periods of default;268 and (4) the concept of default itself is a legacy tool mis-
matched to the current policy issues. 
In a world where the federal government is the creditor and loan payments are 
directly related to borrowers’ adjusted gross incomes, there is no reason for any 
of the above problems to exist. Automatic IDR with paycheck withholding (as for 
income taxes) would virtually eliminate default.269 The general purpose of the 
default tool in lending—a set of legal and economic consequences that follow 
from loan nonpayment—is to ensure timely payment and trigger additional col-
lection tools when payment is not timely. But this series of sticks—including 
self-defeating ineligibility for IDR—is a mismatched and overly punitive set of 
tools when the government has the simpler and more effective tool of the tax sys-
tem at its disposal. Moreover, by inserting the administrative burden of borrower 
opt-in to IDR through a disincentivized private loan servicer (as discussed in the 
next Section), the government is guaranteeing some degree of failure, unnecessa-
rily driving some borrowers into default. The debt-based enforcement tool of 
default is unnecessary, ineffective, and overly punitive.270 
267. 
268. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(1)(ii) (2019) (defaulted loans not eligible for PAYE); id. 
§ 685.209(c)(1)(ii) (defaulted loans not eligible for REPAYE); id. § 685.210(b)(1) (defaulted borrowers 
restricted from changing repayment plans); id. § 685.219(c)(1)(i) (defaulted loans not eligible for 
PSLF); id. § 685.221(a)(2) (defaulted loans not eligible for IBR plans). A borrower can receive a second 
chance by consolidating, but if the consolidated loan enters default, then it becomes a defaulted loan as 
well. See id. § 685.220(d)(1)(i)(A) (defaulted loans are eligible for consolidation under certain 
circumstances). 
269. We address the primary criticism of automatic withholding infra Section III.E. 
270. Under current higher education law, default rates also provide information about school quality. 
For example, a school with greater than a forty-percent cohort default rate can lose access to Title IV 
funding. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.206(a) (2019). Automatic IDR with paycheck withholding would 
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B. ABUSIVE LOAN SERVICING 
1. Student Loan Servicing 
Loans require administration. This includes the sending of invoices, the collec-
tion and processing of payments, the maintenance of account balances, manage-
ment of repayment plans, and resolution of defaults. In many types of lending, 
the administration of the loan is not done by the creditor on the loan but by a party 
called a servicing agent or servicer that is hired by the creditor;271 borrowers have 
no choice regarding who services their loans.272 
Federal student loans utilize private servicers contracted by the Department of 
Education. Direct Loan servicers send out billing invoices; maintain account bal-
ances; provide borrowers with information regarding forbearance, deferment, 
and repayment plans; and process borrower elections of those options.273 
See, e.g., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-FSA-09-D-0012, Attachment 
A-1 to SOLICITATION/CONTRACT/ORDER FOR COMMERCIAL ITEMS 6, 9 (2009), https://www2.ed.gov/ 
policy/gen/leg/foia/contract/greatlakes-061709.pdf [https://perma.cc/85QF-ZXP2] (original Title IV 
Additional Servicers base contract with Great Lakes Educational Loan Services). 
Notably, however, Direct Loan servicers do not process payments.274 Payments 
are made by borrowers directly to a Department of Education lockbox account.275 
Moreover, Direct Loan servicers do not undertake collection suits.276 Once a loan 
runs 360-days delinquent, it is reassigned from the servicer to a private collection 
agency.277 
Federal student loans have, unfortunately, been marked with a range of serious 
loan servicing problems that have compromised some of the benefits of the pro-
gram and resulted in borrowers paying billions in unnecessary interest by virtue 
of being in suboptimal repayment plans.278 
See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, 28,000 Public Servants Sought Student Loan Forgiveness. 96 Got It., 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/business/student-loan-forgiveness. 
html. 
Of all the problems with the current 
loan programing, servicing may be the single biggest. 
Because servicers are the point of communication and contact for borrowers, 
they are the node through which borrowers’ rights regarding forbearance, 
potentially eliminate that signal of school quality, but others could be created, such as per-school loan 
subsidy rates or a broader application of the Gainful Employment (GE) regulations. See generally 
34 C.F.R. §§ 668.401–.415 (2019) (GE regulations). As of this writing, the Trump Administration is 
seeking to rescind the GE regulations. See Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 84 Fed. Reg. 
31,392, 31,392 (July 1, 2019). 
271. ADAM J. LEVITIN, BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY: FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING AND MODERN 
COMMERCIAL MARKETS 124 (2d ed. 2019). 
272. ADAM J. LEVITIN, CONSUMER FINANCE: MARKETS AND REGULATION 29 (2018). 
273. 
274. See, e.g., id. at 5. 
275. See, e.g., id. 
276.  See Memorandum from Patrick J. Howard, Assistant Inspector Gen. for Audit, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., to James W. Runcie, Chief Operating Officer, Office of Fed. Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 3 
(Dec. 13, 2012). 
277. See, e.g., id. Since servicers can continue to earn servicing fees on a delinquent account, some 
servicers could even intentionally delay assignment to a collection agency in order to continue earning 
servicing fees. See id. at 1, 3 (stating that servicers continue to receive fees on loans that fail to be 
transferred, but suggesting the transfers are the result of failed technology, not intentional delay). 
278. 
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deferment, repayment plans, and loan forgiveness are effectuated (or not). This 
makes servicing of utmost importance in the operation of the Direct Loan system. 
Direct Loan servicing, however, is rife with problems because of the design of 
the system, which is in large measure a carryover from the debt paradigm of the 
FFEL Program of federal guarantees of private loans. 
Direct loans are serviced by a combination of private for-profit and not-for- 
profit (NFP) servicers. In 2009, just before the transition to full direct lending, the 
Department of Education entered into five-year servicing contracts with four for- 
profit firms, called Title IV Additional Servicers (TIVAS).279 
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. & STUDENT LOAN BORROWER ASSISTANCE, MAKING STUDENT 
LOAN SERVICING WORK FOR BORROWERS 1 (2014), https://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/wp- 
content/uploads/2013/05/issue-brief-servicing-fed-loans.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GXY-BVBB]. 
In 2010, Congress 
provided that the Department of Education would keep using private loan serv-
icers even after it became the direct lender but required the Department to use 
NFP servicers in addition to the TIVAS.280 A number of NFP entities had serviced 
loans under the FFEL Program, and they successfully lobbied to receive a guaran-
teed initial allocation of 100,000 loan accounts each, subject to performance-based 
adjustments.281 Until 2014, the NFP servicers were compensated at a premium 
over TIVAS for the same Direct Loan servicing, resulting in some NFP servicers 
outsourcing their accounts to TIVAS and keeping the spread in compensation.282 
See ERIC M. FINK & ROLAND ZULLO, FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN SERVICING: CONTRACT 
PROBLEMS AND PUBLIC SOLUTIONS 5 (2014), https://www.elon.edu/docs/e-web/law/faculty/Fink_Zullo_ 
Federal_Student_Loan_Servicing_report_06_25_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM7J-YGFZ]. 
The continued use of private servicers under the Direct Loan Program was in 
part a way to appease the old FFEL lenders who lost out with the move to direct 
lending and in part a move to avoid the need to design an alternative servicing 
system. But it was also based on the continuation of the debt paradigm, which 
requires loan servicing. 
The Department of Education renewed the TIVAS’ contracts in 2014 for 
another five years.283 Today the Department of Education works with both the 
three TIVAS (two TIVAS merged in 2018)284 
Matt Carter, ‘Big Four’ Student Loan Servicers Now ‘Big Three,’ CREDIBLE (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.credible.com/news/student-loans/big-four-student-loan-servicers-now-three/ [https://perma. 
cc/N8DZ-UBL8]. 
and eleven NFP servicers, one of 
which handles all PSLF and Teacher Education Assistance for College and 
Higher Education Grant Program (TEACH) servicing.285 
See Bob Fernandez & Erin Arvedlund, Is FedLoan, America’s Giant Student Loan Servicer, 
Running Out of Money?, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/business/fedloan- 
student-loans-lending-pheaa-pennsylvania-higher-education-assistance-agency-james-steeley-20190224. 
html (identifying the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency as the exclusive servicer for 
TEACH and PSLF); Loan Servicing Contracts, OFF. FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/data- 
The for-profit TIVAS 
279. 
280. See SAFRA Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, sec. 2212(a), § 456, 124 Stat. 1029, 1078–80 (2010) 
(enacted as part of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010). 
281. See id. (allocating the servicing rights for loan accounts of 100,000 borrowers to eligible NFPs, 
defined as “not-for-profit holder[s] under section 435(p) [of the HEA]”). 
282. 
283. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. & STUDENT LOAN BORROWER ASSISTANCE, supra note 279 
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center/business-info/contracts/loan-servicing [https://perma.cc/C3SM-S74Z] (last visited Aug. 12, 2020) 
(offering data on eleven NFP servicing contracts). 
have the lion’s share of the servicing market, managing eighty-eight percent of 
all loan amounts outstanding and seventy-nine percent of all borrowers.286 
See OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SERVICER PORTFOLIO BY LOAN STATUS 
(2020), https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/servicer-portfolio-by-loa n- 
status033120.xls [https://perma.cc/CMC9-KVXU]. 
This use of private servicers for student loans is problematic because it shifts 
all the important interactions with borrowers to private parties that have perverse 
incentives and minimal oversight. We expand on the reasons for this by examin-
ing the arrangements in detail. 
2. Misaligned Servicer Compensation 
Student loan servicers are compensated differently from mortgage servicers, 
which form a better-studied loan servicing industry. Mortgage servicers are com-
pensated with a flat percentage fee based on the outstanding principal balance of 
serviced loans, plus investment (“float”) income on funds collected from mort-
gage borrowers before the funds are turned over to investors.287 They are also 
allowed to keep any ancillary fees collected, but they bear the costs of “advanc-
ing” delinquent payments to the creditor and trying to recoup them from subse-
quent recoveries.288 In contrast, Direct Loan servicers are compensated with a 
monthly per-borrower (not per-loan) fee that varies depending on whether the 
loan is in repayment, deferment, forbearance, or various stages of delinquency or 
default.289
See, e.g., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-FSA-09-D-0012/0080, 
AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION/MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT 12–13 (2014) [hereinafter OFFICE OF FED. 
STUDENT AID, GREAT LAKES CONTRACT], https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/ED-FSA-09-D- 
0012_MOD_0080_GreatLakes.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CEH-QYJR] (contract with Great Lakes 
Educational Loan Services); OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-FSA-09-D- 
0015/0085, AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION/MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT 12–13 (2014) [hereinafter 
OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, NAVIENT CONTRACT], https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/ED- 
FSA-09-D-0015_MOD_0085_Navient.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA4C-BVRN] (contract with Navient). 
 The servicing fee does not depend on the number of loans that the bor-
rower has being serviced by the servicer because borrowers are counted as unique 
borrowers by Social Security number.290 
Under the 2014-contract renewals for the TIVAS, the monthly fee starts at 
$2.85 per borrower who is in repayment and then declines in various stages of 
deferment, forbearance, or delinquency until it is a mere $0.45 per borrower with 
any loan that is over 270-days delinquent.291 An additional incentive of up to  
286. 
287. See Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 70–71 
(2011). 
288. See id. 
289. 
290. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, GREAT LAKES CONTRACT, supra note 289; OFFICE OF 
FED. STUDENT AID, NAVIENT CONTRACT, supra note 289. 
291. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, GREAT LAKES CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 4; OFFICE 
OF FED. STUDENT AID, NAVIENT CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 4. 
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$2 million annually is available if the TIVAS servicer succeeds in reducing delin-
quency rates beyond a certain level.292 
Because Direct Loan servicers do not process payments, they do not enjoy any 
float income from investment of funds between when they are collected from the 
borrower and paid to the creditor. Nor can Direct Loan servicers collect any ancil-
lary fee income; there are no “junk fees” for various unrequested services allowed 
on Direct Loans, unlike on mortgages. The Department of Education’s Master 
Promissory Note permits a six-percent late fee,293 but the Department of 
Education has instructed servicers not to levy the fee,294 and in any event, the 
servicers have no contractual right to retain that fee, unlike most mortgage servic-
ing contracts.295 At the same time, because Direct Loan servicers are not involved 
in the handling of payments, they are not responsible for advancing delinquent 
payments to the creditor and trying to recoup the advances from subsequent 
recoveries. 
The flat per-borrower fees for federal student loan servicing are designed to en-
courage servicer operational efficiency; the more efficient a servicer is, the 
greater its profit with fixed-rate compensation. The flat fees, however, have a gra-
dation depending on repayment status.296 In theory, the lower compensation for 
delinquent borrowers is designed to incentivize servicers to keep borrowers cur-
rent on repayment and to assist delinquent borrowers with returning their 
accounts to repayment status. Moreover, as discussed below, allocations of future 
business flows to servicers also depend in part on relative delinquency rates 
among servicers, which is meant to further incentivize servicers to take steps to 
reduce delinquency rates.297 
Unfortunately, there is a tension between encouraging servicers to keep down 
operational expenses through flat per-borrower fees and encouraging servicers to 
take action to keep loans performing through greater compensation for perform-
ing loans. Servicers can increase their profitability by either reducing expenses or 
maximizing revenues. Keeping loans performing will maximize servicer revenue 
but doing so will also increase servicer expenses because interventions with bor-
rowers to either prevent or cure delinquency are costly. The servicer has to spend 
time working with the individual borrower—collecting and analyzing borrower 
data and then processing paperwork. If the gain in revenue is insufficient to offset 
the additional expenses, then a profit-maximizing servicer will rationally decline 
to undertake the interventions necessary to help borrowers remain current on 
292. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, GREAT LAKES CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 3; OFFICE 
OF FED. STUDENT AID, NAVIENT CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 3. 
293. OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, supra note 211; see also 34 C.F.R. § 685.202(d)(1) (2019) 
(authorizing the Secretary to charge a late fee of up to six percent). 
294. CFPB, supra note 212. 
295. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 287, at 41. 
296. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, GREAT LAKES CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 4; OFFICE 
OF FED. STUDENT AID, NAVIENT CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 4. 
297. See infra Section III.B.3. 
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payments and will instead simply focus on cutting costs, even if that means pro-
viding lower quality service to borrowers. 
In particular, a servicer that is focused on cost cutting will likely concentrate 
on increasing the automation of its operations in order to take advantage of 
economies of scale. This works well when dealing with routine procedures such 
as sending out billing statements or annual certification requirements, but it is a 
poor fit when dealing with distressed borrowers. Distressed borrowers often have 
idiosyncratic problems, and successfully dealing with them requires substantial 
time from skilled—and relatively expensive—personnel who are able to assist 
the borrowers in determining the appropriate repayment options and collecting 
and processing the paperwork necessary to implement these options. 
The Department of Education’s servicing contracts do not require servicers to 
maintain a certain level of staffing in terms of number or skill of personnel or 
even that their personnel be native English speakers or based in the United 
States.298 Thus, there is no check on servicers pursuing a strategy of maximizing 
profits by minimizing service quality. 
The graduated compensation that favors performing loans is meant to encour-
age servicers to take steps to minimize default rates, but it falls short for two rea-
sons. First, servicers have no stake in the ultimate performance of the loans 
because their compensation is unconnected with recoveries or even with loan bal-
ances. Second, the differences in the graduated, per-borrower fee levels are so 
small that it makes little sense for a servicer to spend any time engaging with any 
borrower. A borrower that is in repayment generates all of $2.85 in monthly serv-
icing income, whereas a borrower that is between thirty-one- and ninety-days 
delinquent generates revenue of $1.46 monthly.299 The delinquency thus results 
in a decline of $1.39 in monthly income for the servicer. Suppose that intervening 
to cure the delinquency requires an hour of time from an employee whose com-
pensation (including benefits) is $30 per hour. Ignoring the time value of money, 
it will take the servicer over twenty-one months of continuing loan performance 
to recoup its expenses. 
Now consider that some delinquent loans will self-cure without servicer inter-
vention, some cannot be cured despite intervention, and some that are cured with 
servicer intervention will redefault. If a loan would self-cure, then any effort the 
servicer spends on curing the loan is a superfluous waste. If a loan cannot be 
cured, then any effort the servicer spends on intervention is also a waste. And if a 
loan is cured but redefaults, the servicer’s increased compensation will be cur-
tailed, perhaps before the cost of intervention has been recouped. A servicer can-
not, however, identify ex ante whether a loan will self-cure, cannot be cured, or 
will redefault after cure. 
298. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, GREAT LAKES CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 1–21 
(containing none of these requirements); OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, NAVIENT CONTRACT, supra note 
289, at 1–21 (same). 
299. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, GREAT LAKES CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 4; OFFICE 
OF FED. STUDENT AID, NAVIENT CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 4. 
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The difficulty in sorting between good and bad candidates for intervention 
means that the servicer will be more reluctant to expend the effort on intervention 
for any delinquent borrowers. To illustrate, suppose that it costs a servicer 
$30 per intervention with a thirty-one-day delinquent borrower, irrespective of 
the outcome. Let’s also suppose a servicer has 100 borrowers that are thirty-one- 
days delinquent. The servicer anticipates that twenty percent of the delinquencies 
will self-cure, thirty percent cannot be cured, and that ten percent (separate from 
self-cures) will redefault after a cure after one year. 
With these assumptions, if the servicer intervened in all 100 cases, the cost to 
the servicer would be $3,000 relative to doing nothing (and not even employing 
staff to intervene). But the increase in revenue attributable to the intervention 
would be only $69.50 per month for one year and then $55.60 thereafter. On these 
numbers, it would take over four years to recoup the costs of the interventions, 
even disregarding the time value of money. Once the cost of funds is considered, 
recoupment would take even longer. 
These illustrative figures demonstrate the larger point that if servicers cannot 
sort between good and bad candidates for intervention, they will be less likely to 
expend the funds and the effort to intervene with any delinquent borrowers. The 
surer and easier way for a servicer to increase profitability is to spend as little as 
possible on interventions with defaulted borrowers and to cut operational costs to 
the bone, no matter the effect on quality of performance. 
Thus, consumer advocates cite the problem that servicers often place distressed 
borrowers into forbearance, a process that requires relatively little time for the 
servicer, rather than undertake the more involved and time-consuming process of 
explaining the availability of IDR plans to borrowers and then assisting them in 
compiling the paperwork necessary to qualify for such a plan.300 An IDR plan is 
usually better for the consumer both because it is a long-term, rather than a stop- 
gap (annual), solution and because interest accrues and is capitalized during for-
bearance periods, even as principal is not paid down.301 Though the servicer is 
compensated less per month for a loan in forbearance than one performing in 
IDR,302 the reduced revenue from forbearance does not outweigh the added 
expense for the servicer from helping the consumer get into an IDR plan. 
Servicers are incentivized to keep down their costs rather than provide optimal 
results for borrowers. 
3. Misdesigned Allocation of Servicing Rights 
Borrowers, unfortunately, have no way of avoiding low-quality servicing 
because they cannot choose their servicer (with the limited exception of when 
300. See, e.g., Strengthening the Federal Student Loan Program for Borrowers: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 113th Cong. 7 (2014) (statement of Deanne Loonin, 
Attorney, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.). 
301. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.205(a) (2019). 
302. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, GREAT LAKES CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 4 (paying 
the servicer $1.05 monthly for each borrower in forbearance and $2.85 monthly for each borrower in 
repayment); OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, NAVIENT CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 4 (same). 
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they are consolidating loans). The servicing of loans is determined by the 
Department of Education through a complex and dysfunctional allocation system 
that discourages servicers from spending on achieving high-performance servic-
ing by limiting their rewards for success. 
Allocation of servicing of new loans is done twice a year based on the 
Department of Education’s application of five weighted servicer-performance 
metrics: the percentage of borrowers currently or less than 90-days delinquent 
(30% weight), the percentage of borrowers 91- to 270-days delinquent (15% 
weight), the percentage of borrowers 271- to 360-days delinquent (15% weight), 
borrower-satisfaction survey results (35% weight), and a Federal Student Aid em-
ployee-satisfaction survey (5% weight).303 
OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EXPLANATION OF ALLOCATION AND 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE METHODOLOGY 3 (2019), https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/Explanation- 
2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBF6-V9PM]. 
Servicers are then ranked in each cate-
gory, with the highest score being the total number of servicers and the lowest 
score being one.304 The scores are then adjusted by the category weight, such that 
if there are nine servicers, then the servicer with the highest borrower-satisfaction 
survey results would receive a score of 3.15 (9 multiplied by 0.35) for that cate-
gory.305 A servicer’s total score divided by the combined score of all the servicers 
is used to determine the percentage of new business allocation in the next half of 
the year.306 
The consideration of delinquency rates in this system is intended to encourage 
servicers to invest in default servicing capacity in order to receive greater future 
business flows, but a servicer might still reasonably conclude that the surest way 
to maximize profits is to cut costs. A servicer with higher profits per loan might 
still be more profitable with a smaller market share than one with lower margins 
and a larger market share. 
The allocation system limits the consequences for pursuing a low-cost servic-
ing model because it puts a floor and a ceiling on servicer market shares. With 
nine servicers, if a servicer were consistently the lowest ranked, it would still 
receive two percent of the new business, whereas the highest ranked servicer 
would still not able to receive more than twenty percent of new business, no mat-
ter how much better the highest ranked servicer was than the lowest ranked serv-
icer.307 There is limited incentive for a servicer to attempt to improve its 
performance because upside is capped at a gain of approximately eighteen per-
cent of market share of new loan flows in that year. (The Department of 
Education retains discretion to give a servicer no new business.)308 
303. 
304. Id. at 2. 
305. Id. at 3. 
306. Id. at 4. 




. The lowest ranked servicer has a ranking of 1, which divided by 45 is 2.22%. The highest 
ranked servicer has a ranking of 9, which divided by 45 is 20%. 
308. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, GREAT LAKES CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 8; OFFICE 
OF FED. STUDENT AID, NAVIENT CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 8. 
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If all servicers opt to pursue a cost cutting model, rather than a high- 
performance model, the Department of Education’s allocation system will do 
nothing to correct it. The effect of the Department of Education’s servicing rights 
allocation system is to herd servicers into mediocrity by limiting the upside for 
excellence. Benchmarking is a poor method of quality assurance when all parties 
have an incentive to perform poorly. Indeed, as the Department of Education’s 
Inspector General noted, the methodology for assigning loans to servicers does 
not account for “servicers’ compliance with Federal loan servicing requirements. 
Therefore, servicers with more frequent instances of noncompliance experienced 
no reduction in the amount of new loans that FSA assigned to them.”309 Because 
borrowers cannot choose their servicer and the Department of Education does not 
penalize poor servicers by depriving them of business, there is no market disci-
pline protecting borrowers against poor loan servicing. 
4. Lack of Oversight of Servicers 
Because consumers cannot choose their servicer, they lack the important mar-
ket protection of ability to exit. And because of the perverse allocation system 
used by the Department of Education, there is no meaningful market check on 
servicer behavior. This makes oversight of servicers all the more critical, but that 
oversight is sorely lacking. 
Because of the debt framework for student loans, the Department of Education 
views itself as a lender and therefore focuses on issues like safety and soundness 
of the loan portfolio. This makes it focus excessively on the costs of IDR and the 
net subsidy rate of the loan program. It also leads the Department of Education to 
disclaim its role as a regulator of loan servicers, which it treats much more like 
contracted vendors. 
The Department of Education does not regulate servicers for consumer protec-
tion purposes. Instead, to the extent that servicers are regulated at all by the 
Department, it is for contract compliance, which requires relatively little for serv-
icers.310 The Department does not conduct examinations of servicers for con-
sumer protection compliance. The Department has never applied penalties to 
a servicer or disqualified a servicer, even though other federal agencies 
have brought actions against servicers for substantial legal violations.311
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the U.S. Department of Justice settled 
with Sallie Mae in 2014 for violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. See Press Release, Dep’t 
of Justice, Justice Department Reaches $60 Million Settlement with Sallie Mae to Resolve Allegations 
of Charging Military Servicemembers Excessive Rates on Student Loans (May 13, 2014), http://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/May/14-ag-502.html [https://perma.cc/RS4M-PADK]; Press Release, Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Announces Settlement with Sallie Mae for Unfair and Deceptive Practices and 
Violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (May 13, 2014), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/ 
press/2014/pr14033.html [https://perma.cc/SSS7-5DA5]; see also Complaint for Permanent Injunction 
& Other Relief, supra note 248, ¶ 1 (action against servicer for violations of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Act of 2010, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act); 
Complaint, Commonwealth v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 1784-cv-02682 (Mass. Super. 
 The 
309. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 251, at 4. 
310. See FINK & ZULLO, supra note 282. 
311. 
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Ct. Aug. 23, 2017) (action against servicer for violations of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act 
and the Consumer Financial Protection Act). 
Department of Education has some authority to manage servicer problems, 
including changing servicer compensation and excluding problematic servicers 
from eligibility for future business, but it has little political incentive to do so.312 
Not surprisingly, the servicers appear to prefer this minimal federal oversight 
to any supervision under state-consumer debt law and often argue that state law is 
preempted by federal law—either the HEA or the Department of Education’s 
contracting requirements (which, as noted, are not a substitute for true over-
sight).313 Should these theories prevail, student loan servicers would have nearly 
free rein.314 The only check on them is the CFPB, which supervises “larger partic-
ipants” in the student loan servicing market, including all TIVAS and the largest 
NFPs,315 but since December 2017, student loan servicers have refused to cooper-
ate with CFPB examinations based on guidance issued by the Department of 
Education.316 
Chris Arnold, CFPB Chief Says Education Department Is Blocking Student Loan Oversight, 
NPR (May 16, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/16/723568597/cfpb-chief-says- 
education-department-is-blocking-student-loan-oversight [https://perma.cc/AF8H-YDEK]. It is unclear 
whether this situation has changed as a result of a new Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Department of Education and CFPB signed in January 2020. See Memorandum of Understanding 
Concerning Coordination in Resolving Borrower Complaints, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.–U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., Jan. 31, 2020, at 1, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ed-memorandum- 
of-understanding_student-loan-borrowers_2020-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VCT-KGZ3]. 
The poor design and lack of oversight of the student loan servicing system 
have resulted in billions of dollars of unnecessary charges for borrowers. For 
example, borrowers need to know a precise projected loan balance in order to pay 
off a loan; if so much as one cent remains unpaid, the loan will keep accruing in-
terest, and the servicer will keep receiving its servicing fee on the loan.317 Not 
surprisingly, servicers have often failed to inform borrowers about failed payoff 
attempts.318 
312. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 251, at 2 (“[The Office of Federal Student Aid] 
management rarely used available contract accountability provisions to hold servicers accountable for 
instances of noncompliance.”). 
313. See Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding 
that the HEA does not preempt state regulations of student loan servicers). 
314. See generally David S. Rubenstein, Supremacy, Inc., 67 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 34–43) (discussing cases of state law preemption by federal contracts). 
315. Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,383, 73,384 
(Dec. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1090) (defining the loan servicing market to encompass 
both federal and private student loans and “larger participants” as those with loan servicing-account 
volumes exceeding 1 million). This category includes all of the TIVAS plus the largest NFPs. Id. at 
73,396. 
316. 
317. See CFPB, supra note 212, at 24–25. 
318. Id. (“Many student loan servicers do not inform borrowers that the payoff attempt failed and 
cease communicating regularly with the borrower for a significant period of time because the borrower 
has paid enough to cover subsequent months and does not have a monthly payment due, even though a 
small balance remains on the loan or account. When this type of situation occurs, borrowers may be left 
unaware that a balance remains, resulting in months or years of interest accrual, tradelines remaining 
open in borrowers’ credit reports, and potential delinquency or default when monthly payments are 
again due months or years later.”). 
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Servicers are also disincentivized to facilitate prepayments. When a loan is 
paid off, the servicer’s revenue stream disappears. Borrowers who prepay tend to 
be lower credit risks, and they are most likely to be in repayment status, which 
makes their loans the most lucrative for servicers.319 Therefore, when given a pre-
payment, servicers may encourage borrowers to take a “payment holiday” that 
undoes the benefit of prepayment or to extend the loan term to lower monthly 
payments in order to reduce future prepayments.320 
See Seth Frotman, You Have the Right to Pay Off Your Student Loan as Fast as You Can, Without 
a Penalty, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/blog/you-have-right-pay-your-student-loan-fast-you-can-without-penalty [https://perma.cc/X2G4- 
3QWW]. 
Likewise, servicers are disincentivized to make borrowers aware of the PSLF 
option because when a borrower joins PSLF, the loan is usually transferred to a 
different servicer, depriving the original servicer of its revenue on the loan.321 
See Stacy Cowley, New York Sues Student Loan Servicer for ‘Abusive’ Acts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/business/student-loans-forgiveness-pheaa.html (“The 
servicer, the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, . . . is the sole servicer for the federal 
government’s [PSLF] Program.”). 
There is some evidence that servicers have also avoided giving disabled borrowers 
information about how to have their loans cancelled under disability discharge.322 
See Clare Lombardo & Cory Turner, Student Loan Borrowers with Disabilities Aren’t Getting 
Help They Were Promised, NPR (Dec. 4, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/04/776058798/ 
why-student-loan-borrowers-with-disabilities-arent-getting-the-help-they-deserve [https://perma.cc/QU6T- 
F7ZS]. 
The CFPB has accused Navient, one of the TIVAS, of having steered bor-
rowers into forbearance rather than into IDR because this was the more cost- 
effective measure for Navient, even though the servicing fees on loans in IDR are 
higher than those in forbearance.323 Placing IDR-eligible borrowers into forbear-
ance meant that interest accrued to borrowers’ accounts when some or all interest 
would have been waived under various IDR plans.324 The CFPB also alleged that 
borrowers incurred some $4 billion in extra charges because Navient capitalized 
the interest due to multiple, consecutive forbearances.325 Likewise, the CFPB 
alleged that Navient failed to adequately notify borrowers of the need to recertify 
their income and family size to retain eligibility for IDR.326 As a result, borrowers 
lost eligibility for IDR and saw their payments go up. 
* * * 
We discuss the issues around servicing contracts in detail because, like the 
rules on interest accrual and capitalization, the arrangements are central to the ex-
perience and treatment of the borrower but are highly complex and opaque and 
have not been expounded upon elsewhere. Dysfunctional loan servicing is the 
319. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, GREAT LAKES CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 4; OFFICE 




323. Complaint for Permanent Injunction & Other Relief, supra note 248, ¶¶ 26–54. 
324. Id. ¶¶ 35–36. 
325. Id. ¶ 54. 
326. Id. ¶¶ 155–59. 
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primary reason that the loan program continues to have 9.5 million borrowers in 
default,327 despite the wide availability of IDR. That the loan program even uses 
private loan servicing at all is an artifact of the now-defunct FFEL Program of 
guaranteed loans from private lenders, and the poor design of the servicing con-
tracts is strong evidence that private servicing is a bad fit with Congress’s intent 
to have the student loan program serve borrowers and try to improve their lives. 
Student borrowers are not counterparties to be “serviced”; they are recipients of 
public aid and investment. 
C. OUTDATED REHABILITATION APPROACH 
Prior to IDR, the main way to help defaulted borrowers—those whose loans 
were 270-days delinquent but had not yet been assigned to debt-collection agen-
cies for collection—was through loan rehabilitation. Under the FFEL Program, 
rehabilitation allowed defaulted borrowers to move back into good standing by 
making nine payments over ten months of a reduced amount, presumptively fif-
teen percent of discretionary income.328 In the meantime, however, interest would 
accrue, and the servicer could charge fees of up to sixteen percent of the unpaid 
principal balance and accrued interest.329 Then the borrower would go back to the 
already-unaffordable full payments but with an even higher principal amount, 
thereby extending the loan’s maturity. Even for Direct Loans, the rehabilitation 
structure was preserved, with around twenty percent of the rehabilitation pay-
ments going to collection agency fees, rather than to principal and interest.330 
See id. § 685.211(f)(1) (rehabilitation program for Direct Loans); Loan Servicing and Collection 
- Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.: OFF. OF FED. STUDENT AID, https://ifap.ed.gov/loan- 
servicing-and-collection-frequently-asked-questions#CF-Q2 [https://perma.cc/N7YR-NR46] (last visited 
Aug. 14, 2020) (collection fees for FFEL and Direct Loans held by the Department of Education). 
Individual private collection agency contracts with the Department of Education indicate a lower fee for 
rehabilitations. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SOLICITATION/CONTRACT/ 
ORDER FOR COMMERCIAL ITEMS, ED-FSA-09-O-0014, at 6 (2009), https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/ 
files/NCOFinancialBaseContract.pdf [https://perma.cc/66T6-QVAA] (awarding to the collection agency a 
13.5% commission on the final payoff amount); OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
SOLICITATION/CONTRACT/ORDER FOR COMMERCIAL ITEMS, ED-FSA-09-O-0020, at 6 (2009), https:// 
studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/EnterpriseRecoverySystems.pdf [https://perma.cc/RCR9-NLS2] (same). 
Not 
surprisingly, because loan rehabilitation does not address the prospective pay-
ment burden on borrowers, about one-third of those who go through rehabilitation 
end up redefaulting within twenty-four months.331 
CFPB, UPDATE FROM THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN: TRANSITIONING FROM 
DEFAULT TO AN INCOME-DRIVEN REPAYMENT PLAN (2017), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
documents/201705_cfpb_Update-from-Student-Loan-Ombudsman-on-Redefaults.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/EMW5-TFUG]. 
A much better option for a distressed borrower would be to consolidate the bor-
rower’s old loans into one new loan, and then to put that new loan in IDR so that 
payments would be permanently keyed to the borrower’s income level. Servicers, 
however, are incentivized to prefer rehabilitation rather than consolidation and 
327. See OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, supra note 5. 
328. 34 C.F.R. § 682.405(a)(2), (b)(1)(iii) (2019). 
329. See id. § 682.405(b)(1)(vi)(B) (guarantor servicing fees under FFEL Program). 
330. 
331. 
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IDR because, when a loan is consolidated, it is awarded as part of a new-loan 
allocation. In other words, the servicer will incur costs to do the loan consolida-
tion, for which it will receive a one-time payment of $27.35,332 roughly compen-
sating the servicer for the cost of the consolidation, but the servicer will not 
necessarily get any future revenue stream from servicing the loan. In contrast, 
rehabilitation allows the servicer to levy fees and retain a future revenue stream. 
The very concept of rehabilitation is one that follows from a debt-based educa-
tion financing framework. It is premised on forbearing on the loan if the borrower 
makes a showing of good faith through consecutive on-time payments of a per-
centage of income. A grant-and-tax framework would have IDR as a built-in 
structure, in that taxation would be keyed to the borrower’s income, such that 
there would never be any need for rehabilitation. If a borrower’s income were to 
decline, so too would the borrower’s payment obligation. Special rehabilitation 
procedures that might be suboptimal for borrowers would not be necessary in a 
grant-and-tax framework. 
D. PUNITIVE TAX TREATMENT 
As noted in Section II.F, the Treasury Department currently takes the position 
that loan forgiveness through the IDR plans (other than PSLF) would create tax-
able income for the borrower, although there is some legal uncertainty around the 
issue.333 In the typical debt context, this tax treatment makes sense—if a creditor 
forgives some or all of a debt, that is a net accrual to the borrower’s wealth, as if 
the person had, say, won a lottery and used the winnings to pay down a debt. 
Because that is the default tax treatment, the assumption is that it applies to any 
forgiven debt absent an affirmative exclusion in the tax law, and there is no such 
affirmative exclusion for non-PSLF IDR forgiveness. 
But in the context of a federal loan, particularly an income-contingent one, this 
logic breaks down. Here, the same party—the federal government—is both the 
creditor and the tax collector. Thus, when the government-as-creditor forgives 
100% of a loan, the government-as-tax-collector turns around and demands back 
a portion of the loan it just forgave, perhaps as high as 37%, depending on the ap-
plicable tax rate. 
Gregory Crespi has called this the “tax bomb” from IDR—it could be finan-
cially devastating to a borrower in a weak enough position to need forgiveness in 
the first place, particularly because the payment is due all at once.334 
Gregory Crespi, Should We Defuse the “Tax Bomb” Facing Lawyers Who Are Enrolled in 
Income-Based Student Loan Repayment Plans? 2 (S. Methodist Univ. Dedman Sch. of Law Legal 
Studies, Research Paper No. 225, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2615561 [https://perma.cc/XRH6- 
LR5T]. 
The potential 
impact has also been a subject of media reports and may cause stress among bor-
rowers who feel that they were baited and switched.335 
332. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, GREAT LAKES CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 4; OFFICE 
OF FED. STUDENT AID, NAVIENT CONTRACT, supra note 289, at 4. 
333. See supra Section II.F. 
334. 
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See, e.g., Ryan Lane, Student Loan Forgiveness Is Nice, Until You Get Hit by This Tax Bomb, 
MARKETWATCH (Jan. 29, 2020, 5:01 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/student-loan- 
forgiveness-is-nice-until-you-get-hit-by-this-tax-bomb-2020-01-29?siteid=rss&rss=1 [https://perma.cc/ 
MU9U-VC3J]; Noam Scheiber, An Expensive Law Degree, and No Place to Use It, N.Y. TIMES (June 
17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/19/business/dealbook/an-expensive-law-degree-and-no- 
place-to-use-it.html (framing student debt problems in terms of the tax bill, not the nominal amount of 
debt). 
The context of the forgiveness also underscores the absurdity of this tax treat-
ment. Unlike a typical commercial or consumer debt, the availability of forgive-
ness is in the ex ante terms of the student loan itself—the borrower and the 
creditor both understand at loan grant that the borrower has the choice to make 
only income-based payments for twenty to twenty-five years. It is not so much 
forgiveness as an option for the borrower. In forgiving the loan, the government 
is just following through on this promise, not granting the borrower an unantici-
pated windfall. Moreover, the forgiveness is for a clear public policy reason. 
Congress decided that a borrower who can afford only to make income-based 
payments for twenty to twenty-five years should be relieved of the remaining 
debt. To then tax that relief undermines the goal of forgiveness and makes the 
lack of underwriting of student loans based on the borrower’s ability to pay much 
more problematic. In similar government transfer contexts, a general welfare 
exception applies to exclude the transfer from the transferee’s income.336 
It is not clear that any policymaker affirmatively wanted IDR forgiveness to be 
taxed, and some immediately began trying to correct the issue after the IBR 
option was passed in 2008.337 But this problematic tax treatment automatically 
follows from labeling the program “debt” because the tax treatment is one of the 
legal consequences of “debt.” As noted above, the problem could be solved sim-
ply by labeling the forgiveness (or, indeed, all of the loan) instead as a “scholar-
ship,” which is excluded from gross income for tax purposes.338 Even further, if 
the transfer of funds were not labeled debt at all, then the question of tax conse-
quences would be entirely moot. 
E. OVERWEIGHTING THE IMPORTANCE OF PAYMENT HIERARCHY 
Many of the problems with default and IDR complexity could be alleviated if 
(1) IDR were the default repayment plan and (2) payments were collected 
through wage withholding with tax return reconciliation. (This is how Australia 
and the United Kingdom do it, for example.)339 
Since 1989, the Australian Government has offered student loans through its Higher Education 
Loan Program. Students can borrow up to AUS106,319 in 2020, and loans are repaid through the tax 
system as a percentage of income, between one and ten percent depending on income level. The loans 
are not charged interest but are indexed to inflation. See AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, COMMONWEALTH 
SUPPORTED PLACES AND HECS-HELP INFORMATION 14, 20–22 (2020), https://www.studyassist.gov.au/ 
Because the IDR payments are 
335. 
336. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 14-35, 2014-26 I.R.B. 1110 (describing general welfare exclusion); Rev. 
Rul. 75-271, 1975-2 C.B. 23 (excluding “[m]ortgage assistance payments” from income); Rev. Rul. 74- 
205, 1974-1 C.B. 20 (excluding “[r]eplacement housing payments” from income); Rev. Rul. 57-102, 
1957-1 C.B. 26 (excluding payments to the blind from income). 
337. See, e.g., H.R. 2492, 111th Cong. § 1 (2009). 
338. See I.R.C. § 117 (2018); supra notes 224–27 and accompanying text. 
339. 
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sites/default/files/ed19-0226_hecs-help_booklet_acc.pdf?v=1576816381 [https://perma.cc/F6L3- 
RK78]; Brooks, supra note 33, at 275–77. In the United Kingdom, students can borrow up to £9,250 in 
2020 and pay back nine percent of their income above a threshold. Payments are charged interest that 
varies between 1.1% and inflation plus 3%, depending on circumstances. Payments are collected 
through the tax system. See Repaying Your Student Loan, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/repaying-your- 
student-loan/what-you-pay?step-by-step-nav=18045f76-ac04-41b7-b147-5687d8fbb64a [https://perma. 
cc/H92Y-MQEN] (last visited Aug. 14, 2020); Student Finance, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/student- 
finance/new-fulltime-students [https://perma.cc/Z69T-4Y4A] (last visited Aug. 14, 2020). 
based on adjusted gross income, collection through wage withholding would be 
relatively trivial. However, many student debt advocates (and likely other finan-
cial institutions would) resist this because mandatory collection would upend the 
typical priority of payments notion that borrowers should be able to prioritize 
more important payments, such as for food and shelter.340
See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., The Dark Side of Payroll Withholding to 
Repay Student Loans (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.nclc.org/media-center/dark-side-of-payroll- 
withholding-repay-student-loans.html [https://perma.cc/4CB6-RSBB]. 
 Default, in this sense, 
is actually an important self-help option for borrowers that would be undermined 
if debt payments were collected through paycheck withholding. 
But this is a legacy of pre-IDR thinking. IDR specifically provides for low, 
even zero, payments when income is low and also includes a large exemption 
based off of the federal poverty level341—meaning that any borrower in IDR 
should have a reasonable amount of income for basic necessities before having to 
make any loan payment. 
Furthermore, under current rules, if a borrower defaults twice, the IDR plans 
are no longer available.342 So the self-help option of nonpayment will put a bor-
rower in a much worse position, particularly because unpaid loans can lead to 
wage garnishment by the Treasury Department anyway.343 These rules for default 
and IDR availability should be changed regardless, but the larger point remains: 
if IDR continues just as an opt-in plan for relatively sophisticated borrowers, it is 
likely to exclude those most in need of its relief. Though automatic IDR and with-
holding could be painful to some borrowers, the lack of it harms many more. 
Often what is underlying concerns about automatic payment is not automatic-
ity but rather the calculation of the payment itself. In other words, for some strug-
gling borrowers, even 10% of discretionary income is not reasonably affordable, 
and the exemption of 150% of the federal poverty line is not sufficient to cover 
basic living costs.344 We propose in Section V.D a system of graduated rates for 
income-based payments, and this and the other reforms we propose go hand in 
hand—for automatic withholding to be fair and effective, the payment calculation 
must be affordable. 
340. 
341. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(2)(i) (2019) (limiting PAYE monthly payments to 10% of the 
amount by which a borrower’s income exceeds 150% of the federal poverty level); id. § 685.209(c)(2)(i) 
(same for REPAYE loans). 
342. See, e.g., id. § 685.209(a)(1)(ii) (removing defaulted loans from eligibility for IDR); id. 
§ 685.211(f)(12) (stating that a loan that has been rehabilitated is not eligible for rehabilitation upon 
redefault). 
343. See 31 C.F.R. § 285.11 (2019) (administrative wage garnishment for nontax debt). 
344. See Press Release, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 340. 
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F. MISFRAMED PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON STUDENT LOAN DEBT 
Using debt as the policy instrument for income-contingent payments for higher 
education distorts public discussions, policy debates, and individual decisions. 
Politicians, academics, journalists, and students focus on the top-line “debt” label 
to imply excessive financial burden and risk, both for the government and on the 
economy, without looking at the deeper fundamentals. Calling this particular sys-
tem of government payments and receipts “debt” leads to simplistic and often 
misleading comparisons to other types of debt, like home mortgages, car loans, 
and credit card debt, despite huge differences.345 
For example, the headline $1.5 trillion number is sometimes cited as evidence 
of an impending financial crisis, along with it exceeding the amount of outstand-
ing credit card debt.346 
See, e.g., Zack Friedman, This Is What Happens if $1.6 Trillion of Student Loans Are Forgiven, 
FORBES (Dec. 3, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2019/12/03/student- 
loans-debt-forgiven-impact/#74ba23c374e9 [https://perma.cc/J5M9-9B6V]; Healey, supra note 15; 
Josh Mitchell, The Long Road to the Student Debt Crisis, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2019, 12:08 PM), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/the-long-road-to-the-student-debt-crisis-11559923730. 
That $1.5 trillion student loan debt figure, however, is 
materially different than, say, $1.5 trillion in credit card debt. The $1.5 trillion is 
a measure of the outstanding principal on student loans, but it is not a measure of 
what borrowers must actually repay because it does not account for IDR plans 
that substantially reduce debt burdens. Nor does the $1.5 trillion account for the 
repayment period of the loans and the frequent availability of deferment and for-
bearance. Credit card debt is short-term revolving debt, but student debt is spread 
over as many as twenty-five years. In economic reality, the $1.5 trillion figure is 
just an estimate of how funds are flowing to and from the federal government to 
pay for an important public good. We rarely think of other government spending 
programs in this way. For example, the present value of federal government 
expenditures over the same time period as the loans is on the order of $100 tril-
lion.347 
Government outlays currently run about $4 trillion per year. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 
BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2020 TO 2030, at 7 (2020), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020- 
01/56020-CBO-Outlook.pdf [https://perma.cc/36FN-YE33]. Assuming that outlays grow at a rate 
similar to the rate of overall economic growth, we can treat the present value of future outlays as also 
roughly equivalent to $4 trillion per year. 
Though $1.5 trillion may seem concerningly large compared with out-
standing credit card debt levels, it is miniscule compared with other federal 
government expenditures. 
Turning to the revenue side of the equation, making an income-based payment 
to the government is analogous to paying an income tax, yet we would never treat 
twenty-five years of future income taxes as a “debt” that would show up on an 
individual’s balance sheet or affect that person’s credit score. This is not to mini-
mize the obligation of course—not paying required taxes is a serious offense and 
will have credit implications. The point instead is that, in the case of both IDR for 
student loans and taxes, all a person has promised ex ante is to pay a percentage 
345. See Glater, supra note 17, at 119–31 (discussing specious comparisons between student loans 
and mortgage debt). 
346. 
347. 
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of income to the government for some future years. Indeed, student debt is in 
some ways less of an obligation than taxes because it will cease at some point (at 
forgiveness or when the loan balance is paid), whereas most tax obligations con-
tinue until death (and beyond). 
The excessive focus on the top-line “debt” numbers also fuels misguided pol-
icy responses, from both the right and the left. For example, a recent proposed 
bill from Republicans in Congress to reauthorize the HEA would have dramati-
cally scaled back the amount of debt that a graduate or professional student could 
borrow from the federal government, capping it at $28,500 per year.348 Graduate 
students currently can borrow a lot of money through the federal loan program— 
sometimes up to $100,000 or more per year349
Recall that Grad PLUS Loans are available up to the program’s “cost of attendance.” See Higher 
Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, sec. 422, § 428H(c), 106 Stat. 448, 535; supra 
notes 122–24 and accompanying text. The cost of attendance of some law schools now exceeds 
$100,000. See, e.g., Costs and Budgeting, COLUM. L. SCH., https://www.law.columbia.edu/about/ 
offices-and-departments/office-financial-aid/costs-and-billing/costs-and-budgeting [https://perma.cc/ 
J2PY-U2N3] (last visited Aug. 15, 2020) (2020–2021 cost of attendance: $104,420); Student Expense 
Budget, N.Y.U. L. SCH., http://www.law.nyu.edu/financialaid/budgetandbudgeting/studentexpense 
budget [https://perma.cc/C2FC-S8LL] (last visited Aug. 15, 2020) (2020–2021 cost of attendance: 
$104,113). 
—so it is understandable that poli-
cymakers would focus on graduate students if the overriding goal is to reduce the 
overall debt level. But the consequences of doing so would have been to make the 
loan program less financially stable and potentially increase the burden on tax-
payers. Graduate student borrowers have the lowest default rates and pay the 
highest interest rates.350 
See 34 C.F.R. § 685.202(a)(7)–(9) (2019) (showing that Grad PLUS rate is always more than 
undergrad rates); DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2020 BUDGET PROPOSAL, 
at Q-35 (2019), https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget20/justifications/q-sloverview.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D7CZ-DL4X] (comparing default rates among categories of loans). 
Although the news sometimes features dramatic stories 
of huge, unpayable debts,351 
See, e.g., Josh Mitchell, Mike Meru Has $1 Million in Student Loans. How Did That Happen?, 
WALL ST. J. (May 25, 2008, 10:41 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mike-meru-has-1-million-in- 
student-loans-how-did-that-happen-1527252975. 
the average graduate borrower will have a high 
income and the ability to pay back any loans fully.352 
Average incomes for those with graduate degrees significantly exceed those with just bachelor’s 
or lower degrees. See Elka Torpay, Measuring the Value of Education, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT.: 
CAREER OUTLOOK (Apr. 2018), https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2018/data-on-display/education- 
pays.htm [https://perma.cc/4EUT-9FTR]. 
Grad PLUS Loans are the 
most profitable class of student loan for the government,353 and thus help to cover 
the IDR relief for lower income borrowers. In other words, graduate student bor-
rowers are subsidizing borrowers for undergraduate and nondegree education. 
Without those payments to subsidize the weaker performing loans, overall sub-
sidy rates for the loan program would increase. 






353. See DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 350, at Q-25 (showing high, negative subsidy rates for Grad 
PLUS Loans). Parent PLUS Loans are even more profitable, in part because they mostly do not qualify 
for the IDR plans. See id. 
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At the same time, there are calls on the left for debt cancellation,354 
See, e.g., College for All and Cancel All Student Debt, FRIENDS BERNIE SANDERS, https:// 
berniesanders.com/issues/free-college-cancel-debt [https://perma.cc/W4AH-S6XP] (last visited Aug. 
15, 2020); My Plan to Cancel Student Loan Debt on Day One of My Presidency, WARREN DEMOCRATS, 
https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/student-loan-debt-day-one [https://perma.cc/Q7JD-P7UH] (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2020); Shahien Nasiripour, Trump Student Loan Official Quits, Calling for Debt Forgiveness, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 24, 2019, 3:41 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-24/trump- 
student-loan-official-quits-calling-for-debt-forgiveness. 
which 
alone would do little to manage the costs of higher education going forward. 
Moreover, because IDR is already available, the incremental benefit of outright 
cancellation would accrue disproportionately to higher income graduates. The 
loan system is far from perfect (as we try to make clear here), but policy solutions 
that focus only on the existence or nominal amount of debt miss the larger 
issues.355 
Finally, but most importantly, at the level of the student, the psychological 
effects of debt for individuals can lead to stress and distorted and inefficient deci-
sions.356 Stress alone can be a real cost to many, in health and other outcomes. 
There is also evidence that student loans may be connected to slower rates of 
home buying, retirement savings, and other features of long-term personal 
investment.357 
To the extent that borrowers focus on the total stock of their debt, rather than 
on the monthly flows, and fail to consider the impact of IDR on total payment 
obligations, they may overestimate their debt burdens and make suboptimal con-
sumption decisions as a result. The debt framework emphasizes stocks, rather 
than flows, which may have unintended behavioral consequences. 
IV. CONSIDERING THE TAX ALTERNATIVE 
The biggest problems in the student loan system stem from the frictions 
between the economic reality of the loans—grants plus income-based taxes—and 
the legacy infrastructure of debt. Making an income-based payment to the federal 
government to fund the provision of a public good or service is more akin to a tax 
and transfer than borrowing to fund consumption, and the legal and institutional 
structures of debt are a poor fit for the policies of the student loan program. 
Continuing to treat student loans as typical debt belies their unique status and 
leads to many of the problems in the loan program as currently operated. 
In this Part, we briefly consider, but reject, the idea of a wholesale shift to a 
true grant-and-tax model. That is, we consider the policy alternative of applying 
the grant-and-tax metaphor literally—replacing student loans with a system of 
up-front grants to pay tuition fees and a tax on grant-recipients that is a function 
of a person’s income, the size of the initial grant, and time. Thus, instead of 
354. 
355. See Glater, supra note 19, at 1217–18 (criticizing regulatory responses that focus on financial 
outcomes as a measure of education quality). 
356. See, e.g., Glater, supra note 58, at 1580–96 (discussing negative effects of shifting education 
risk to students). 
357. See id. at 1588 (citations omitted). 
66 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 109:5 
receiving a loan and paying it back through IDR, a student would receive a grant 
and then pay a tax of ten percent of discretionary income annually until either the 
total taxes paid equaled the initial grant plus interest or twenty years had passed. 
That would be essentially the cash-flow equivalent to the current IDR plans.358 
This grant-and-tax approach is different than direct tax-funded higher educa-
tion (“free college”). The grant-and-tax model would make explicit what is now 
implicit with IDR-based student loans—that the federal government provides 
funds up front for higher education, paid for by a ten-percent income surtax on 
borrowers. The “free college” alternative would instead raise additional, general 
revenue with the federal income tax and use that revenue to directly fund higher 
education institutions.359 That policy is beyond the scope of this Article, which is 
concerned with redesigning and reforming our current system of education 
finance. 
Though student loans have many similarities to taxes, they also differ from tra-
ditional taxes in important ways. We briefly discuss some of the differences 
below in Section IV.A. Moreover, taxes have their own institutional, psychologi-
cal, and economic downsides. We review some of those downsides below in 
Section IV.B. Although conceptualizing student loans as taxes helps to solve 
some problems with the system and points the way toward worthwhile reforms, a 
complete shift to a grant-and-tax model would bring with it a new set of political, 
institutional, and budgetary issues that could be worse than the disease. For this 
reason, we ultimately reject a formal transition to grant-and-tax and instead pro-
pose a hybrid paradigm in Part V. 
In Section IV.C, we compare the income-based repayment feature of student 
loans to public income share agreements (ISAs), in which the financing of educa-
tion is undertaken in exchange for a fixed percentage of the borrower’s income 
over a minimum amount for a fixed number of years. Public ISAs would work 
similarly to a grant-and-tax system but with total repayment unmoored from the 
amount of financing provided, which can create its own set of problems. 
A. GRANT-AND-TAX COMPARED TO TRADITIONAL TAXES 
A central part of our argument is that an income-based payment to the govern-
ment in exchange for receiving a share of public goods is conceptually similar to 
paying an income tax to fund the activities of government. But there are nonethe-
less some important differences between this grant-and-tax model and traditional 
income taxes. We discuss two in particular. 
First, the federal income tax applies, essentially, to all citizens and residents of 
the United States, whereas the income surtax in the grant-and-tax model would 
apply only to those who receive grants to pay for higher education. This model 
would mean that two individuals with the same income from the same source 
358. Assuming we also account for the different ways interest is charged, accrued, and capitalized. 
See supra Section II.D. 
359. For an example of such proposals, see College for All and Cancel All Student Debt, supra note 
354. 
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might face different marginal income tax rates based on whether they had used 
the tuition grant or not. Although the United States has taxes that are focused 
only on particular public goods—such as the payroll tax for Social Security—or 
that apply only to particular subsets of U.S. persons—like the corporate tax or 
bank contributions to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—there are 
fewer examples of an income surtax that apply to individuals based on their activ-
ities rather than only their income. That said, the primary other example of differ-
ent rates applying to the same income based on a non-income-generating activity 
is marriage,360 so this is hardly unheard of. Nonetheless, such a policy would be a 
departure from how an income tax typically operates. 
A grant-and-tax model like this is sometimes conceptualized as a “graduate 
tax.” Some, particularly in the United Kingdom, have thus proposed taking the 
grant-and-tax model further and simply funding higher education through a uni-
form tax on college graduates in place of income-based loans.361 
See, e.g., Jessica Shepherd, Student Leaders Call for Graduate Tax to Replace Tuition Fees, 
GUARDIAN (June 10, 2009, 5:18 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2009/jun/10/nus-tuition- 
fees-graduate-tax [https://perma.cc/9WSJ-C3XG]. 
This sort of a 
model would lie somewhere between grant-and-tax and free college on the spec-
trum between fully private and fully public funding. 
Second, although monthly or annual payments would be a function of income, 
total payments over a lifetime would be capped either at an amount equal to the 
original grant (perhaps with interest) or after a certain number of years. In con-
trast, the individual income tax applies every year for life. The payroll tax for 
Social Security flips this somewhat—an annual cap but no lifetime cap362—but 
an income tax for a fixed number of years would be novel. 
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE TAX PARADIGM 
In addition to the conceptual differences discussed above, there are political 
and institutional issues that would arise from a shift to a true grant-and-tax 
model. 
1. Budget Politics 
Perhaps the biggest problem with a wholesale shift to grant-and-tax would be 
the change to budgetary procedures and appropriations. As noted above, federal 
credit programs, including the student loan program, have a budget cost only of 
the present value difference between outlays and expected receipts.363 That has 
two main advantages over traditional tax-and-spend programs. First, it means 
that the budget item is small, and often even shows positive net revenue for the 
government. Second, it matches outlays to receipts over the full life of a loan, all 
in one net budget item in the initial year of outlay. 
360. The individual income tax rates apply at different bands of income depending on whether the 
taxpayer is married or single. See I.R.C. § 1(a)–(c) (2018). Thus, two taxpayers with the same income 
from the same source could pay different amounts of tax if one is single and one is married. 
361. 
362. See 42 U.S.C. § 430 (2018). 
363. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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In contrast, a traditional tax-and-spend program will have large gross outlays 
and gross revenue numbers listed separately, making overall spending and taxing 
look larger (even though the cash flows are roughly the same as for a loan and 
repayment). Moreover, the outlay years will be front-loaded, but the revenue 
from the offsetting tax will be spread out over twenty or twenty-five years. 
Because much of the revenue will occur outside of the ten-year “budget window,” 
it would make a grant-and-tax program look much more expensive, and also like 
a money-loser, relative to student loans. The accounting for federal credit pro-
grams has its problems,364 and the Department of Education has been criticized 
for its methods of estimating costs.365 But the “net subsidy” approach arguably 
does a better job of balancing the revenue and outlay sides of the equation than 
typical tax-and-spend accounting. 
Furthermore, a grant-and-tax model could default to being an annual appropri-
ation, in contrast to the entitlement structure of the current student loan program. 
That could result in disruptive uncertainty regarding timely funding availability 
for the entire higher education sector. This would depend on the actual language 
of any bill, but if the grants end up being discretionary spending, they would be 
more at risk of political attack, given our broken budget politics. 
For these reasons, a grant-and-tax program would be significantly disadvan-
taged in the budget and political process compared to a federal credit program. 
Of course, Congress could do what it wants and could call for special budget 
treatment or for setting up a grant-and-tax model as an entitlement. But the cur-
rent program already has those features, and it may be more effective to reform 
the loan program toward our hybrid model, rather than to replace it wholesale. 
The loan program as it stands today generates around $100 billion of funding for 
higher education,366 and it is hard to imagine that an on-budget discretionary 
appropriation could approach that scale. 
2. Public Policy Discourse and Framing 
We have shown that the rhetorical frame of “debt” creates a destructive burden 
for the student loan program, including the psychological overhang of a balance- 
sheet liability for taxpayers and public discourse that treats loans either as preda-
tory lending on the one hand or financially irresponsible borrowing on the other. 
Because taxes are measured as a financial flow, rather than a stock—no one con-
ceives of future income tax payments as a liability on personal balance sheets—a 
shift to a tax model could correct some of these problems. That said, the political 
and legal consequences of labeling something a “tax” are not without cost.   
364. See, e.g., Stanton, supra note 96, at 396. 
365. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-22, FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS: EDUCATION 
NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS INCOME-DRIVEN REPAYMENT PLAN BUDGET ESTIMATES 52–53 (2016). 
366. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 27, at 2. 
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For example, taxes often carry a “punishment” valence in public discourse,367 
See, e.g., Ben Stein, Ben Stein: Raising My Taxes Is a Punishment, CBS NEWS (Sept. 19, 2010, 
10:14 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ben-stein-raising-my-taxes-is-a-punishment [https://perma. 
cc/ZK8T-D8ZQ]. 
and a student tax could be framed as punishing the inability to pay for college. 
We reject this framing normatively—with the exception of “sin” and other 
Pigouvian taxes, the tax policy question is on what basis to assign tax burdens, 
not whether the thing taxed is “good” or “bad.” But ultimately what matters is 
how the tax is actually perceived, and what behavioral effects flow from that. The 
politics and rhetoric of appearing to tax the inability to pay for school out of 
pocket could be blistering. 
In addition, we would be asking students to opt in to an additional income tax 
on top of the existing income tax, which could create its own psychological bar-
rier that might inhibit students from using the grants. How that barrier would 
compare to the psychological barrier of borrowing is an empirical question, but it 
could have important consequences. 
It is also possible that labeling the student payments as a “tax” could lead to a 
disconnection between the payment and the benefit of reduced or free tuition. 
Framing the payments as “debt” may make it clearer that a person is just deciding 
to pay tuition now or in the future. But framing the payments as a “tax” may 
make the connection between the payments and tuition less salient to students.368 
That could affect the political stability of the tax portion of the grant-and-tax pro-
gram. If the grant and tax become disconnected from each other in students’ 
minds, that may allow policymakers to tinker with one or the other, instead of 
managing them together.369 For example, Congress could end up reducing the 
grant size without adjusting the tax, or vice versa. 
A related objection is that if we are going to have a tax, it should be not a linked 
separate surtax but instead a small increase in our existing income tax, thus fall-
ing on everyone, not just those who cannot pay for college up front (or, alterna-
tively, as an additional tax on the most well-off, such as a wealth tax or higher top 
marginal income tax rate). The equity and timing issues of tax-funded free (or 
heavily subsidized) college are complicated and beyond the scope of this 
Article.370 Our project here is to redesign and reform the current system of educa-
tion finance, but other reform options are possible. If our proposal encourages 
people instead to consider free college funded out of general revenues, so be it. 
Part of our argument is that, from the standpoint of financial flows, these choices 
are all more similar than headline labels like “debt” and “tax” might imply. 
367. 
368. See Brooks et al., supra note 177, at 1257–58. 
369. See Jason S. Oh, Will Tax Reform Be Stable?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1176–78 (2017) 
(arguing that policies are more stable when linked with others because changing one requires changing 
multiple). 
370. For a partial analysis of these issues, see Brooks, supra note 33, at 268–74. 
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3. Tax Enforcement 
A wholesale shift to a grant-and-tax model would imply that the government 
could use its full tax-enforcement powers to ensure compliance. That may appear 
harsh relative to using debt. Wage withholding, for example, would leave no 
options for students to avoid payments, and nonpayment could theoretically lead 
to criminal sanctions.371 
We think that is an extreme case, however. In the typical situation, an individ-
ual would not be treated all that differently than that person is today. The vast ma-
jority of people who underpay taxes simply owe interest and penalties, just as 
those who default on loans do.372
In Fiscal Year 2018, the latest data available, there were just 1,714 criminal tax investigations 
initiated. IRS, IRS: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION: ANNUAL REPORT 2018, at 9 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-utl/2018_irs_criminal_investigation_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8PW-CQQN]. 
 The government can already garnish wages and 
tax refunds for student loans in default, so a person’s financial exposure is not 
materially different.373 
See 31 C.F.R. § 285.2 (2019) (tax return offset); id. § 285.11 (wage garnishment); How TOP 
Works, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY: BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERV., https://fiscal.treasury.gov/top/how-top- 
works.html [https://perma.cc/DLC2-XDM7] (last visited Aug. 16, 2020). 
And in many cases, unpaid taxes are treated as just another 
uncollected debt anyway.374 
See Topic No. 201 The Collection Process, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/ 
taxtopics/tc201 [https://perma.cc/DD74-3RYN] (last updated July 17, 2020). 
That said, the perception of extreme enforcement 
and the possibility of criminal sanctions under the grant-and-tax model may still 
be counterproductive. The first case of a former student being criminally prose-
cuted for avoiding the grant surtax would likely have serious negative repercus-
sions for the whole system, and the alternative of the government not using its 
full enforcement powers for fear of bad publicity could also weaken the system. 
Thus, even if the actual degree of enforcement under the grant-and-tax model 
would not be so different than that under other models, a perception of harshness 
could lead in turn to a perception of illegitimacy. 
4. Transition 
Shifting to a grant-and-tax model would also require addressing the enormous 
question of what to do with the existing $1.5 trillion in outstanding student loans— 
it is not realistic or fair to imagine that the old loans would just continue as they are 
when they are in massive need of repair. 
Transitioning old loans to a new program is possible—for example, by issuing 
grants to current borrowers equal to the value of the outstanding loans and then 
continuing forward from there. But if, as we propose, interest terms were 
changed, it could be worthwhile to recalculate the old loans as if interest had not 
been charged or were not accruing. The math is not difficult, but structuring it 
into a new program could be complicated. 
These transition issues do not go away under our preferred approach but are 
made somewhat simpler by reforming, rather than replacing, the whole program. 
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C. REJECTING OTHER MODELS: THE INCOME SHARE AGREEMENT ALTERNATIVE 
Before turning to our proposed approach to student loans, it is important to 
briefly address another reform proposal: replacing the loan model with some ver-
sion of an income share agreement, or ISA. An ISA is an agreement between a 
student and a funder. The funder pays the student’s tuition and fees in exchange 
for the student committing to pay the funder a set percentage of income (typically 
over a minimum amount) for a set number of years.375 
See Kevin Carey, New Kind of Student Loan Gains Major Support. Is There a Downside?, N.Y. 
TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/16/upshot/student-loan-debt- 
devos.html. 
Although the ISA concept has been around for some time, relatively few exam-
ples exist. Yale University provided a “Tuition Postponement Option” in the 
1970s that we would today call an ISA. It provided that students would pay 0.4% 
of their future income for each $1,000 borrowed for the lesser of thirty-five years 
or until their whole loan cohort had paid off its debt.376 The plan was offered only 
from 1971 to 1978, and in 1999, Yale canceled all the outstanding debt even 
though no class had fully paid off its debt.377 
See Bret Ladine, ’70s Debt Program Finally Ending, YALE DAILY NEWS (Mar. 27, 2001, 12:00 
AM), http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2001/03/27/70s-debt-program-finally-ending [https://perma.cc/ 
L34A-FCGX]. 
The most prominent example today is Purdue University’s “Back a Boiler” 
program, which asks students to pay a percentage of their incomes for a set num-
ber of years, with the percentage and term determined case-by-case depending on 
the student’s major and likely future income.378 
See Back a Boiler Program Overview, PURDUE U., https://www.purdue.edu/backaboiler/ 
overview/index.html [https://perma.cc/37Y9-XR7L] (last visited Aug. 16, 2020). 
There is little information on 
actual terms and examples on the program’s website and informational materials, 
though they do offer a “Comparison Tool.”379 Other ISA programs today can be 
found at missionary schools, such as Messiah College,380 
See Messiah College Announces New Financing Model to Align Cost of Education with Student 
Outcomes, MESSIAH U. (May 1, 2018), https://www.messiah.edu/news/article/264/messiah_announces_ 
new_financing_model_to_align_cost_of_education_with_student_outcomes [https://perma.cc/9S5N- 
GWBU]. 
and nondegree coding 
camps.381 
See, e.g., Financing Your Education with an Income Share Agreement, DIGITAL CRAFTS, https:// 
perma.cc/5QQH-CZUA (last visited Aug. 16, 2020). 
Existing ISA programs all have private funding, but some commentators have 
called for replacing the federal student loan program with something closer to an 
ISA system.382 
See JASON D. DELISLE, AM. ENTER. INST., STUDENT AND PARENT PERSPECTIVES ON HIGHER 
EDUCATION FINANCING: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONALLY REPRESENTATIVE SURVEY ON INCOME-SHARE 
AGREEMENTS 12 (2017), https://www.luminafoundation.org/files/resources/student-and-parent-perspectives- 
on-higher-education-financing-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4H3-4MVZ]. 
Because ISAs require repayment based on a percentage of income, 
rather than a fixed amount of principal plus accrued interest, they are inherently a 
375. 
376. See A Tax Shelter for Students: Yale’s Tuition Postponement Option, 81 YALE L.J. 1392, 1396 
(1972); Brooks, supra note 33, at 274–75; Shireman, supra note 134, at 188–90. 
377. 
378. 
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type of income-driven repayment program. Given that all private ISAs of which 
we are aware do not require repayment absent a certain minimum level of income 
in a repayment period, they also all incorporate some degree of a back-end abil-
ity-to-repay standard. Existing ISA programs typically do not, however, cap the 
total amount of payments, and if they do, the cap is not at a level that closely cor-
responds to the amount of funding (effectively the principal). The funder gains 
the upside of the student’s higher income during the repayment period. 
In an ISA, a successful student can end up paying well more than the amount 
of the original funding, even plus interest. This “upside risk,” in combination 
with degree-specific terms, is likely to create adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems that could undermine the overall program.383 For example, students are 
likely to have better private information about their future incomes than funders. 
Those who rationally anticipate higher incomes would be less likely to take ISAs, 
whereas those who rationally anticipate lower incomes would continue to take 
ISAs. Moreover, once in an ISA, a student would be more likely to underreport 
income, relative to IDR loans, particularly when approaching the end of the ISA 
term. Whether this would occur in practice is an empirical question, but it is tell-
ing that ISAs are often marketed as supplements to, rather than replacements for, 
federal loans (which have superior terms). 
* * * 
For the reasons above, we conclude that, although a grant-and-tax model is a 
better conceptual description of the student loan program than is true debt and 
would arguably improve many of the biggest problems with the program as cur-
rently designed, the political economy and budget politics of a wholesale replace-
ment of a debt paradigm with a tax paradigm would be too costly and could create 
a new set of problems to address. Likewise, the public ISA model presents its own 
set of problems of moral hazard and adverse selection because of the disconnect 
between the amount of financing received and the total amount that will be repaid. 
V. A HYBRID PARADIGM FOR EDUCATION FINANCE 
Because student loans carry features of both debt and tax, and because fully 
adopting either paradigm entails large costs, we propose instead treating student 
loans as a hybrid instrument that is still labeled as a credit program for public and 
budgetary purposes but adopting many of the institutional tools and design fea-
tures normally associated with taxation and leaving behind the most damaging 
features of debt. This new paradigm both better matches the reality of what stu-
dent loans have become and sets student loans on a path toward increased fair-
ness, simpler administration, and longer term sustainability. 
This is, by its nature, a first exploration into developing a hybrid category of 
instrument, and we hope that this Article can set an agenda for future research 
and policymaking. In large part, this shift means simply accepting the reality that 
383. See Shireman, supra note 134, at 190. 
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student loans are different—they are unlike any other government program or 
institutional arrangement. The law and institutions of student loans already differ 
substantially from those for traditional debt arrangements, so it is only a small 
step further to divorce them entirely. Student loans could still be treated as a fed-
eral credit program, and thus technically as a loan and repayment for federal 
budgeting purposes, but the structure of the cash flows, the legal obligations, and 
the enforcement mechanisms would draw much more from taxation. The end 
result would be a new category of public finance instrument, neither debt nor tax 
but a hybrid of both. 
To make this happen, we propose the following four changes to the student 
loan program: first, making income-based payments the automatic (indeed, the 
only) option; second, collecting payments through the tax withholding and return 
filing system; third, having students pay the “tax” until the original grant amount, 
adjusted for inflation, is repaid (that is, removing both market interest and loan 
forgiveness); and fourth, imposing a graduated schedule of marginal repayment 
rates. We elaborate on these proposals below. 
Along with these four specific proposals is a broader, but more diffuse, task of 
gradually dismantling the other legal and cultural appurtenances of debt. Small 
changes will be needed throughout the law to remove, for example, notions of 
default and liability. Banks and rating agencies will need to have new regulatory 
guidance on how to consider student loan payment obligations (short answer: as 
flows, like tax obligations, rather than as balance sheet liabilities). The full range 
of these changes is beyond the scope of this Article, but we hope legislators, regu-
lators, and courts will begin working toward the proper results. 
In sketching out these proposals, we adopt a loose constraint of revenue-neu-
trality, that is, we imagine a system of higher education finance that redesigns 
and reforms the current system without dramatic effects on other aspects of gov-
ernment finance. We say “loose” because, of course, this constraint is not 
required, and there are compelling reasons to support additional public subsidies 
for higher education. But, as we have noted, that is an argument beyond the scope 
of this Article—our main argument here is that dramatic improvements can be 
made in higher education finance through legal, institutional, and structural 
reforms irrespective of the level of public subsidy.384 
A. AUTOMATIC INCOME-BASED REPAYMENTS 
In the current system, borrowers default to a standard loan amortization sched-
ule and have to affirmatively opt in to an IDR option. This usually involves a 
complicated income-verification process, managed by a private loan servicer that 
lacks the right incentives to help the borrower into the best repayment plan. As a 
result, many borrowers who should be in an IDR plan are not—indeed, many 
seem to not even know that the option exists. 
384. Within our framework, additional subsidies could come from, for example, lower monthly 
repayment rates, a higher income exemption (currently set to 150% of the federal poverty level, see, e.g., 
34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(2)(i) (2019)), or the reintroduction of loan forgiveness. 
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There is little reason not to have income-based payments as the default—or, 
indeed, the only—option for student repayments. As the plans are currently 
designed, IDR dominates the standard loan repayment schedule for all borrowers. 
They pay no more, and perhaps less, under one of the IDR plans.385 Moreover, 
from the government’s standpoint, the borrowers who would pay less in IDR are 
those that probably should be paying less for equity reasons. In addition, under 
the current rules a borrower can default on the loan at most twice before becom-
ing ineligible for IDR,386 meaning that those borrowers who most need IDR are 
precisely those who are shut out of the plans. If we truly have a policy commit-
ment to IDR, there is no reason for continuing to use the old standard repayment 
schedule. Only our commitment to treating a student loan as a “loan” stops us 
from making IDR the default option. 
Our proposal would instead make income-based payments the only option, 
built into the terms of the loans from day one. If we make no other changes to the 
loan program, payments for nearly all borrowers would be either the same or less 
compared to the current program.387 We propose some further changes below that 
complicate this view, but the case for automatic income-based payments remains 
strong regardless of whatever other parameters one might choose. 
B. COLLECTION THROUGH TAX WITHHOLDING 
If the student loan payments are more akin to a tax, then the obvious way to col-
lect the payments is through the tax system, with wage withholding and tax return 
filing. This would address several problems with the current system. First, it would 
make income calculation and verification easier, and it would use current-year 
income, rather than income from the prior year. An unfortunate feature of the cur-
rent system is that a person’s payments in a given year are calculated based on the 
person’s adjusted gross income in the prior year, as reported on that year’s tax 
return.388 For borrowers with a lot of volatility in their income, this can be painful, 
for example when a high-income year is followed by a low-income year. By using 
the tax withholding system, the payments can be based instead on a decent approx-
imation of current-year income, with any corrections handled through tax return 
filing, just like we do for income tax (and also for income-based health insurance 
premiums through the Affordable Care Act marketplaces).389 
385. Under REPAYE, high-income borrowers will still pay ten percent of their discretionary 
incomes, rather than defaulting back to standard loan payments, but as discussed, that will often result in 
lower lifetime payments because of less interest accrual. See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying 
text. 
386. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(1)(ii) (2019) (defaulted loans not eligible for IDR); id. 
§ 685.211(f)(12) (loan that has been rehabilitated is not eligible for rehabilitation upon redefault). 
387. Again, the possible exception is a high-income borrower in a REPAYE-like plan. See supra 
note 385. 
388. Payments are based on adjusted gross income as reported on the borrower’s tax return, which 
usually will be filed in the year after the income is actually earned. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(1)(i) 
(2019). 
389. See I.R.C. § 36B(f) (2018) (reconciling the difference between the advanced premium- 
assistance tax credits and the actual credits based on current year income). 
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Second, using the tax system would lessen the administrative burden of making 
payments and obviate the need for a separate loan servicing system. Under the cur-
rent system, private loan servicers do not even collect payments, which are instead 
sent directly to the Department of Education, and the servicers already use IRS data 
to determine income-based payments.390
See OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, supra note 273, at 5; If Your Federal Student Loan Payments 
Are High Compared to Your Income, You May Want to Repay Your Loans Under an Income-Driven 
Repayment Plan., U.S. DEP’T EDUC.: OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/manage- 
loans/repayment/plans/income-driven [https://perma.cc/NFX4-4LLP] (last visited Aug. 17, 2020). 
 Shifting to collection through the tax sys-
tem would remove this unnecessary and antiborrower layer of administration. 
Third, using the withholding system would virtually eliminate default as a 
problem, especially combined with income-based payments being the only possi-
bility. As noted in Section III.E, this aspect of withholding has raised objections 
among borrower advocates because of a concern that a borrower would have no 
ability to voluntarily choose to miss a payment because of other financial 
demands.391 Although we acknowledge that this could be the case for a small sub-
set of borrowers, we think that the other aspects of our proposal minimize that 
risk and that the benefits greatly outweigh the costs. In particular, we further pro-
pose below the elimination of interest and the introduction of a graduated repay-
ment schedule, which should provide additional relief to low-income borrowers. 
Additional reforms, such as raising the exemption level could also be considered. 
Finally, our proposal does not eliminate self-help. Our current system of tax 
withholding allows individuals to adjust their withholding away from the 
default,392 and that would be true for these payments as well. Students who would 
owe additional amounts at tax return filing could extend filing or even choose not 
to pay. Finally, this proposal could be further modified to include some escape 
hatch relief if necessary, such as deferred payments with interest accrual. 
C. ELIMINATION OF INTEREST AND FORGIVENESS 
We propose that student loan payments be collected until the student has paid 
back the original loan amount (or until death), adjusted for inflation. Put another 
way, we would remove both forgiveness and interest rate charges. We understand 
that eliminating forgiveness may appear harsh, but these two features work to-
gether still to favor the student, particularly when coupled with the graduated rate 
schedule we propose below. 
Because the IDR system is built on top of a legacy system of guaranteed loans, 
the system includes interest charges on the debt. The rates are set by statute and 
regulation and, for 2020–2021, range from 2.75% (for undergraduate Direct 
Loans) to 5.30% (for PLUS Loans).393
Understand How Interest Is Calculated and What Fees Are Associated with Your Federal 
Student Loan., U.S. DEP’T EDUC.: OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/understand-aid/ 
types/loans/interest-rates [https://perma.cc/7PK5-NDUQ] (last visited Aug. 17, 2020). 
 These relatively high interest rates are a 
390. 
391. See supra note 340 and accompanying text. 
392. See, e.g., IRS, OMB NO. 1545-0074, FORM W-4: EMPLOYEE’S WITHHOLDING CERTIFICATE 2–3 
(2020). 
393. 
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source of revenue for the government, a source of pain for borrowers, and a 
source of mind-boggling complexity for everyone.394 A virtue of shifting away 
from a debt framework and toward a grant-and-tax framework is the opportunity 
to rethink how interest could work. 
We propose abolishing the interest charges and instead indexing the unpaid 
grant amounts to inflation, following the Australian model.395 This would lower 
the amount paid by students in real terms and make obsolete all of the compli-
cated and varied (and little-understood) interest subsidies in the various IDR 
plans. It would also alleviate the psychological costs of seeing a debt balance 
grow even while making regular payments (if, for example, the income-driven 
payments are not sufficient to cover any principal). 
Lowering the interest rate to the rate of inflation would slow the growth of the 
amount owed more than any of the existing IDR plans, which in turn would make 
it less necessary to stop the payments after a fixed number of years. Furthermore, 
indexing to inflation is equivalent to an interest-free loan, so having a long repay-
ment period is not a particular hardship because the present value of the amount 
paid will decrease as the length of the repayment period increases. Indeed, an in-
terest-free loan with a long repayment period should actually promote saving and 
wealth building beyond simply the investment in human capital. Finally, extend-
ing the repayment period allows us to use a schedule of low, graduated rates, as 
we describe below. 
Eliminating loan forgiveness implicitly solves the problem of the tax treatment 
of forgiveness,396 although that is not the motivation. To the degree that loan can-
cellation remains an option in other circumstances, such as for closed schools or 
for total and permanent disability, that forgiveness must be excluded from gross 
income for tax purposes. 
As noted above, we aim in these proposals for a primarily self-financed system, 
like the current student loan system. We think it is valuable politically for the stu-
dent loan system to be fully or almost fully self-financing—that is, to not require 
a large net subsidy from general tax revenues. Higher education is in large part a 
public good, and heavy government subsidies and investment are still good pol-
icy. Other policy instruments, such as direct student grants, investments in basic 
research, and tax subsidies for charitable giving, must remain and likely should 
increase. But the student fee portion of any cost-sharing also recognizes that there 
are large private benefits from higher education, and it is appropriate to ask col-
lege graduates—most of whom go on to be the most privileged members of our 
society—to bear some direct costs, even while still sharing and spreading risk 
among themselves. But shifting too much of that risk onto taxpayers who 
received no benefit from college could undermine higher education financing 
394. See supra Section II.D. 
395. See supra note 339. 
396. See supra Section III.D. 
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more broadly, ultimately to the detriment of those borrowers who most need 
support.397 
The current loan system is close to self-financing, partly because the high inter-
est rate payments from some borrowers subsidize those with lower, income-based 
payments and potential forgiveness. If we lower the interest rates to the rate of 
inflation, we lose that revenue and risk increasing the net subsidy. Removing can-
cellation and extending the time period for repayment makes up for some or all of 
that difference, with the additional benefit of ensuring that those with higher 
incomes in the back half of their working lives pay their fair shares. 
As a first approximation, any net subsidy would just be a result of the differ-
ence between the rate of inflation (that is, the rate at which future payments 
increase) and the present value discount rate (to discount those future payments 
back to the current period). Ignoring defaults, if those two rates are the same, 
there is zero net subsidy. The discount rate used now is just the risk-free federal 
borrowing rate, which at the time of this writing, is within 0.5% of the inflation 
rate.398
The discount rate used in calculating loan subsidy cost is the “average interest rate on 
marketable Treasury securities of similar maturity to the cash flows of the direct loan or loan guarantee 
for which the estimate is being made.” 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(E) (2018). In 2020, rates on twenty-year 
Treasuries were in the neighborhood of one percent. See Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, U.S. DEP’T 
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView. 
aspx?data=yield [https://perma.cc/ZXX5-55Z8] (last visited Aug. 17, 2020). The standard inflation 
measure (CPI-U) was at 1.6% in July 2020. See Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: CPI for All 
Urban Consumers (CPI-U), U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CUUR0000SA0L1E? 
output_view=pct_12mths [https://perma.cc/5VMD-EK3M] (last updated Aug. 17, 2020). 
 In other words, the net subsidy would be close to zero. 
Removing the interest charge also fixes the problem with REPAYE—that 
income-based payments for high-income borrowers is actually a net benefit 
because it helps them to avoid high interest charges. If there is no interest, then 
the optimal financial strategy shifts to delaying payment as long as possible, 
instead of accelerating it. (We propose graduated repayment rates below to pro-
gressively remove this benefit from high-income borrowers). 
As a final point, we should note that eliminating forgiveness also implicitly 
repeals the ten-year forgiveness for PSLF. A full examination of PSLF is beyond 
the scope of this Article, but we question whether starkly different treatment of 
borrowers based on a somewhat arbitrary definition of “public service” is justi-
fied. A low-income borrower is not less deserving of support and relief simply 
because of the tax status of the borrower’s employer, and many workers in nomi-
nally private sector jobs contribute to the public good. 
D. PROGRESSIVE, GRADUATED REPAYMENT RATES 
The current IDR system uses a flat repayment rate—ten percent of “discretion-
ary income.” Although that makes payments affordable for many borrowers (as 
shown by the low default rates for those in IDR), it can still be difficult for some 
397. That said, current targeted forms of forgiveness, such as for closed schools and total and 
permanent disability, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.213–.214 (2019), should remain, and Congress should 
consider whether additional targeted relief is justified for noncompleters and other specific cases. 
398. 
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low-income borrowers, particularly those in financial distress who are already 
missing rent and other necessary payments.399 For a system of automatic with-
holding and payment through the tax system to work well, it must be certain that 
the payments are affordable and will not be overly taxing on low-income or 
liquidity-constrained borrowers. Moreover, if we are correct that the student loan 
system has tax-like qualities and is in essence a progressive income-based pay-
ment for a public good, then it may be desirable to shift the degree of progressiv-
ity closer to that of the tax system itself. (That was in part the purpose of 
removing the monthly payment cap for REPAYE, after all—even if it was not 
effective in achieving that purpose.) 
Therefore, we propose to institute a system of progressive, graduated repay-
ment rates to replace the flat ten-percent rate. Additional modeling and access 
to nonpublic data would be necessary to develop with precise rates, and we hope 
to address this in future work, but we suspect that starting at rates more like 
one to two percent of discretionary income for low incomes, gradually working 
up to ten percent, would not greatly change the overall economics of the program, 
particularly if combined with removing the interest charge. Under the current 
IDR terms, lowering the repayment rate could backfire by increasing any negative 
amortization (though it would be partially addressed by the interest capitalization 
limits under PAYE and REPAYE). Removing interest charges (and extending the 
repayment term) should make it easier to accommodate lower rates without ex-
cessive build-up of loan balances. 
CONCLUSION 
Student loan debt is simply different. It has evolved over time to operate unlike 
any other kind of debt. The role of the federal government, the public goals of the 
program, and its use of income-contingent payments make student debt more 
closely resemble a progressive, tax-funded grant program than a typical consumer 
loan. Yet education finance remains clothed in the legal structures, financial con-
cepts, and institutions of debt. The frictions generated by the mismatch between 
the federal student loan program’s economic reality and its legal and institutional 
apparatus are the source of the most significant problems in the education finance 
system, ranging from the level of defaults, to abusive servicing, to the very idea 
that there is an imminent student debt crisis. 
Fixing education finance requires a closer match between the economic reality 
encouraged by the public policy behind federal educational finance assistance 
and the legal and institutional structure of the program. A wholesale transforma-
tion of education finance into a tax program, however, would introduce its own 
problems and complications, and student debt does retain some aspects of debt, 
in particular the varied and capped amounts of borrowing. Likewise, a shift to an 
“equity”-based education finance system through public ISAs presents its own 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
399. See Press Release, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 340; supra Section III.E. 
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The solution lies in recognizing that education finance does not neatly fit into 
existing paradigms of debt, equity, or tax. Instead, it is a hybrid that deserves its 
own category. Effectuating this hybrid system can be accomplished through a rel-
atively discrete set of targeted reforms that would make IDR the automatic 
default, ensure affordability through graduated repayment rates and the substitu-
tion of inflation adjustment for interest accrual, and eliminate servicing problems 
by shifting collection to the tax system. Eschewing the student loan program’s 
legacy “debt” framework and treating education finance as an independent finan-
cial and fiscal arrangement enable the legal and institutional changes necessary to 
ensure that federal education finance programs fulfill their policy goal of provid-
ing affordable educational finance.  
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